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1 Introduction 
It is often said that science broadens our knowledge of the Universe, while engineering brings 
these knowledge to our daily life. This document is aimed at presenting a bridge between the 
engineering standards that drive the industrial processes and the design & implementation of 
scientific installations.  
The development of new scientific installations has always been a challenging task, as usually 
implies exploring technologies beyond the limit of the actual knowledge. However, it is not only 
from a technological point of view that the scientific installations are so demanding, they are also 
huge projects that need an efficient managerial structure, and should be reliable from the point of 
view of their design, implementation and operation to accomplish their scientific goals. 
On the other hand, the engineering of industrial processes has undergone in the last quarter of 
past century up to present time an evolution of the techniques aimed at providing the most 
reliable products with the highest efficiency in their development. 
On top of that, there is an area which usually deals with both topics, scientific installations and 
efficient industrial processes: the aerospace sector. Involving three types of different actors: The 
national -or international- agencies, the scientific committees/institutions and the industry, they are 
obliged to define rules for the proper definition, implementation, validation of the products as 
well as the efficient management and coordination of the associated projects to produce them. 
This work is aimed at presenting the experience gathered in two different scientific projects, the 
European Space Agency’s PLANCK mission, and the Cherenkov Telescope Array – CTA. The 
activities carried out in different areas plus the methodologies applied, led to the idea of defining a 
general Product Assurance procedure which could be applied to any scientific installation. 
The goal behind this procedure is to exploit the benefits of the consolidated techniques used 
throughout the engineering processes in the industry applied to the scientific installations. 
1.1 Context 
Scientific research is immersed, as almost everything in the world, in a globalization process. The 
attempt to reach further and further in the nature of the elementary particles, the structure of the 
Universe, the planetary exploration, etc. demands the development of challenging scientific 
installations which are more complex, expensive and bigger each time.  
The design and implementation of such installations cannot be assumed by a single research 
institution or even a single country. The magnitude of the effort and cost needed to build them 
exceeds what can be assumed individually, so the only way to bring them into reality is their 
internationalization, i.e. the collaboration of several institutions from countries worldwide. 
On the other hand, the scientific requirements which shall be accomplished for the installation to 
provide the desired performances are so demanding that there shall be an excellent collaboration 
between the scientific and engineering teams to succeed in their construction. This implies, in 
many cases, that scientific teams are involved in engineering tasks and vice-versa. 
 Introduction 
 
 
Page 10 
The scenario presented above for a so-called Large Scientific Installation (LSI) by the previous 
paragraphs hence faces several problems which shall be properly addressed, among which is 
worth to mention: 
— The definition of the appropriate managerial structure to ensure the correct governance 
of the project during the entire lifetime: concept, design, implementation, operations and 
disposal. 
— The definition of the appropriate procedures and plans by the aforementioned 
managerial structure for the different working groups to devote their activity according to 
them. 
— The definition of internal and/or external auditing teams in charge of verifying the correct 
application of those procedures and plans in the final products. 
This schematic description of how the biggest scientific installations are made is obviously too 
simplistic. Actually, it is not the goal of this introduction to deeply analyse the different types of 
problems which could face a Large Scientific Installation, but to define to context to which the 
work of subsequent chapters apply. 
The industrial production is driven by a set of procedures, methods and checks which compose 
the so-called Product Assurance. That methodology is not so deeply integrated in the design and 
implementation of the scientific installations, which usually define a completely new management 
policy for each project. This becomes a huge task in Large Scientific Installations when 
international consortiums defined ad-hoc manage the projects. The coordination of such 
consortiums usually has to deal with boundary conditions that impose important constraints 
completely different from the technical aspects of the project: Political issues, competition 
between team members instead of cooperation, lack of understanding between the scientific 
committee in charge of defining the project’s objectives and the technical team in charge of 
implementing it, etc. 
In the aerospace sector, this scenario already occurs, with the major advantage that there is a top 
management organization which usually drives the development of the projects. Considering the 
three types of actors involved which were defined previously, the organization in a scientific 
mission in the aerospace sector is as follows: 
— The National or International Agencies (e.g. ESA1, NASA2, CNES3, DLR4, etc.) are the 
higher managerial structure of these projects, coordinating both the scientific committees 
and the industries. 
                                                     
 
 
1
 ESA: European Space Agency (Europe) 
2
 NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (United States) 
3
 CNES: Centre Nationale des Etudes Spatiales (France) 
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— The Scientific Institutions/Committees are in charge of defining and supervising the 
scientific objectives of the mission, and co-operates with the industry in the design and 
production of the scientific payload. 
— The Aerospace Industry is mainly composed of private owned companies in charge of 
designing and developing specific elements of the mission, under the supervision of the 
National/International Agencies and in collaboration with the Scientific 
Institutions/Committees. 
Apart from the pre-defined managerial structure with the different actors involved, the aerospace 
sector has entire sets of norms, standards and procedures for almost every aspect of its activities. 
In the general industry, as explained before, the Product Assurance management is driven by 
international standards that define the minimum requirements that a single company / institution 
must comply for a pre-defined level of certification (for instance, ISO standards). 
In the aerospace sector, these international standards have been augmented to cover specific areas 
of aeronautics, navigation, manned space flights, etc. For instance, the European Coordination for 
Space Standardization (ECSS) maintains the so-called ECSS standards which are applicable to all 
ESA projects. 
In the case of a Large Scientific Installation, it is common to start from “scratch”, hence defining 
the applicable rules for Product Assurance at the same time as the managerial structures of the 
project are been consolidated. This may lead to a lack of “time to market” in the provision of the 
needed procedures & rules to the different working groups during their activities. 
At these early development stages of Large Scientific Installations, mainly in those that stem from 
an ad-hoc international consortium, the core of the manpower is mainly composed of scientists 
that deal with scientific, industrial and managerial aspects of the project. This scenario may lead to 
inefficiently tackling the provision of the predefined set of Product Assurance rules, as the 
scientists are mainly talented people with an absolute knowledge of the scientific aspects of the 
project, but not so of the industrial processes involved in its development. 
This situation is the one intended to be overcome with the proposed solution: The definition of 
an entire procedure for Product Assurance applicable to almost any Large Scientific Installation 
that allows speeding up the internal settlement of the rules that will drive its development, with a 
significant reduction of the associated effort & time needed to prepare them. 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
4
 DLR: Deutschen Zentrums für Luft- und Raumfahrt (Germany) 
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1.2 Background experience 
A new entire procedure for the management of Product Assurance is presented. It is intended to 
be flexible enough as to fit the needs of any Large Scientific Installation with very small 
modifications, as will be summarized in section 1.3 
The procedures proposed for the aforementioned disciplines is the result of joining the 
experience gathered in two different projects: ESA’s PLANCK mission and CTA, at two different 
levels: 
1.2.1 The PLANCK mission 
The European Space Agency PLANCK mission is the third medium-sized mission (M3) of the 
Horizon 2000 scientific programme. It was conceived for the detection of the anisotropies of the 
Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) radiation, remnant of the Big Bang and the major source 
of experimental data for testing cosmological models. It contains two instruments on board: 
— The High Frequency Instrument (HFI), covering the frequency range from 100 to 845 
GHz. 
— The Low Frequency Instrument (LFI), with three channels at 30, 44 and 70 GHz. 
From the point of view of the work devoted to the PLANCK mission and the experience gathered 
for the purpose of the procedures presented in the final solution, the major highlights are listed 
below: 
— PLANCK is an excellent example of a Large Scientific Installation developed in the 
frame of the aerospace sector, with its three actors clearly identified:  
 ESA being the International Agency leading the project,  
 The scientific committee being a group of Universities and Research centres led 
by Nazzareno Mandolesi, from Istituto di Astrofisica Spaziale e Fisica Cosmica 
(INAF - IASF) in Bologna (Italy) for the Low Frequency Instrument and Jean-
Loup Puget, from Institut d'Astrophysique Spatiale (IAS - CNRS) in Orsay 
(France) for the High Frequency Instrument.  
 Finally, the industries in charge of manufacturing the satellite were managed by an 
industrial consortium led by Alcatel Space Industries (France), with Astrium 
GmbH (Germany) and Alenia Spazio (Italy) as main contractors. 
— The work devoted to PLANCK was carried out at Instituto de Física de Cantabria 
(IFCA - CSIC) in Santander (Spain) and focused in: 
 The development of a physical model of the radiometers at 30 and 44 GHz of 
the Low Frequency Instrument, to obtain the equations that described their 
susceptibility to the variations in the environmental conditions of operation as a 
function of adjustable parameters [34]. 
 The development of two modules of the software for the ground calibration of 
the radiometers, Radiometer aNAlyzer (RaNA): the RaNA_Oft to characterize 
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the zero-point offsets and dark signals, and the RaNA_Susc to characterize the 
parameters of the susceptibility model previously described. 
 The further support to the LFI calibration activities [27], [28], [29], [30], [31]. 
A more detailed description of the PLANCK mission and the work devoted to it which helped in 
the preparation of the proposed solution will be provided in chapter 2.  
1.2.2  The Cherenkov Telescope Array 
The Cherenkov Telescope Array (CTA) is, by far, the most challenging project in astroparticle 
physics ever [32], [33]. CTA is aimed at constructing two observatories in the Northern and 
Southern hemispheres, with unprecedented resolution, sensitivity and dynamic range of energies 
covered. Both observatories will be composed of up to four different types of Imaging Air 
Cherenkov Telescopes (IACT’s) covering each a different range of energies. An IACT does not 
observe the night sky objects directly, but the cascade of particles disintegrations produced in the 
higher layers of the atmosphere when an incident very high energy particle (a gamma-ray photon) 
impacts on it. 
Now switching to the work devoted to CTA observatory, it is the seed of the procedures proposed 
in chapters 4 to 8. While PLANCK mission is a clear example of an aerospace LSI with a very 
well consolidated structure as per the actors identified in section 1.2.1, CTA is, on the contrary, 
an excellent example of a LSI started from “scratch” and coordinated by a newly defined 
international consortium. 
The work devoted to CTA project was done at UCM_ELEC group. UCM_ELEC is the acronym 
for Universidad Complutense de Madrid, High Frequency Electronics group 
(http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/electron/CTA/), which belongs to Departamento de 
Física Aplicada III (Electricidad y Electrónica) of Facultad de Ciencias Físicas. Among the 
different tasks carried out in CTA which served as the ultimate origin of the procedures 
proposed, it is worth remarking: 
— The contribution to the CTA Product Assurance Plans [35], [36], [37], [38], [46], [47]. 
— The contribution to the RAMS assessment in the different technical work packages [39], 
[40], [42], [43], [45]. 
— The contribution to the organization of the Product Assurance managerial structure [41], 
[44]. 
— The contribution to the review of the seismological risk assessment in the document for 
CTA-North Spanish SITE candidate proposal [22]. 
A more detailed description of the CTA observatory is provided in chapter 3, along with the 
details on the work carried out there. 
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1.3 The proposed solution 
As a result of the experience gathered in the two LSI’s presented, it was identified a clear 
drawback in LSI’s managed by an ad-hoc International Consortium compared to the ones 
managed by an existing International Agency, as in the case of the aerospace sector examples. 
This drawback was reflected in: 
— Lack of consensus to define the Project Plans, including the Product Assurance ones. As 
a result, their approval and subsequent applicability in the project suffered long delays 
which made them, once approved, basically not usable (at the time they had been 
approved they were already obsolete). 
— Lack of knowledge of industrial processes. In the early stages of these ad-hoc LSI’s, the 
consortium is led by the scientific committee. There is a lack of balance between the 
know-how in science tasks compared to engineering ones. As a result, the latters are 
under-estimated. 
— Reluctance to adopt pre-existing standards. The change of paradigm that implies the 
construction of a LSI encompasses the need for a change of the way of working. Mainly 
in the design and implementation phases it is mandatory to adopt a series of rules that 
guarantee the quality of the final product. This is ensured in the industry through the 
usage of international standards. However, many scientists find them too demanding for 
the purpose of a LSI. 
From the analysis of these elements it was conceived the idea of producing a tailored set of 
procedures to ensure the proper Product Assurance in an ad-hoc LSI. This solution came from 
the study of the international standards which are widely applied in the industry, and their 
subsequent adaptation of what is more suitable for a LSI.  
The ideas behind this solution were exchanged [48] with experts in reliability from LSI’s (ITER5, 
LHC
6
) [24], [25], [26] and space projects. Their feedback was decisive in the final procedures 
presented. 
This solution is presented in the form of standalone procedures for the main branches of Product 
Assurance, one defined inside a chapter, namely: 
— Product Assurance Management, chapter 4. 
— Quality Assurance, chapter 5. 
                                                     
 
 
5
 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
6
 Large Hadron Collider 
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— Risks Management, chapter 6. 
— Dependability and Safety, chapter 7. 
— Rules for Software development, chapter 8. 
Actually, the last chapter is not a discipline of Product Assurance by itself, but taking into account 
the importance of SW developments in any Large Scientific Installation (simulation, data 
acquisition & analysis, HW control, tasks scheduling, etc.), it was worth including a dedicated 
chapter for this specific aspect of the LSI’s. 
1.4 International Standards for Product Assurance 
Among the large amount of standardization institutions and norms available, it was decided for 
the preparation of the procedures in the solution presented to stick mainly to the norms provided 
by two of the most important organizations: The International Organization for Standardization 
and the European Coordination for Space Standardization. 
The reasons for selecting them are twofold: 
— On the one hand, ISO is the most important organization in the world for 
standardization, with the most widely accepted set of norms. 
— On the other hand, the standards provided by the ECSS are applicable to all the ESA 
projects, of which the most of the expertise used to develop the proposed solution come 
from. 
Hereafter follows a brief description of both sets of standards. 
1.4.1 ISO standards 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a non-governmental organization 
based in Geneva, Switzerland, composed of national regulation institutions worldwide. 
ISO produces a set of norms grouped by categories attending the subject to which they apply, 
labelled with a specific code (ISO 9001, ISO14000). It is important to remark that ISO norms are 
recommendations, since ISO being a non-governmental organization, cannot impose to a third 
party their rules. However, ISO allows the possibility to certify a given institution, industry or 
organization according to a specific norm. For instance, the ISO 9001 certification is widely used 
as the best indicator for the proper implementation of a Quality Management System. 
The ISO standards referenced in this work are listed below: 
— ISO 9000 [3], with the fundamentals for Quality Assurance. 
— ISO 10006 [4], with the guidelines for Quality Assurance Management. 
— ISO 17666 [8], with the recommendations for the proper Risks Management applied to 
space projects. 
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1.4.2 ECSS standards 
The European Coordination for Space Standardization (ECSS) is an organization which works in 
the definition of a set of standards to be met by any company/institution involved in the Space 
sector in Europe. It was created in 1993 as an effort by ESA, national space agencies and industry 
for the harmonization the Product Assurance requirements.  
The ECSS standards have been adopted by ESA so any contractor of this organization shall 
adhere to them. 
ECSS rules are grouped into three branches attending the specific field to which they apply: 
—  ECSS-M-xx: Branch of rules applicable to Space Project Management. 
—  ECSS-Q-xx: Branch of rules applicable to Space Product Assurance. 
—  ECSS-E-xx: Branch of rules applicable to Space Engineering. 
As in the case of ISO standards, inside a given branch there are many different documents, each 
labelled with a unique code, that group the set of rules applicable to a specific field (ECSS-E-ST-
40, ECSS-Q-ST-20, ECSS-M-ST-80, etc.). 
ECSS standards became the most important source of references for the procedures in the last 
chapters, namely the following: 
— ECSS-P-001B [1], with the glossary of terms and definitions that serve to uniquely define 
the different concepts used. 
— ECSS-S-ST-00C [2], which contains the overall description of the ECSS standards as well 
as the tailoring guidelines. 
— ECSS-Q-ST-10C [5], with the general requirements for the Product Assurance 
Management.  
— ECSS-Q-ST-20C [6], with the general requirements for Quality Assurance and ECSS-Q-
ST-10-04C [7], with the Critical Items Control. 
— ECSS-M-ST-80C [9], containing the rules for the proper Risk Assessment. 
— ECSS-E-ST-40C [14] and ECSS-Q-ST-80C [15] with the engineering and quality 
assurance rules for software developments, respectively. 
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2 Software Product Assurance in ESA’s PLANCK 
mission: RaNA calibration software 
2.1 Overview of PLANCK 
2.1.1 High level description of PLANCK 
PLANCK is the third medium-sized mission (M3) of ESA’s Horizon 2000 programme, launched 
in May 2009, conceived to observe the entire sky to map the anisotropies of the Cosmic 
Microwave Background (CMB). 
 
Figure 2–1: The PLANCK mission spacecraft 
The CMB is the remnant radiation, almost homogeneous throughout the sky, with a black body-
like thermal emission spectrum corresponding to a temperature of 2.73 K that fills the Universe. 
It is the most distant radiation that can be observed, as indeed it corresponds to the first photons 
able to propagate on a transparent medium right after the cosmological recombination. According 
to the Big Bang theory, when the Universe was 3.8 x 10
5
 years old, the temperature descended 
below 3000 K approximately, allowing the protons and electrons to recombine producing the first 
hydrogen atoms, and the Universe became transparent to electromagnetic radiation (prior to this 
recombination, the scattering processes made it opaque). The study of the anisotropies of the 
CMB is the most valuable empirical test of cosmological models. The reason is straightforward: 
the anisotropies indicate the distribution of matter in the ancient Universe. 
The CMB was theoretically postulated by R. Alpher and R. Herman in 1948, and observed for 
the first time in 1964 by A. Penzias and R. Wilson by change when mapping the radio 
interference spectrum. 
The first anisotropies in the CMB were detected by the COBE satellite, led by G. Smoot, in 1992. 
PLANCK was at that time conceived as the second generation of CMB observers and was named 
COBRAS/SAMBA, but renamed to PLANCK in 1996 when the mission was approved by ESA. 
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Figure 2–2: The five lagrangian equilibrium points of Sun-Earth 
system showing a spacecraft  in a Lissajous orbit round L2 
PLANCK is located in a stable orbit around the second lagrangian point of the Sun-Earth system, 
far enough from the interferences coming from our planet (Figure 2–2). The payload on board 
PLANCK consists of two instruments: 
— The Low Frequency Instrument (LFI), with radiometers at 30, 44 and 70 GHz. 
— The High Frequency Instrument (HFI), with bolometers at 100, 143, 217, 353, 545 and 
857 GHz. 
Both instruments have their front-end at extremely low temperatures, in order to reduce the noise 
by thermal radiation: HFI Front-End Module (FEM) operates at 4 K and LFI FEM at 20 K.  
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Figure 2–3: The PLANCK focal plane showing the feed-horns of 
the HFI bolometers (inside the circular plate) and the ones of the 
LFI radiometers (surrounding the plate) 
 
2.1.2 The Low Frequency Instrument 
The LFI instrument consists in: 
— 2 radiometer chains at 30 GHz 
— 3 radiometer chains at 44 GHz 
— 6 radiometer chains at 70 GHz 
All of them are correlation differential radiometers. In the signal acquired by any radiometer, as 
the frequency increases, the highest contribution to the noise is the white noise, with a plain 
spectrum (i.e. a noise amplitude which does not vary with the frequency). However, at the lowest 
frequencies, the 1/f noise dominates, as it varies its amplitude with the inverse of the frequency. 
The boundary between the spectrum region dominated by white noise and the region dominated 
by 1/f noise is the so-called knee frequency. Figure 2–4 shows the noise spectrums of two signals, 
with: 
— The region where 1/f noise dominates (the smaller frequencies) on which the noise 
increases as the frequency decreases with a constant slope in the logarithmic plot. 
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— The region where the white noise dominates, with a constant amplitude 
— The knee frequency, obtained as the intersection between the linear regression of 1/f 
noise and white noise (green vertical line) 
 
 
 
Figure 2–4: Noise spectrums of two signals showing the location of the knee frequency 
A correlation differential radiometer uses the weighted difference between two correlated signals 
to reduce the knee frequency of the output signal obtained: 
           [Eq.1] 
 
The result of the weighted difference for the optimal value of the adjustable parameter r  in [Eq.1] 
is shown in Figure 2–5, where it is noticeable the displacement to the left of the new knee 
frequency obtained, and the reduction of the amplitude of the noise at lower frequencies. 
 
 
 
Figure 2–5: Knee frequency of the weighted difference of the previous 
signals 
All of PLANCK LFI radiometers compute this weighted difference between two signals: 
— The input signal from the feed horn coming from the sky. 
— A reference signal, emulating a black body at 4 K, which is obtained through a reference 
horn that captures the signal of the cryogenic unit that cools the HFI at that temperature. 
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In order to obtain the best correlation between the sky and reference signals in the weighted 
difference, the radiometer splits each signal into two orthogonal components through the so called 
Ortho-Mode Transducers (OMT). Thus, four different channels are obtained at this stage (2 sky 
signal components plus 2 reference signal components). Then, a Hybrid Coupler (“magic T”) 
combines the sky and reference channels into four mixed signals. Afterwards, a series of Low 
Noise Amplifiers (LNA) augment these signals, but the key aspect is that, being the signals a 
combination of sky + reference signals in the four channels, the noise added to the sky and the 
reference signals is the same on each channel. These signals go through a series of Phase Switches 
which perform a relative phase shift of each signal with respect to the others, whereas each pair of 
signal and phase-shifted signal are combined in a second Hybrid Coupler, which due to the phase 
shift introduced between the signals, isolate again the sky and reference original signals in their 
output channels. 
As a result, the noise added to both signals in the LNA’s is highly correlated and the weighted 
difference between sky and reference signals has the 1/f noise contribution mitigated in a very 
efficient way. 
The LFI has three main components: 
— The Front-End Module (FEM), located in the focal plane and connected to the feed-horn 
that acquires the sky signal and the reference horn that acquires the 4 K reference signal. 
This unit contains all the elements of the differential radiometer explained above (horns, 
OMT’s, 1st Hybrid Couplers, LNA’s, Phase Switches and 2nd Hybrid Couplers). 
— The Back-End Module (BEM), located beyond the thermal shields or V-grooves which 
isolate the cryogenic unit and the focal plane at 4 K and 20 K from the rest of the 
spacecraft, which operates at 300 K. The BEM amplifies again the microwave signals and 
converts them into output voltages to be sent to the Data Acquisition Electronics (DAE) 
module that will digitize them and prepare to be sent back to the ground stations. 
— The Waveguides (WG), which transport the output signals from the FEM to the BEM 
through the V-grooves, which operate with an extreme temperature gradient varying from 
20 K to 300 K in 1-2 metres. 
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Figure 2–6: Schematic modular description of LFI radiometers 
 
2.2 RaNA: The Radiometer aNAlyser SW 
2.2.1 High level description of RaNA 
RaNA (Radiometer aNAlyzer software) is a SW designed to analyse the PLANCK LFI 
Radiometer Chains Array (RCA) calibration data. RaNA consists in a Top level program, an 
interface to read the calibration FITS files created by RACHEL (RAdiometer CHains EvaLuator 
software) and several blocks, divided into RCA tuning, basic and advanced analysis modules. 
 
Figure 2–7: RaNA software logo 
The RaNA modules manager gave access to the different modules of the main program: 
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Figure 2–8: RaNA_Mods, the RaNA modules manager 
The RCA tuning modules allowed changing the operation conditions of the radiometer to find 
the optimal configuration: 
— Phase switch module was in charge of modifying the response of the Phase Switchers in 
the FEM prior to the second Hybrid Couplers to completely separate the sky and 
reference signals at the output channels of the FEM. 
— Gate 1 voltage and Gate 2, drain 2 voltage were in charge of modifying the operational 
conditions of the HEMT transistors that comprised the LNA’s to find the optimal signal 
to noise ratio. 
The basic analysis modules allowed obtaining the elementary parameters of the RCA chain, 
namely: 
— The Linearity and Gain module, in charge of characterising the linear response of the 
radiometer’s response as a function of the input signal. 
— The Noise Temperature module, in charge of computing the equivalent temperature of 
the noise added to the signals in the RCA chain. 
— The Offset module, which was in charge of determining the zero-point values of the input 
signals and the output voltages, constituting the dark signal of the RCA. 
Finally, the advanced modules were aimed at determining the advanced configuration parameters 
of the RCA chain: 
— The Noise properties module was responsible for the computation of the knee frequency 
from the weighted difference of the sky and reference signals, returning the optimal value 
of the weight r  (see [Eq.1]). 
— The Susceptibility module was on charge of finding the parameters in the equations 
which characterised the radiometer’s response to variations in the environmental 
conditions (temperatures of the different elements of the radiometers, voltages of the 
RCA amplifiers, etc.) 
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— Spectral response module was in charge of determining the fine parameters of the RCA 
response as a function of the frequency of the sky and reference signals. 
2.2.2 RaNA_Susc and RaNA_Oft modules 
RaNA_Susc and RaNA_Oft are the acronyms for RaNA susceptibility to environmental variations 
advanced analysis module and RaNA offset basic analysis module of RaNA software, respectively. 
As explained in 1.2.1, they are the modules entirely developed at Instituto de Física de Cantabria 
(IFCA), which provided the core of the background experience in the Product Assurance for 
software. 
RaNA_Oft is a basic analysis module which computes the bias output values in absence of real 
input signal which the RCA chain provided. This constitutes the so called dark signal in an 
astronomical instrument, but the way to characterize it was somehow different from a typical 
camera at the focal plane of a telescope. In a radiometer, the thermal radiation from the 
instrument itself as well as the spurious output voltages from the electronics constitutes the dark 
signal, opposite to the thermal energy of the silicon in a CCD dark signal. The offsets in voltages 
and temperatures should then be characterized jointly.  
The process of obtaining the temperature and voltage offsets was done by measuring the outputs 
of the RCA when both the sky horn and the reference signals were set to minimum by connecting 
them to the same source: a cooled (4K) black body-like source. In this scenario, sky and reference 
signals were (almost) equal, and the equivalent temperature and voltage of the output signals could 
then be characterized. 
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Figure 2–9: RaNA_Oft module 
RaNA_Susc is an advanced analysis module in charge of computing the parameters of the model 
that characterise the variations in the outputs of the RCA chain due to variations in the 
environmental conditions. The output voltage of the RCA chain is determined by a general 
function f , which is the so called physical model of the radiometer: 
                                             [Eq.2] 
 
This equation depends on the equivalent temperature of the sky and reference signals, plus many 
other physical magnitudes of the radiometer modules, namely: 
— The physical temperatures of the Front and Back end modules, T FEM , TB EM  
— The voltage bias of the Low Noise Amplifiers, V b i a s  
— The physical temperatures of the three thermal shields or V-grooves, TV - g r o o v e s  
These magnitudes in the ideal scenario remain constant with their values set for optimal 
performance of the system. However, this objective is not achievable in the real operational 
environment, reason why it is mandatory to characterize the variations in the output voltage due to 
small variations in these magnitudes. A first order perturbation method was used to obtain the 
coefficients of a linear equation that involved each variation in the magnitudes considered, and 
how they were related to the variations in the equivalent sky temperature which is the final 
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objective of the radiometers. The physical model of the radiometers is fully explained in next 
section (2.2.3), whereas the first order perturbation method to derive each of the variations is 
detailed in section 2.2.4. 
2.2.3 Physical Model of the LFI radiometers 
The different components of the LFI radiometers explained in section 2.1.2 are analysed to 
derive their physical model. Since all of them are connected sequentially, the output signal at each 
one acts as the input for the following stage. 
2.2.3.1 Feed-horn + Ortho Mode Transducer & Reference horn 
Output Power 
2.2.3.1.1 Power of the signals coming from the Sky and the Reference Load 
The signals coming from the Sky and the Reference load can be expressed in terms of their 
Equivalent Antenna temperatures through the following expressions: 
 ant
SkySky TβkP   [Eq.3] 
 
 ant
K4K4 TβkP   [Eq.4] 
 
Where 
ant
SkyT  and 
ant
K4T  are the so called Equivalent Antenna temperatures for the Sky and the 
reference load signals, respectively; k  is the Boltzmann constant; and β  the bandwidth. In order 
to ease the nomenclature, from now on both equivalent antenna temperatures will be denoted 
SkyT  and K4T . These antenna temperatures can be obtained from the thermodynamic 
temperatures using the following equations: 
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[Eq.6] 
 
2.2.3.1.2 Feed-horn + Ortho mode transducer & Reference horn Physical Model 
and Output Power.  
Once the input signals have been expressed in terms of their equivalent antenna temperatures (i.e. 
the thermodynamic temperatures), a physical model of the Feed-horn + Ortho mode transducer 
& Reference horn is needed to obtain its output power. This model considers the Feed-horn, the 
Ortho mode transducer and the Reference horn separately as low lossy mediums. The general 
description of the output power of a signal that crosses a lossy medium is: 
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   thermττinout Pe1ePP    [Eq.7] 
 
The first part of the output power, 
τ
in eP
  is the power of the input signal, attenuated due to the 
optical depth of the medium, τ , and the other contribution,   thermτ Pe1   , is the thermal 
reemission of the medium. We can now re-write the equation using the equivalent temperatures: 
   physττinout Te1eTT    [Eq.8] 
 
In our case, both the Feed-horn + Ortho mode transducer and the Reference horn are low lossy 
mediums (i.e. 1τ   ), so the attenuation factor, τe , can be approximated as: 
 
L
1
τ1e τ   [Eq.9] 
 
Where L  is the dimensionless attenuation factor of the low lossy medium and the previous 
equation can be written as: 
 
physinout T
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



  [Eq.10] 
 
Finally, this result can be applied to obtain the output power for the Feed-horn + Ortho mode 
transducer: 
 
Sky
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 is the equivalent temperature of the output 
signal; OMTFeedL   is the attenuation factor, and 
FE
physT  is the physical temperature of the system, 
equal to the physical temperature of the front end where it is placed. 
Similarly:  
 
K4
out
K4 T
~
βkP   [Eq.12] 
 
is the output power for the Reference horn system, where 
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K4 T
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

  is the 
equivalent temperature of the output signal; and K4L  the Reference horn’s attenuation factor. 
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2.2.3.2 Front End Module (FEM) Physical Model. 
In this section, the physical models of the different elements in which the FEM can be divided are 
discussed. The input signals on each channel of the FEM are named x~  and y~ , an correspond to 
the output signals of the Feed-horn + Ortho mode transducer and the Reference horn, 
respectively. In the next section the conversion from signals to powers to derive the FEM’s output 
power will be discussed. 
2.2.3.2.1 First Hybrid coupler  
The physical model of the magic ‘T’ can be expressed as follows. 
 
Where x~  and y~  are the signals coming from the Feed horn + Ortho Mode Transducer and the 
Reference horn, respectively. The average power of these signals can be expressed as 
Sky
2 T
~
βkx~  ; K4
2 T
~
βky~  , corresponding to the output power of the Feed-horn + OMT 
& Reference horn systems. 
2.2.3.2.2 Low Noise Amplifiers  
The output signals exiting the first hybrid coupler are amplified in the LNA’s, according to the 
following expressions: 
 
Where 1Fg , 2Fg  are the signal gains for each amplifier, so the power gains are  
2
1F1F gG  , 
 22F2F gG   ; 1Fn , 2Fn are the noise added to the signals. Given the average noise power for 
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each LNA: 
2
1Fn  and 
2
2Fn , equivalent noise temperatures can be defined as: 
βk
n
T
2
1F
1nF

 , 
βk
n
T
2
2F
2nF

 . 
2.2.3.2.3 Phase Switch 
In order to alternately obtain a signal from the Sky or the Reference load on each channel, a 
phase switch is introduced. So, depending on the state of this element, the output signals will be 
different: 
 
 
In this case, the output signal on channel 2 depends on the state of the phase switch. Assuming an 
ideal phase switch, there is no attenuation of the signals, and the phases for each state are: 0θ1  , 
πθ2   radians. So, the output signals at this point are: 
— Channel 1: 







1F1F n
2
y~x~
g  (for both states of the phase switch) 
— Channel 2 output depends on the state of the phase switch:  
 Phase Switch state 1: 







2F2F n
2
y~x~
g  
 Phase Switch state 2: 







2F2F n
2
x~y~
g  
2.2.3.2.4 Second Hybrid Coupler:  
The physical model of this second magic ‘T’ is the same as for the first one, but the input signals 
and hence the output ones are different. 
The output signals of the second hybrid coupler depend on the state of the phase switch, so taking 
into account that the input signals for each channel are: 
 Software Product Assurance in ESA’s PLANCK mission: RaNA calibration 
software 
 
 
Page 30 
— Channel 1: 
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The output signals for the state 1 of the phase switch are: 
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— Channel 2: 
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The output signals for the state 2 of the phase switch are: 
— Channel 1: 
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— Channel 2: 
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The output signals on each channel are equal on different states of the phase switch. So, the signal 
of the channel 1 on the state1 of the Ph. Sw. is the same as the output signal of the channel 2 on 
the state 2 of the Ph. Sw.; and the output signal of the channel 1 on the state 2 of the Ph. Sw. is 
the same as that of the channel 2 on the state 1 of the Ph. Sw. 
2.2.3.3 Front End Module Output Power.  
Depending on the state of the phase switch, different output signals for each channel of the FEM 
are produced: 
FEM Channel 1 Output Power on the state 1 of the phase switch:  
The output signal is: 
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So the average output power can be obtained as   1Channel1State1Channel1State1Channel1State ssP . Taking into 
account that the average of uncorrelated signals are null, 
0nnny~ny~nx~nx~y~x~
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*
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*  , the output power is: 
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Now, the average of the output signal powers can be expressed in terms of their equivalent 
temperatures, Sky
2 T
~
βkx~  , K4
2 T
~
βky~  , 1nF
2
1F Tβkn   and 2nF
2
2F Tβkn  ; 
and the square of the signal gains of the LNAs can be expressed as power gains, 
1F
2
1F Gg  , 
2F
2
2F Gg   and 2F1F2F1F GGgg  ; so the FEM’s Channel 1 output power on the state 1 of 
the phase switch is: 
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This output power can be expressed as: 
 1Channel
1State
1Channel
1State TβkP   [Eq.16] 
 
Where 
1Channel
1StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the signal exiting the Channel 1 of the FEM on 
the state 1 of the phase switch, which is expressed as a function of the previous magnitudes as 
follows: 
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2
T
~
T
~
G
2
1
T  [Eq.17] 
 
FEM Channel 1 Output Power on the state 2 of the phase switch  
Now, the output signal is: 
 






















 2F2F1F1F
1Channel
2State n
2
x~y~
gn
2
y~x~
g
2
1
s  [Eq.18] 
 
And   1Channel2State1Channel2State1Channel2State ssP  is its output power. Using the same hypothesis explained 
above, this output power is: 
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 
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

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



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
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
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


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

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


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2F1nF
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1F
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~
T
~
GGT
2
T
~
T
~
GT
2
T
~
T
~
G
2
βk
P  [Eq.19] 
 
This output power can be expressed as: 
 1Channel
2State
1Channel
2State TβkP   [Eq.20] 
 
Where 
1Channel
2StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the signal exiting the Channel 1 of the FEM on 
the state 1 of the phase switch. 
 
 






























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2F1nF
K4Sky
1F
1Channel
2State T
~
T
~
GGT
2
T
~
T
~
GT
2
T
~
T
~
G
2
1
T  [Eq.21] 
 
FEM Channel 2 Output Power on the state 1 of the phase switch  
In this case, the output signal on the state 1 of the phase switch of FEM’s Channel 2 is equal to 
that of the state 2 of FEM’s Channel 1, so the output power is: 
 
 









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
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
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
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
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
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K4Sky
1F
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~
T
~
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2
T
~
T
~
GT
2
T
~
T
~
G
2
βk
P  [Eq.22] 
 
Or: 
 2Channel
1State
2Channel
1State TβkP   [Eq.23] 
 
With:  
 
 
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

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





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
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







 SkyK42F1F2nF
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~
T
~
GGT
2
T
~
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~
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2
T
~
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~
G
2
1
T  [Eq.24] 
 
FEM Channel 2 Output Power on the state 2 of the phase switch  
As explained before, the output signal is equal as the one of FEM’s channel 1 on the state 1 of the 
phase switch, so the output power will be: 
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
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





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
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









 K4Sky2F1F2nF
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2F1nF
K4Sky
1F
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~
T
~
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2
T
~
T
~
GT
2
T
~
T
~
G
2
βk
P  [Eq.25] 
 
Or: 
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 2Channel
2State
2Channel
2State TβkP   [Eq.26] 
 
With:  
 
 
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




























 K4Sky2F1F2nF
K4Sky
2F1nF
K4Sky
1F
2Channel
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~
T
~
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2
T
~
T
~
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2
T
~
T
~
G
2
1
T  [Eq.27] 
 
Brief analysis of the equivalent temperatures obtained  
It is important to notice that the equivalent temperatures 
1Channel
1StateT  and 
2Channel
2StateT  are equal, and 
assuming a perfectly balanced radiometer, where both the power gains of the LNAs are equal, 
2F1F GG  , this equivalent temperature only contains information about the signal coming from 
the Sky, because the signal coming from the Reference Load is nulled. Although Planck’s 
radiometers will never be perfectly balanced, the difference between the power gains will be as 
small as possible, so 
1Channel
1StateT  will contain basically information about the signal from the Sky. 
Similarly, 
2Channel
1State
1Channel
2State TT   and in the case of a perfectly balanced radiometer, the signal of the 
Sky is nulled and only the equivalent temperature from the Reference Load remains. Finally, the 
output on each channel of the FEM informs alternately about the Sky and the Reference Load, 
taking into account that when Channel 1 “carries” the Sky signal, Channel 2 will “carry” the 
Reference Load signal and vice-versa. 
2.2.3.4 Waveguides Physical Model and Output Power 
2.2.3.4.1 Waveguides Physical Model 
The Waveguides do not transform the signals that propagate through them, so the scene is very 
similar to that described for the physical model of the Feed-horn + OMT & Reference load horn 
in 2.2.3.1.2. The only exception is that the physical temperature of the waveguides changes from 
one point to another, and there is to modify the equation described in 2.2.3.1.2 to include a 
temperature distribution along the system. As explained in 2.2.3.1.2, the equivalent temperature 
of a signal after crossing a low lossy medium was: 
 
physinout T
L
1
1
L
1
TT 





  [Eq.28] 
 
Assuming that the attenuation factor does not change with small variations of the physical 
temperature of the system, the term 
L
1
Tin   remains constant, while the reemission term, 
physT
L
1
1 





  varies with  rTT physphys

 . The waveguide temperature distribution depends 
only on one dimension that corresponds to the direction of propagation of the microwaves along 
it, as will be explained later. So, the one-dimensional restricted problem consist in finding the 
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general reemission term for a given temperature distribution along the propagation direction, 
 zTT physphys  . On the general medium sketched in Figure 2–10, there is a direction along 
which the physical temperature varies from one point to another, so each interval  δzzz,   
reemits a signal with an equivalent antenna temperature  zTreem  proportional to its physical 
temperature  zTphys . 
 
Figure 2–10: Schematic description of the thermal reemission through the waveguides 
On each differential element δz , the reemission term values    zT
L
1
1zT physreem 





 , so the 
total reemission along the system is: 
 
  
d
0
reem
TOT
reem dzzT
d
1
T  [Eq.29] 
 
The problem now is to find the temperature distribution along the waveguides. The waveguides 
are divided into several sections, each one made with different materials, so they have different 
attenuation factors and temperature distributions: 
 
Figure 2–11: Schematic diagram of LFI radiometers waveguides 
In Figure 2–11 above, the divisions between the different sections considered correspond to the 
following parts of the RCA: 
(I) Beginning of the waveguides (junction between the front-end and the electroformed 
copper section) 
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(a) Junction between the Electroformed copper – Stainless steel sections of the waveguides 
(b) V-groove #1 (coldest). 
(c) V-groove #2. 
(d) V-groove #3 (warmest). 
(II) Ending of the waveguides (junction between the stainless steel section and the back-end) 
Points (a) to (d) will have a fixed temperature equal to: 
(a) 
FE
physa TT   
(b) 
1V
phys
1grooveV
physb TTT 

 
(c) 
2V
phys
2grooveV
physc TTT 

 
(d) 
3V
phys
3grooveV
physd TTT 

 
Besides, the waveguides extreme temperatures (I) and (II) are those of the Front End, 
FE
physT , and 
the Back End, 
BE
physT . 
Considering the steady state, each section of the waveguides has its extreme points maintained at 
different temperatures, so there is a linear temperature distribution given by: 
 
  jminj
j
min
j
maxj
phys Tz
d
TT
zT 




 
  [Eq.30] 
 
Where  zT jphys  is the temperature distribution along the j-th waveguide section; z  is the distance 
measured from the coldest to the warmest point (from left to right on the figure above); 
j
minT , 
j
maxT  are the “cold” and “warm” physical temperatures of its extreme points; and 
jd its length. 
Now, the reemission term can be calculated: 
 
dzTz
d
TT
d
1
L
1
1T
jd
0
j
minj
j
min
j
max
jj
j
reem 










 






   [Eq.31] 
 
Solving the integral: 
 





 







2
TT
L
1
1T
j
min
j
max
j
j
reem  [Eq.32] 
 
So, the reemission term of a system with a linear temperature distribution along a single 
dimension is equal to the reemission term of the same system with a constant temperature equal 
to the average of its extreme temperatures, which will be named from now on as effective physical 
temperature of the j-th section of the waveguides. 
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Now, the physical model of the waveguides can be obtained as a cascade of low lossy mediums 
that are the waveguide sections with their effective physical temperature, where the output of each 
section acts as the input for the next one. So, considering an input signal with an equivalent input 
temperature inT , next subsections show how to obtain the equivalent output temperature, outT . 
Waveguide Section 1 output 
 
FE
phys
1WG1WG
in1WG
out T
L
1
1
L
T
T 







  [Eq.33] 
 
Waveguide Section 2 output 
 







 









2
TT
L
1
1
L
T
T
1V
phys
FE
phys
2WG2WG
1WG
out2WG
out  [Eq.34] 
 
It is now possible to replace the WG section 1 output, obtaining: 
 
eff
1,2eff
1,2
eff
1,2
in2WG
out T
L
1
1
L
T
T 








  [Eq.35] 
 
Where 
eff
1,2L  is the effective attenuation factor and 
eff
1,2T  the effective physical temperature for the 
combined waveguide sections 1 and 2. These two magnitudes are the attenuation factor and the 
physical temperature that a lossy medium must have to produce the same effect on the input 
signal as the waveguide sections 1 and 2 produce on the FEM’s output signal. Finally, 
eff
1,2L  and 
eff
1,2T  can be obtained from the attenuation factors and the extreme temperatures of the waveguide 
sections 1 and 2 as: 
 
2WG1WG
eff
1,2 LLL   [Eq.36] 
 
   
 1LL2
T2TTLTTL
T
2WG1WG
FE
phys
1V
phys
FE
phys2WG
1V
phys
FE
phys1WGeff
1,2


  [Eq.37] 
 
Waveguide Section 3 output 
 







 









2
TT
L
1
1
L
T
T
2V
phys
1V
phys
3WG3WG
2WG
out3WG
out  [Eq.38] 
 
Re-writing the equation in terms of the effective magnitudes: 
 Software Product Assurance in ESA’s PLANCK mission: RaNA calibration 
software 
 
 
Page 37 
 
eff
1,2,3eff
1,2,3
eff
1,2,3
in3WG
out T
L
1
1
L
T
T 








  [Eq.39] 
 
Now, 
eff
1,2,3L  and 
eff
1,2,3T  are the effective attenuation factor and physical temperature for the 
combined system Section 1 + Section 2 + Section 3 of the waveguides: 
 
3WG2WG1WG
eff
31,2, LLLL   [Eq.40] 
 
    
 1LLL2
T2TTLTTLTTL
T
3WG2WG1WG
FE
phys
2V
phys
1V
phys3WG
2V
phys
FE
phys2WG
1V
phys
FE
phys1WGeff
1,2,3


  [Eq.41] 
 
Waveguide Section 4 output 
 







 









2
TT
L
1
1
L
T
T
3V
phys
2V
phys
4WG4WG
3WG
out4WG
out  [Eq.42] 
 
Re-writing the equation in terms of the effective magnitudes: 
 
eff
1,2,3,4eff
1,2,3,4
eff
1,2,3,4
in4WG
out T
L
1
1
L
T
T 








  [Eq.43] 
 
eff
1,2,3,4L  and 
eff
1,2,3,4T  are the effective attenuation factor and physical temperature for the combined 
system Section 1 + Section 2 + Section 3 + Section 4 of the waveguides: 
 
4WG3WG2WG1WG
eff
1,2,3,4 LLLLL   [Eq.44] 
 
      
 1LLLL2
T2TTLTTLTTLTTL
T
4WG3WG2WG1WG
FE
phys
3V
phys
2V
phys4WG
3V
phys
1V
phys3WG
2V
phys
FE
phys2WG
1V
phys
FE
phys1WGeff
1,2,3,4


  [Eq.45] 
 
Waveguide Section 5 output  
Finally, the output signal exiting the last section of the waveguide is the output signal of the whole 
system: 
 







 









2
TT
L
1
1
L
T
TT
BE
phys
3V
phys
5WG5WG
4WG
out5WG
outout  [Eq.46] 
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As in the previous sections, this output equivalent temperature can be expressed in terms of an 
effective attenuation factor and an effective physical temperature. So, the physical model of the 
waveguides is that of a lossy medium as explained in 2.2.3.1.2: 
 
eff
WGeff
WG
eff
WG
in
out T
L
1
1
L
T
T 







  [Eq.47] 
 
Where 
eff
WGL  and 
eff
WGT  are the effective attenuation factor and the effective physical temperature 
of the waveguides, and can be obtained from the attenuation factors and the physical temperatures 
of each section through the following expressions: 
 
5WG4WG3WG2WG1WG
eff
WG LLLLLL   [Eq.48] 
 
       
 1LLLLL2
T2TTLTTLTTLTTLTTL
T
5WG4WG3WG2WG1WG
FE
phys
BE
phys
3V
phys4WG
BE
phys
2V
phys4WG
3V
phys
1V
phys3WG
2V
phys
FE
phys2WG
1V
phys
FE
phys1WGeff
WG


  [Eq.49] 
 
2.2.3.4.2 Waveguides Output Power 
Once the physical model of the waveguides is known, their output signals’ power is, depending on 
the input signal coming from the front end: 
 
















 effWGeff
WG
eff
WG
Channel_k
State_jWG
out T
L
1
1
L
T
βkP  [Eq.50] 
 
Where 
Channel_k
State_jT  is the equivalent temperature of the front end output signal for the k-th Channel 
on the j-th state of the phase switch, as described in [Eq.17], [Eq.21], [Eq.24] and [Eq.27]. 
2.2.3.5 Back End Module (BEM) Physical Model and Output Power. 
The Back End Module (BEM) is where the signal is transformed from a microwave signal to a 
DC voltage output. Once the input signal enters the module, it is first amplified and after 
transformed into a DC signal through square-law detectors. So, if the amplifiers of the i-th channel 
are modelled as described in 2.2.3.2.2 with a power gain iBG  and a noise temperature nBiT ; and 
the square law detectors are considered to have a constant of proportionality named a , the 
output voltage outV  for an input signal which equivalent temperature is inT  is: 
  nBiinBiout TTGβkaV   [Eq.51] 
 
So, the output voltages exiting each channel of the BEM are: 
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BEM Channel 1 Output Voltage on the state 1 of the phase switch 
 
















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WGeff
WG
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WG
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L
1
1
L
T
GβkaV  [Eq.52] 
 
Where 
1Channel
1StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the FEM described in [Eq.17]. 
BEM Channel 1 Output Voltage on the state 2 of the phase switch 
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
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L
1
1
L
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GβkaV  [Eq.53] 
 
Where 
1Channel
2StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the FEM described in [Eq.21]. 
BEM Channel 2 Output Voltage on the state 1 of the phase switch 
 

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


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L
1
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L
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GβkaV  [Eq.54] 
 
Where 
2Channel
1StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the FEM described in [Eq.24]. 
BEM Channel 2 Output Voltage on the state 2 of the phase switch 
 








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





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eff
WGeff
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2B
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L
1
1
L
T
GβkaV  [Eq.55] 
 
Where 
2Channel
2StateT  is the equivalent temperature of the FEM described in [Eq.27]. 
Brief analysis of the voltages obtained   
As explained at the end of 2.2.3.3, 
2Channel
2State
1Channel
1State TT   is the “Sky signal” because the 
contribution of Reference Load is almost nulled and 
2Channel
1State
1Channel
2State TT   is the “Reference Load 
signal”. Therefore, the output voltages 
2Channel
2State
1Channel
1State VV   will be the “Sky voltages” and 
2Channel
1State
1Channel
2State VV   the “Reference Load voltages”. 
2.2.3.6 Radiometer Output 
On each channel of the radiometer there will be two different outputs, carrying information about 
the Sky and the Reference Load signals, respectively. What is really important of these alternating 
outputs is that their main sources of noise, which are those produced by the FEM’s LNAs, are 
correlated because of the two hybrid couplers that compose and decompose the input signals, and 
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therefore by subtracting both signals an effective reduction of the 1/f noise can be made, and the 
knee frequency shifts to lower values. 
In order to optimise this 1/f reduction, the subtraction between both signals is weighted, so the 
“Reference Load voltage” (see considerations about the voltages obtained at the end of 2.2.3.5 for 
details) is multiplied by a gain modulation factor, r , and then subtracted from the “Sky voltage” 
on each channel: 
— Channel 1: 
1Channel
2State
1Channel
1State VrV   
— Channel 2: 
2Channel
1State
2Channel
2State VrV   
Radiometer output on channel 1 
 
 
[Eq.56] 
 
Radiometer output on channel 2 
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[Eq.57] 
 
2.2.4 Susceptibility equations 
2.2.4.1 Radiometer susceptibility to changes in the physical 
temperature of the Reference Load, RCA_THR 
Through the following sections the procedure to explain the different variations induced on the 
radiometer output by changes on the environmental conditions will be the same. First of all, the 
physical magnitudes that are modified by the variation will be discussed. Then, the propagation of 
these variations in the radiometer output will be analysed. 
Magnitudes that are modified by fluctuations in the physical temperature of the Reference 
Load 
— Equivalent antenna temperature of the Reference Load after the Reference horn: In this 
case, the only magnitude that is modified is the signal entering the Reference horn, K4T . 
Variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature 
The variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature are obtained using a first order 
perturbation method, so the Reference Load physical temperature can be written as a constant 
term plus a perturbation,   K40K4K4 δTTT  , and therefore the variations induced in the Sky 
temperature can be expressed as   Sky0SkySky δTTT  . Given the following identity: 
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The fluctuations in the Sky temperature, SkyδT  can then be obtained: 
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RL
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the reference load. Let 
us obtain its value: 
The numerator value is: 
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where: 
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The denominator value is: 
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where: 
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So, finally: 
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2.2.4.2 Radiometer susceptibility to changes in the physical 
temperature of the Front End, RCA_THF 
 
Magnitudes that are modified by fluctuations in the physical temperature of the Front End 
— Power Gain of the Low Noise Amplifiers: 1FG  and 2FG  are supposed to have a linear 
variation with 
FE
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— Equivalent noise temperatures of the LNAs: 1nFT  and 2nFT  are supposed to have a linear 
variation with 
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— Sky and Reference Load signals exiting the Feed horn + Ortho mode transducer & 
Reference horn system: As the reemission term defined in 2.2.3.1.2 depends on the 
physical temperature of the system, SkyT
~
 and K4T
~
 will vary with 
FE
physT . 
— Effective temperature of the waveguides: Although the effective temperature of the 
waveguides depends on 
FE
physT , its contribution to the fluctuation induced in the Sky 
temperature is negligible, compared with the rest of the terms, so its variation will not be 
included. 
Variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature 
Using the identity given by the perturbation method: 
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The fluctuations in the Sky temperature, SkyδT  are: 
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endfront-
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the FEM, which 
value is: 
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Let us replace the numerator and the denominator by their values. On the numerator: 
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[Eq.70] 
 
where: 
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On the denominator the variations are the same as those in [Eq.63], with the partial derivatives as 
per [Eq.64] and [Eq.65]. 
So, finally, the transfer function is: 
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2.2.4.3 Radiometer susceptibility to changes in the voltage bias of 
the Front End, RCA_ELE 
The LNAs of the FEM consist in two amplifying stages. Their point of operation, determined by 
the voltage biases of those stages, has a clear influence in the output signals. 
Magnitudes that are modified by fluctuations in the voltage bias of the Front End 
The voltage biases which variations are to be analysed are those of gate and drain for the two 
amplifying stages:  1gateδV ,  2gateδV ,  1drainδV  and  2drainδV . The fluctuations induced in the 
radiometer output are different, but the magnitudes that are affected are the same for all of them, 
so from now on all the analysis will be made over a general voltage bias called αV  that can 
represent any of the voltage bias defined above. 
— Power Gain of the Low Noise Amplifiers: 1FG  and 2FG  are supposed to have a linear 
variation with the voltage biases, so  
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— Equivalent noise temperatures of the LNAs: 1nFT  and 2nFT  are supposed to have a linear 
variation with 
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Variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature. 
The general expression for the variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature is: 
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Once again let us use the identity given by the perturbation method to find  
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δT : 
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So: 
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endfront-
αbiasf  is the transfer function for variations in the ‘α’ voltage bias of the FEM, where ‘α’ can be 
gate1, gate2, drain1 or drain2 and which general value is: 
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The values of the variations produced in the different magnitudes can now be replaced into this 
equation, on the numerator: 
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where: 
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On the denominator the variations are the same as those in [Eq.63], with the partial derivatives as 
per [Eq.64] and [Eq.65]. 
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And finally, the transfer function is: 
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And the variations in the equivalent Sky temperature: 
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2.2.4.4 Radiometer susceptibility to changes in the physical 
temperature of the V-Grooves, RCA_THV 
The three V-Grooves are thermal shields that allow the waveguides to change their temperature 
from that of the front-end (≈20 K) to the back-end’s one (≈300 K). According to the convention 
established in 2.2.3.4.1, the coldest V-Groove is numbered as #1, the next one as #2 and the 
warmest one as #3. 
Magnitudes that are modified by fluctuations in the physical temperature of the V-Grooves 
— Effective temperature of the waveguides: The only magnitude of the physical model of 
the radiometer that varies with the temperature of the V-Grooves is the effective 
temperature of the waveguides, as described in [Eq.49]. 
Variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature. 
Now three different variations (one for each V-Groove) are to be taken into account in the 
identity: 
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So there will be three different transfer functions: 
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Or: 
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1V
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the V-Groove #1 
(coldest) and is computed as follows: 
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where: 
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On the denominator the variations are the same as those in [Eq.63], with the partial derivatives as 
per [Eq.64] and [Eq.65]. 
So: 
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2V
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the V-Groove #2 and is 
obtained by: 
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where: 
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Finally, 
3V
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the V-Groove 
#3 (warmest), which value is given by: 
 























3V
phys
eff
WG
eff
WG
out
i
3V
phys
out
i
T
T
T
V
T
V
 [Eq.102] 
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For the derivatives in the denominator, refer to [Eq.63], [Eq.64] and [Eq.65] 
So: 
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2.2.4.5 Radiometer susceptibility to changes in the physical 
temperature of the Back End, RCA_THB 
All the previous variations have been calculated considering a generic i-th output channel of the 
BEM, because this output channel did not affect the transfer functions obtained. In this latter 
case, as the physical magnitudes of the BEM are those to be affected by the variations of their 
physical temperature, the same generic i-th channel is to be used in the calculations, so finally two 
different transfer functions (depending on the BEM’s output channel) will be obtained.  
Magnitudes that are modified by fluctuations in the physical temperature of the Back End. 
— Power Gain of the BEM Amplifiers: 1BG  and 2BG  are supposed to have a linear 
variation with 
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expressed in units of (dB·K-1), because the transfer functions are then  simplified, using 
the following expression: 
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— Constant of proportionality of the square-law detectors: a  is supposed to have a linear 
variation with 
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physT , so 
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— Effective temperature of the waveguides: Although the effective temperature of the 
waveguides depends on 
BE
physT , its contribution to the fluctuation induced in the Sky 
temperature is negligible, compared with the rest of the terms, so neither its variation, nor 
the reemission term of the waveguides will be included in the following calculations. 
Variations induced in the equivalent Sky temperature. 
Using the identity given by the perturbation method: 
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The variations induced in the equivalent temperature of the Sky signal are: 
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endback-
thermf  is the transfer function for variations in the physical temperature of the BEM, which 
value is: 
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Let us obtain the numerator: 
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where: 
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The derivatives in the denominator remain unchanged so the results in [Eq.63], [Eq.64] and 
[Eq.65] still apply. 
So the transfer function for channel 1 of the BEM is: 
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And for channel 2: 
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Depending on the channel considered, one of the two transfer functions above should be chosen. 
2.3 Lessons learnt and ideas for the final solution 
proposed 
The development of RaNA SW was a bottom up approach that involved several institutions from 
the PLANCK consortium, which each assumed the responsibility of one or more modules. 
Concerning the work devoted to this project, the Instituto de Física de Cantabria (IFCA-CSIC) led 
the development of RaNA_Susc and RaNA_Oft modules, as explained previously. 
The initial stages of the design of these modules encompassed the development of the 
susceptibility equations explained in 2.2.4 from the physical model of the radiometers presented 
in 2.2.3, as well as prototypes of the derived equations which were developed in MATLAB. 
These preliminary SW packages were developed in a very similar approach to the “three P’s 
problem” of ad-hoc simulation SW which will be detailed in section 8.1.2. Basically, they did 
neither contain a requirements specification document (apart from the on-going equations 
obtained), nor the minimum documentation available to the users; and they also were poorly 
validated, apart from source code inspections during the implementation. 
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Figure 2–12: PLACK RCA calibration equipment at LABEN. Vacuum chamber with the RCA cooled 
(left), and detail on the Data Acquisition Unit – RACHEL (right) 
 
Once the final algorithms design was agreed [34], the final implementation of the modules in IDL 
6.0 began. This implied a complete change of paradigm in the way of working for SW 
developments: From the “three P’s scenario” on the prototypes for internal use only to a new 
development scenario where the management/coordination was carried out by an external 
institution (Istituto Nazionale di Astrofisica – INAF, Milano). The benefits of this coordination 
were evident from the very beginning of this phase, as it involved: 
— The development of the modules RaNA_Susc and RaNA_Oft as a part of a higher level 
SW on which other institutions were developing other modules. 
— The exchange of information about development status, procedures followed, relevant 
implementation details, etc. in weekly teleconferences. 
— The centralized SW source code configuration management through a dedicated CVS 
server. 
— The definition of the deliverables with the chapters to be filled in by each member of the 
RaNA coordination. 
— The definition of a joint validation strategy with a common test data set which had to be 
used for the verification of each module and the validation of the entire SW. 
— The organization of two collocations to review the status of the RaNA development: 
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 At Istituto di Astrofisica Spaziale e Fisica Cosmica – INAF-IASF in Bologna, 
Italy, from 07/06/2004 to 09/06/2004, to agree the design and validation strategy, 
in a very similar approach to what is meant by a Critical Design Review (CDR) in 
the procedure for SW developments, in chapter 8. 
 At LABEN laboratories in Milano, Italy, from 06/03/2005 to 09/03/2005, to 
participate in the first tests of RaNA SW in the operational environment during 
the calibration campaign of the Qualified Models of the LFI radiometers at 30 
and 44 GHz. This step constituted the transition from System Testing to 
Operations and Maintenance stages in a V-model life cycle (although RaNA was 
not formally developed with this specific life cycle, but on an incremental model 
basis), as depicted in Figure 8–2 
The excellent results of the calibration campaign [27], [29], [30], [31] of which RaNA played a key 
role, led to the conclusions that the adoption of SW engineering rules had become a significant 
step ahead in the quality of the modules developed, and the motivation for including a dedicated 
chapter to the procedures for SW development in a Large Scientific Installation in the proposed 
solution (Chapter 8). 
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Figure 2–13: (Top) PLACK RCA in preparation on the test bench prior to be introduced in the 
vacuum chamber. (Bottom) Detail on the Back-End module and the stainless steel waveguides  
(left) and the Front-End module with the feed horn, the 4K reference connectors and the 
beginning of the electroformed copper waveguide (right) 
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3 Product Assurance in the Cherenkov Telescope 
Array (CTA) 
3.1 Overview of CTA 
3.1.1 High level description of CTA 
The Cherenkov Telescope Array is an ambitious international project aimed at the design & 
implementation of new generation of Imaging Air Cherenkov Telescopes (IACT’s) at two 
observatories –in the northern and southern hemispheres– for the study of high/medium energy 
cosmic rays to cover the full sky.  
The southern array will focus its activities in the study of high energy processes within our galaxy, 
provided that the Milky Way centre is located at southern latitudes (galactic centre activity, 
supernova remnants, pulsar wind nebulae, etc.), as well as extragalactic sources. The northern 
array will mainly devote its activities to the study of extra-galactic sources (AGN, quasars, blazars, 
etc.). 
CTA concept emerged from the significant advances in the gamma-ray astronomy in the last 
years. The new generation of IACT’s (MAGIC, HESS, VERITAS) have broadened the upper 
limits of the energies of the photons which can be detected with ground-based observatories. 
Contrarily to gamma-ray telescopes on board spacecraft’s, several IACT’s can combine their 
measurements to obtain an effective collection area much wider than the sum of the areas of their 
main mirrors. This allows the detection of very small radiation fluxes, typical of the higher energy 
photons. On the other hand, single IACT’s with very large primary mirrors can increase the 
sensibility of lower energy photons. 
Keeping both ideas in mind (many IACT’s working together for the detection of the higher 
energy photons, and large single IACT’s covering the range of the lower energies), CTA proposes 
to combine three types of telescopes to enlarge the sensitivity range in energies to the maximum 
extent. 
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Figure 3–1: Expected ratio of the threshold flux detectable as a function of the input energy of the 
photons expected for CTA, compared with the real capabilities of existing observatories 
Such a wide range of energies as that foreseen for CTA in Figure 3–1 can be achieved through the 
use of three types of telescopes, each one covering a smaller range which overlaps to produce the 
complete interval: 
— Large Size Telescopes (LST): With diameter of the primary mirror of about 24 metres, 
will cover the energy range up to tens of GeV. 
— Medium Size Telescopes (MST): Which primary mirror diameter is about 12 metres, 
will cover the range between hundreds of GeV and few TeV. 
— Small Size Telescopes (SST): Those with the smallest primary mirror (6 metres), but 
spread to a wider area to cover an effective collection surface which allows the detection 
of input photons of several TeV. 
There are several alternatives for the distribution of the three types of telescopes above in the final 
observatories in the northern and southern hemispheres. Due to the different sources expected to 
be observed at each location, the southern array will be the largest and contain more telescopes 
than the northern one. 
The final configuration of both arrays is one of the major drivers in the expected cost of CTA. 
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3.1.2 CTA organization 
CTA is led by the so called CTA Consortium, the ad hoc institution defined for the concept, 
design and implementation of this project. The definition and organization of the CTA 
Consortium was established in the Memorandum of Understanding [16]. 
The CTA Consortium defined the organization which manages the project, which is presented in  
Figure 3–2. 
 
Figure 3–2: CTA Top level organization. 
 
This top level organization defines the subsequent work packages for the different technical tasks 
of CTA, through the Product Breakdown Structure (PBS), as defined in the Project Management 
Plan [17]. This PBS has evolved with the project, as will be seen in the different phases of CTA in 
next section. Present paragraphs, on the contrary, will focus in the most remarkable elements of 
the CTA top level organization, as defined in [17]. 
Consortium Board 
Concerning all scientific matters and organisational issues, the CTA Consortium is governed by 
the Consortium Board (CB). The CB represents the ultimate internal authority in the CTA 
Consortium. It is the body through which all major decisions are endorsed.  
The  CB  is  composed  of  one  representative  from  each  institute  representing  a  Regular  
Party,  with voting  right.  CTA  Management  and  Project  /  Work  Package  Leaders  
participate  as  ex-officio members,  without  voting  right.  The  ex-officio  members  cannot  at  
the  same  time  represent  a  Party.  
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Each Associated Party may send one observer into the Board. The CB elects its chairperson (CB 
chairman) among its members, which is the representative of the CB in the remaining CTA 
governance entities. 
Resource Board 
The Resource Board (RB) of CTA oversees the work in the Pre-Construction Phase of CTA. 
The parties of the Resource Board are countries represented by ministries, governmental 
agencies, or other institutions suited for this purpose. The Resource Board consists of a 
maximum of two representatives for each country, representing all institutions of their respective 
country.  
Spokesperson 
The Spokespersons (Spokesperson and Co-Spokesperson) lead the CTA project in all scientific, 
technical, and administrative aspects of the design, construction and operation of the CTA 
observatory. The Spokesperson and Co-Spokesperson share tasks and responsibilities in mutual 
agreement. The Spokespersons report to the Resource Board and the Consortium Board.  
The Spokesperson and Co-Spokesperson are part of the CTA Management and members of the 
Project Committee. The Spokesperson chairs the general part of the meetings of the Project 
Committee.  
The election of the Spokesperson and Co-Spokesperson are organised by the CB chair. The 
terms of the Spokespersons are normally 3 years. 
Project Manager 
The Project Manager is the head of the Central Project Management (CPM). As such he is 
responsible for  the  coordination  of  the  overall  design  of  the  CTA  Observatory,  and  
controls  the  schedule, resources, and technical objectives of the project.   
Project Committee 
The Project Committee (PC) tracks progress and makes working decisions for all aspects within 
the responsibility of the CTA Management. The PC receives regular reports from the Project 
Team Leaders and Work Packages Leaders and returns advice to the teams. In particular, the 
schedule and topic of internal reviews and the composition of the review panels is decided by the 
PC.  
The PC is composed of the members of the CTA Management, and the leaders of the Project 
Teams and of the Work Packages in the science branch. The members have the right to vote. 
The chairperson(s) may invite additional non-voting participants for specific topics. Members of 
the Central Project Management team can join regularly the PC meetings as observers.  
The PC meets typically once per month.  
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3.1.3 CTA schedule 
CTA began its activities in 2006 and it is foreseen that the two observatories start to operate 
around 2018. To cope with this objective, the following schedule has been proposed [20]: 
 
Figure 3–3: Schedule for CTA development 
From the figure above, it can be identified three different phases in the CTA development [32]: 
— Design Study Phase (2007-2010). 
— Prototyping & Preparatory Phase (2010-2014). 
— Array Construction & Deployment (2014-2018). 
NOTE: The schedule in Figure 3–3 is outdated. At the time of preparing this document the 
Preparatory Phase had already been extended up to mid-2014. 
3.1.3.1 Design Study Phase 
This phase covered all the activities aimed at the mature design of the telescopes which will 
compose the CTA observatories, definition of the layouts of the observatories and small-scale 
prototyping. In order to properly focus on each of the critical parts and to effectively meet the 
goals proposed this Design Study was divided into different Work Packages. 
 Product Assurance in the Cherenkov Telescope Array (CTA) 
 
 
Page 62 
Each Work Package in the Design Study Phase was linked to a specific area so that the members 
could collaborate in those WP’s on which they have background experience sharing their 
knowledge for the sake of the efficiency. 
Work Package 
Identifier 
Name 
PHYS Astrophysics and astroparticle physics 
MC Optimisation of array layout, performance studies and analysis 
algorithms 
SITE Site evaluation and site infrastructure 
MIR Design of telescope optics and mirror 
TEL Design of telescope structure, drive and control systems 
FPI Focal Plane Instrumentation 
ELEC Readout electronics and trigger 
ATAC Atmospheric monitoring, associated science and instrument 
calibration 
OBS Observatory operation and access 
DATA Data handling, processing, management and data access 
QA Risk assessment and quality assurance 
Table 3–1: Work Packages defined in the CTA Design Study Phase 
 
The Design Study Phase concluded with the publication of an article that summarized the 
activities carried out to cope with the pre-defined objectives: The CTA Design Concepts [32]. 
3.1.3.2 Prototyping & Preparatory Phase 
Once the Design Study phase was completed, the design choices underwent a campaign to test its 
capabilities and to pave the way for the final construction of the array in the so-called Prototyping 
& Preparatory phase. This phase, on which CTA development is currently immersed, is about to 
be completed, and has evolved from the way it was conceived when it began by the end of 2010. 
This phase encompasses very different tasks: 
— Prototyping of the elements identified in the final design of the CTA array. 
— Establishment of a legal framework and governance structure for the future CTA 
observatories attending the requirements of the CTA consortium and the local authorities 
of the final places where they will be deployed. 
— Management of the funding to ensure the financial coverage during the construction of 
the arrays. 
The hierarchical structure of CTA has been modified throughout the Prototyping and 
Preparatory Phase to cope with these objectives. The responsibilities of the CTA Project Office 
increased, and new work packages were defined for the prototyping of the telescopes. 
More precisely, and according to the information in [21], the new WP’s defined for the 
Preparatory Phase were grouped into three major categories: 
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— Preparing CTA organization: This category –labelled as “A”– covers the legal, governance 
& logistical and financial work. This comprises the organization of the project, its 
management, identification of the potential funding sources from the different countries 
& institutions involved, etc. It is leaded by the Project Office as per WP A1 in Table 3–2. 
— Preparing CTA construction: The work packages of this category (labelled “B”) are those 
covering all the technical issues, such as telescope detailed design, quality assurance, risk 
assessment, site selection, etc. It is leaded by the Technical Project Coordination as per 
WP B1 in Table 3–2, which hierarchically depends on the Project Office. 
— Preparing CTA operation: Finally, this group “C” comprises the strategic work to be 
performed. It is under the responsibility of this category the continuous revision of the 
project objectives w.r.t. the scientific advances achieved during the construction of the 
observatories to ensure that the scientific goals are preserved. The tasks to define the data 
handling, analysis tools, user interfaces, etc. will also be assumed by the WP’s of this 
category. 
The list of work packages inside each category was initially defined as follows: 
Work Package 
Identifier 
Acronym Name 
GROUP A PREPARING CTA ORGANIZATION 
WP A1 MAN Management 
WP A2 LEGAL Legal framework for constructing and operating CTA 
WP A3 GOV Governance scheme for CTA 
WP A4 FINANCE Financial model for funding construction, operation and 
decommissioning of CTA 
GROUP B PREPARING CTA CONSTRUCTION 
General Work Packages 
WP B1 TPC-INT Technical Project Coordination 
WP B2 SST-SYS System engineering and integration of SST 
WP B3 MST-SYS System engineering and integration of MST 
WP B4 LST-SYS System engineering and integration of LST 
WP B5 SITE CTA site characterization 
WP B6 SDEV Planning site development and site infrastructure 
WP B7 PROC Procurement and industrial engagement in CTA 
WP B8 IRD Industrial R&D and pre-production 
“Vertical” Work Packages 
WP B9 SST-STR Design and prototyping of SST telescope structure and optics 
WP B10 SST-CAM Design and prototyping of SST camera 
WP B11 MST-STR Design and prototyping of MST telescope structure and optics 
WP B12 MST-CAM Design and prototyping of MST camera 
WP B13 LST-STR Design LST telescope structure and optics, and prototyping of 
components 
WP B14 LST-CAM Design and prototyping of LST camera 
“Horizontal” Work Packages 
WP B15 MC Simulation and optimization of instrument performance 
WP B16 TEL Telescope structures and drives – common aspects among 
Telescope types 
WP B17 MIR Mirror facets, facets support and alignment – common aspects 
among Telescope types 
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Work Package 
Identifier 
Acronym Name 
WP B18 FPI Focal plane instrumentation – common aspects among Telescope 
types 
WP B19 ELEC Electronics and triggering – common aspects among Telescope 
types 
WP B20 ATAC Atmospheric monitoring and calibration 
WP B21 ACTL Instrument control and data acquisition 
GROUP C PREPARING CTA OPERATION 
WP C1 LINK Linking with science communities towards refining and 
preparing the science goals and utilization of CTA 
WP C2 OUTR Outreach activities 
WP C3 CEIN CTA e-infrastructure 
WP C4 DAFA Data formats, archiving and analysis 
Table 3–2: Initial set of Work Packages defined in the CTA Prototyping & Preparatory Phase 
The relationships between “A”, “B” and “C” groups of work packages are shown in Figure 3–4. 
 
 
Figure 3–4: Links and connections among the WP’s defined for the Preparatory Phase 
It is important to remark that WP’s A1 (MAN – Management), and B1 (TPC-INT – Technical 
Project Coordination) comprise all the tasks related to the management of the remaining work 
packages, whereas some WP’s also depend hierarchically from other ones, being the Project 
Office the responsible for the correct management, coordination and integration among them. 
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Thus, the overall hierarchy for the WP’s for CTA Preparatory Phase can be depicted as per 
Figure 3–5. 
 
Figure 3–5: Hierarchy of WP’s in the Preparatory Phase, being the Project Office on top of the 
management responsibilities 
 
Group “B” of work packages related to the technical issues of the Preparatory Phase of CTA 
deserves a more detailed description, as its WP’s are organized in a more complex structure than 
that of the management & dependence hierarchy introduced previously. 
Table 3–2 divides the work packages of group B in three different sub-categories: 
— General work packages: Includes WP’s B1 to B8, of which B1 correspond to the overall 
management through the Technical Project Coordination, WP’s B2, B3 and B4 are 
specific management and coordination work packages for the small, medium and large 
sized telescopes, and finally WP’s B5 to B8 are work packages covering those activities 
not directly linked to the construction of the CTA observatories’ telescopes but the 
associated infrastructures instead (site characterization, deployment, procurement, R&D, 
etc). 
— “Vertical” Work Packages: The organization of the CTA observatories as composed by 
three types of telescopes spread in a different manner to cover a wide energy range (refer 
to section 3.1.1 for details) implies that there is a complete design chain per telescope 
type. 
“Vertical” work packages refer to those specific tasks of a given type of telescope. 
 Product Assurance in the Cherenkov Telescope Array (CTA) 
 
 
Page 66 
— “Horizontal” Work Packages: Following the explanation above, “Horizontal” work 
packages refer to those specific tasks of a part of the design chain of a telescope which 
apply to the three types of telescopes. 
Hereafter follows an example for a better understanding of the division above. 
Example 
Imagine that we want to produce uniforms for the students of a given school. There are three types of 
uniforms: One is designed for boys, another one for girls and the last one for practising sports, which fits to 
both boys and girls. All of these uniforms are composed of an upper cloth (polo shirt or T-shirt), a lower cloth 
(skirt, trousers or shorts) and socks (white for sports uniforms, coloured in the remaining cases). 
Our textile enterprise is famous for its overall quality and outstanding prices, which is a result of the low 
internal costs due to optimal internal organization: we organized our staff in two categories: Uniform 
designers and Cloth manufacturers. The first group (uniform designers) is in charge of defining completely a 
given type of uniform according to the available cloths. Thus, part of the staff is specialized in the uniforms for 
boys, another part in uniforms for girls, and finally the staff which designs the sports uniform. They all care 
that on the uniforms produced the sizes of each cloth are coherent one another for each age, the colours of 
shirt and socks fit well, etc., though they do not care much about how each cloth is produced. The second 
group (cloth manufacturers) receive instructions from the uniform designers about the sizes, colours and 
other specific design tips of the uniforms and produce the different types of cloths. So, our staff of cloth 
manufacturers is divided into upper body manufacturers (producing polo shirts or T-shirts), lower body 
manufacturers (producing skirts, trousers and shorts), and finally, the socks manufacturers. 
 
In the example above, the specialists of uniform designers in boys, girls and sports uniforms are 
equivalent to the vertical work packages defined within the group B above for Small, Medium and 
Large Sized Telescopes; whereas the cloth manufactures divided into upper & lower body cloths, 
and socks manufacturers are equivalent to the horizontal work packages defined previously (in 
charge of the mirrors, electronics, focal plane, structure, etc.). 
On top of that, and following the example of our textile enterprise, we not also need uniform 
designers and cloth manufacturers, we need to procure the materials, manage our staff, provide 
the furniture and services needed for their work, organize out plant, etc. This is aligned with the 
general work packages of group B. 
The naming convention for “vertical” and “horizontal” WP’s comes from the fact that a very 
useful representation of them is through a matrix on which the columns are vertical WP’s and the 
rows are horizontal WP’s. In this matrix, the overlapping regions between a row and a column 
indicate common tasks to the corresponding horizontal and vertical WP’s related. This matrix is 
presented in Figure 3–6: 
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Figure 3–6: Matrix of Horizontal and Vertical WP’s with three overlapping regions identified as 
examples: 1) Tasks related to the structure of the mirrors of SST’s; 2) Tasks related to the Monte-
Carlo simulations of the MST cameras; 3) Tasks related to the electronics of the LST cameras. 
 
Soon after this structure had been established, it was refined to include some tasks not covered by 
the initial set of work packages presented in Table 3–2. As a result, the first Work Package 
structure consolidated for the Prototyping and Preparatory Phase was the one presented in Figure 
3–7. 
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Figure 3–7: Initial Work Package structure for the Prototyping and Preparatory Phase    
 
This initial Work Breakdown Structure for the Preparatory Phase has recently evolved in order to 
improve it with the lessons learnt in the on-going development. Currently, the “Vertical” work 
packages have turned into entire sub-projects within CTA. Besides, the three initial types of 
telescopes (LST, MST and SST) have evolved to consider up to five types: LST, MST, SCT, 
SST-1M and SST-2M. SCT are the medium sized Swarzschild-Couder Telescopes, whereas two 
different branches for the development of the small sized telescopes are considered: 1M and 2M, 
which indicates the absence or presence of a secondary mirror in their design. 
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Figure 3–8: Representations of the different types of CTA telescopes, from left to right and then 
from top to bottom: SST-2M, LST, MST and SCT 
 
The current hierarchy of Work Packages at the end of the Prototyping & Preparatory Phase is 
depicted in Figure 3–10. 
 
Figure 3–9: Array of three clusters of the DRAGON solution for LST cameras 
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Figure 3–10: Current WP structure for CTA 
 
It is noticeable that the “Horizontal” and “Vertical” work packages’ approach remains, although 
not so explicitly as per the initial WP’s in Figure 3–6. Figure 3–10 shows the subprojects (blue 
boxes) as drop boxes including the different work packages that compose them, in a similar way 
as the previous “Vertical WP’s” did, being many of them identical from one subproject to another 
(the WP’s names of each type of telescope are the same), hence constituting the former 
“Horizontal” WP’s. 
The Prototyping and Preparatory phase has been extended up to fall 2014, and its closure will be 
pronounced with the publication of the final design of the CTA which allows its construction: The 
CTA Technical Design Report. In the meanwhile, preliminary versions are being released with 
the results of the design reviews for the different technical work packages, the so called 
Preliminary Technical Design Reports, which latest version is [18]. 
3.1.3.3 Array construction and Roadmap to the operational stage 
Once the preparatory phase is completed, the next stage will encompass in the construction of the 
two observatories, commissioning period for the assessment of its capabilities and transition to the 
operational life of the CTA arrays. It is foreseen that before the end of 2013 the sites for both the 
Northern and Southern observatories will be finally decided. 
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Currently, the site candidates for the construction of the Northern Observatory are: 
— Teide Observatory at Tenerife (Spain). 
— San Pedro Martir Observatory at Baja California (Mexico). 
— Likr (India). 
— Upshi (India). 
— Arizona (USA) (potential candidate). 
— Tibet (China) (potential candidate). 
On the other hand, the site candidates to host the Southern Observatory are: 
— Leoncito (Argentina) 
— San Antonio de los Cobres (Argentina) 
— HESS Observatory (Namibia) 
— Aus (Namibia) 
 
Figure 3–11: World Map with the location of the Northern (blue stars) and Southern (red stars) site 
candidates for CTA observatories. 
The site candidates must be flat areas at high altitude, free of light pollution, stable from a 
seismological point of view, and allowing a relative easy access from the nearby towns. Obviously, 
from a meteorological point of view, the atmospheric conditions are a key aspect, imposing the 
most demanding requirements in terms of cloud coverage, average wind speed, snow load, etc. 
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CTA Site Requirements description Target values 
Topographic requirements  
Land flatness (maximum difference in height) < 150m 
(< 50m is desirable in Northern site) 
Area >= 10 km2 (Southern site) 
>= 1 km2 (Northern site) 
Altitude 1500 – 3800 m above Mean Sea Level 
Seismic activity < 5 m·s-2  
Atmospheric requirements  
Cloud coverage percentage from satellite data > 70% nights good for observation 
Night Sky Background (light pollution) U > 21.55 mag·arsec-2 
B > 22.25 mag·arsec-2 
V > 21.25 mag·arsec-2 
Wind speed on observation conditions < 50 km·h-1 for 80% of observable time 
Maximum wind speed < 200 km·h-1 
Maximum snow load < DIN 1055 
Accessibility requirements  
Medical Rescue < 2 hours or below (depending on local 
regulations) 
Table 3–3: CTA Site requirements 
 
 
Figure 3–12: Computer simulation of the aspect of CTA observatory 
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3.2 Product Assurance in CTA 
The management of the Product Assurance in CTA has evolved with the managerial structure of 
the project itself. This section presents a timeline of the different phases of the CTA schedule 
achieved to current date, with the relevant tasks carried out from the point of view of Product 
Assurance. 
NOTE: It is important to remark that the concept Product Assurance is denoted Quality in CTA, 
being the remaining disciplines named as usual: Quality Assurance, Risks Management, 
Dependability and Safety. Therefore, the usage of Quality and Quality Assurance terms in CTA 
indicate two different concepts. 
3.2.1 PA in the Design Study Phase 
At the early stages of the CTA project, a dedicated work package was defined, the so called QA – 
Risk Assessment and Quality Assurance (refer to Table 3–1), aimed at preparing the Quality Plan 
for the project and the Product Assurance structure. 
The Quality Plan for CTA suffered a long period of iterations and reviews up to the approval of 
the first agreed version [35], on 08/04/2011. At least seven previous draft versions were prepared 
and rejected since December 2009 up to March 2011. 
Such a long period for the approval of the key document for the Product Assurance within CTA 
made it somehow useless, once approved, for the Design Study Phase at least. The reason is 
clear: The Design Study Phase had concluded at the end of 2010 leading to the Preparatory 
Phase. 
The document has evolved since then, mainly to adapt to the various modifications of the 
managerial structure of CTA impacting the organization of the Product Assurance hierarchy. The 
problem of the long processes for the approval of the newer versions still remains, though 
somehow mitigated, as there is not yet a consolidated procedure for the revision and approval of 
documents within CTA. Instead of this, a list of reviewers is included in the document, but not so 
the deadlines for raising comments, nor the way to discuss them with the authors. 
Quality Plan 
version 
Date Status 
v1.0 08/04/2011 First approved version with some comments to be implemented 
v1.1 07/07/2011 Second approved version 
v1.2.2 07/11/2012 Version submitted for review & approval. No more information 
provided to date 
Table 3–4: CTA Quality Plan history (excluding draft versions prior to v1.0) 
Among the contents of the Quality Plan it is worth remarking: 
— The definition of a managerial structure for Quality within CTA composed of: 
 Quality Manager (Tasks: Coordination of the quality work packages, preparation 
and update of the Quality Plan, etc.). Quality is understood as Product Assurance 
as per the NOTE in section 3.2. 
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 Quality Assurance Manager (Tasks: Identification of the Quality Assurance 
requirements, preparation and update of the Documentation Plan, etc.) 
 Quality Control Manager (Tasks: Audits) 
 Risk Assessment, Dependability and Safety (RADS) Manager (Tasks: 
Management of the Risk Assessment, Dependability and Safety disciplines of 
Product Assurance; preparation and update of the Risks Management Plan and 
RAMS Plan) 
 Local Quality Managers (Responsible for Quality tasks in the different Work 
Packages) 
— A quality program that covers  
 HW aspects 
 SW aspects 
 Documentation changes 
 Non conformances 
 Audits 
 
Figure 3–13: Quality Program defined for CTA 
 
UCM_ELEC role played for the Product Assurance in the Design Study Phase 
UCM_ELEC was involved in the preparation of the CTA Quality Plan from its very early stages: 
Initially as a part of the reviewers’ team in charge of raising amendments to the different draft 
versions; afterwards as responsible for a specific section (Quality Program for Software). In 
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parallel, a separated document with Quality Assurance rules for SW developments [36] to extend 
the ideas in the Quality Program for SW was also delivered to the consortium. 
3.2.2 PA in the Prototyping and Preparatory Phase 
3.2.2.1 First part of Preparatory Phase (2010-2012) 
When CTA development entered the Prototyping and Preparatory Phase, the work packages 
evolved from the list presented in Table 3–1 to the three levels (A, B and C) structure of Table 3–
2 as per the hierarchy of Figure 3–7. 
The first version of the Quality Plan was approved at the early stages of this Preparatory Phase 
once the iterations on their contents extended beyond the Design Study Phase. Therefore, 
although this plan was not available in the previous phase, as the new managerial structure for the 
so called Quality Management Team had been traced in the document, the drawback in its late 
approval become a benefit in this new one.  
The Quality Management Team, as explained in previous section, was divided into four work 
packages. 
 
Figure 3–14: Organization of the Quality Management Team at the beginning of the Preparatory 
Phase 
 
Quality Management (QM) work package 
Quality Management work package was led by the Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de 
Physique des Particules – IN2P3, and had the following responsibilities: 
— Managing the QMT (quality activities planning and monitoring, LQMs and auditors list),  
— Organizing  periodic  QMT  meetings  (progress  status  report:  non-conformance  status,  
report  on identified risks and their management, summary of the audit reports),  
— Developing and maintaining the Quality Plan, assisted by the QMT,  
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— Communicating and convincing  the consortium on the necessity for quality management,  
— Representing  the  QMT  during  Project  Committee  (PC)  meetings  (communicate  
PO  decisions  to quality team, collecting and reporting LQMs requests to PO),  
— Providing support for quality activities to the collaboration,  
— Coordinating the training of the LQMs on the quality manager’s recommendations.   
Quality Assurance (QA) work package 
The responsibility of the Quality Assurance work package was assigned to the AstroParticule et 
Cosmologie – APC group of Université Paris Diderot – Paris 7. This work package encompassed 
the following tasks: 
— Identifying quality requirements and developing quality tools (data base, future planning 
of the information management system tools),  
— Developing and maintaining the Documentation Plan (documentation procedure, tool, 
identification procedure, and training),  
— Checking the documents requiring quality control (management, quality or technical 
documentation and associated templates),  
— Defining and implementing the traceability system (product identification, record, 
logbook),  
— Developing and maintaining the product changes system (configuration management 
plan, traceability of versions, non-conformances, upgrades, maintenance).  
Quality Control (QC) work package 
This work package was initially assigned to Fidias Consulting, a privately owned Spanish company, 
with the following responsibilities: 
— Assisting and providing support in the definition of product specifications. 
— Providing support to LQMs as far as possible. 
— Drawing up the auditing guides (prototypes, production launch, supplier audits). 
— Holding on-site auditing when necessary. 
— Collecting field-failure data for the development of the RADS documentation. 
— Checking and auditing risk assessment for maintenance output. 
— Checking the electronic components, materials, and processes used with RADS team 
support). 
— Assisting in the identification of the product condition on delivery. 
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— Assisting in the identification of the product condition during its lifetime. 
— Creating and organizing the auditing teams. 
The lack of funding for QC, plus the long delay in the acceptance of the Product Assurance Plans 
and associated requirements postponed indefinitely the beginning of the activities of this work 
package. 
Risk Assessment, Dependability and Safety (RADS) work package 
The responsibility of this work package yielded in UCM_ELEC group, and therefore the activity 
devoted to the associated tasks in RADS comprise the most of the work that supports the 
procedures developed as well as the bulk of the experience gathered. 
As per the definition in the Quality Plan [35], the tasks assigned to RADS work package are: 
— Identifying and evaluating project risks.  
— Developing and maintaining the Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan. 
— Developing and maintaining the Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety 
Document. 
— Supporting the QC manager in the checking of the electronic components, materials, and 
processes used.  
— Defining the RADS procedures and designing the corresponding templates. 
Due to the relevance of the activity carried out for RADS in the final procedures proposed, a 
detailed summary is provided hereafter, unlike the previous work packages for which only an 
overall description is given. 
3.2.2.1.1 RADS activities: The RADS management strategy 
The first part of the work in RADS was the settlement of the managerial structure that allowed a 
proper implementation of the RADS procedures in the different technical groups of CTA. 
This comprised two main procedures: The process for Dependability and Safety (RAMS) and the 
process for Risks Management. 
RADS process for Dependability and Safety (RAMS) 
The general RAMS process in CTA was structured through the establishment of an organization 
that allowed the down flow of RAMS guidance from the high project to the lower local level and 
the corresponding feedback, thus allowing the CTA RAMS assurance. With this aim, the 
technical working groups were requested to submit Dependability (Reliability, Availability and 
Maintainability) and Safety information about their components, operation and maintenance 
procedures. The Maintainability information would contain suggested Preventive Maintenance 
Schedules. 
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RADS working group would then gather all the RAMS information from lower local level and will  
— incorporate it into the system level RAMS analysis and reports,  
— flag problem areas and  
— make the necessary modifications to ensure that the RAMS objectives are fulfilled. 
Figure 3–15 summarizes the RADS work logic defined for RAMS in the context of the CTA 
project activities. 
 
 
Figure 3–15: Overall of RADS process for Dependability and Safety (RAMS) 
 
More precisely, the descriptions of the activities in RADS work logic for RAMS are summarized 
below: 
1. RADS working group produces the RADS Plans (RAMS plan and Risks Management 
Plan) and submits them for review & acceptance, as well as the templates to fill in with the 
outputs from each procedure. 
2. Once accepted, RADS working group conducts the training sessions for the technical 
group engineers in charge of the RAMS work. 
3. The  technical groups implement the RAMS procedures and deliver their reports 
4. The RADS working group collects the reports from all the technical work packages, 
integrates them in a joint RADS report and makes it available to the CTA collaboration. 
5. Based on the RADS plans, RADS working group prepares a set of checklists in RADS 
activities to be evaluated by the Project Management. 
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6. The Project Management carries out the reviews on RADS activities and makes the 
corresponding report available to the CTA collaboration. 
RADS process for Risk Assessment 
The Risks Management policy in CTA was defined so that the relevant information was properly 
exchanged between the local groups and the overall project management. This flow of 
information allowed identifying similar situations already tackled by other groups for which the 
previous experience could be an added value to solve them. 
RADS working group would gather all the Risks management information from lower level and 
will 
— incorporate it into the system level Risks management reports 
— notify to the appropriate recipient the existence of Non-Acceptable Risks 
The overall RADS work logic defined for RAMS in Figure 3–15 was adapted to the new 
discipline or Risks Management, as depicted in Figure 3–16. 
  
 
 
Figure 3–16: Overall of RADS process for Risks Management 
 
The specific steps of the Risks Management policy deserving a detailed explanation are: 
1. RADS Working Group produces the Risks Management Plan (present document) and 
distributes it for approval. 
2. Once approved, RADS working group conducts specific training sessions for Risks 
Management. Such training is aimed at Work Package Coordinators and not at technical 
group engineers as it is done for the RAMS case. 
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3. The responsibility to conduct the Risks Management policy on each Work Package lies 
with its Work Package Coordinator. The risks identified will be assessed and reported to 
the RADS team by filling in the Risk register template, provided as a part of the Risks 
Management Plan [38]. 
Steps 4 to 6 remained unchanged from the overall work logic for RAMS, so once the complete 
information on risk assessment was collected by RADS team, the joint risk report would be 
distributed to the CTA collaboration. 
Interaction with other technical groups 
The processes defined for RAMS and Risks Management by the RADS team are essential parts 
of the RAMS Plan and Risks Management Plan under preparation. However, based on the 
experience with the Quality Plan, it was very likely that the approval of these plans became a long 
and difficult task. 
Therefore, in order to mitigate the impact of this scenario in the remaining tasks of RADS work 
package and taking into account that the processes defined involved the technical groups as key 
actors, it was designed an information campaign to create awareness in CTA consortium about the 
foreseen strategy to implement RAMS and Risks Management procedures. 
This strategy consisted of dedicated presentations with the proposed procedures at:  
— CTA “Horizontal” (FPI, ELEC) and “Vertical” (LST) work package meetings [42], [45]. 
— CTA Project Office meetings [41]. 
— Parallel Sessions and Work Package Coordination Session of CTA Consortium General 
Meetings [43], [44]. 
3.2.2.1.2 RADS activities: The RAMS Plan 
The RAMS Plan included all the procedures for the proper assessment of Dependability and 
Safety activities within CTA, alongside with their managerial aspects. Its preparation involved 
external collaborations other than the members of UCM_ELEC group, namely: 
— RAMS experts from GMV Aerospace and Defence, a privately owned Spanish company. 
— The Technical Coordinator of CTA. 
— The Project Manager of CTA. 
— The Systems Engineer of CTA at Project Office in Heidelberg, Germany. 
First steps: Roadmap to version 1.0 
The preparation of the RAMS Plan was planned so that the CTA technical and managerial 
representatives were involved from the very early stages. Two teleconferences were organized in 
summer and fall 2011 in order to: 
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— Agree a Table of Contents. 
— Define the guidelines with the aspects to be covered by each section of the agreed Table 
of Contents. 
— Assign the elaboration of each section to a different responsible, with the following 
repartition: 
 UCM_ELEC will write the managerial and organizational parts of the document 
 GMV RAMS experts will write the technical part of the document with the 
applicable RAMS procedures to each phase, templates, etc. 
— Gather “on the fly” comments about the various intermediate draft versions by the 
Technical Coordinator, Project Manager and Systems Engineer of CTA to ease the 
formal review process once the document were completed. 
As a result of this work plan, the first version of the RAMS Plan was ready for the CTA 
Consortium General Meeting in Madrid, on November 2011. This version already incorporated 
the comments received from the coordinators of the technical work packages, as it had been 
distributed two weeks in advance. 
The RAMS Plan was then “officially” presented at that meeting [46] and was then released to the 
entire CTA collaboration for its last review, after it had been reviewed by the Project Manager, the 
Technical Coordinator and the Work Packages Coordinators. 
Iterations with the Project Office 
Finally, the RAMS Plan had incorporated all the comments received and was sent to the CTA 
Project Committee at the CTA Project Office for its approval, in February 2012. 
At that time, the RAMS plan contained the process already explained in 3.2.2.1.1, plus a very 
detailed explanation of the RAMS techniques applicable to each phase of the project, along with 
their description and associated templates. 
The meeting in Heidelberg on which this document was presented, [47], implied an inflection 
point in the RAMS Plan. The Project Committee in charge of approving the document rejected it 
with two main complaints about its contents: 
— It was too complex and specific from the point of view of the techniques included. 
— The CTA technical working groups were not prepared to implement it in their 
developments, as the ECSS standards on which it was based were perhaps too strict for 
CTA. 
A major revision of the RAMS Plan was done on which all the templates and explanations about 
the techniques involved were removed. Two months later, the finally approved RAMS Plan [37] 
had significantly reduced its contents and concise description of the techniques involved, to turn 
into a generic summary of the procedures that should be applied at the different stages of a 
general development and no further information on the procedures themselves. 
 Product Assurance in the Cherenkov Telescope Array (CTA) 
 
 
Page 82 
At the time of preparing this document, some of the templates in the original RAMS Plan rejected 
had been published as separated documents, along with guidelines for the elaboration of Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [23]. 
The RAMS Plan has been updated twice since the first version approved (1.0). The last version 
(1.2, dated 10/11/2012) is yet pending to be approved. The changes introduced are aimed at 
adapting the document to the last CTA organization of Figure 3–10. 
3.2.2.1.3 RADS activities: The Risks Management Plan 
The Risks Management Plan is the second major deliverable of RADS work package. Its 
preparation began in fall 2011, few after the first iterations on the RAMS Plan finished. The 
elaboration of this plan was entirely assumed by UCM_ELEC group, which released the first 
version for review by the end of February 2012. 
Some iterations with people from the Project Office in Heidelberg, which were developing a 
similar procedure for Risks Management lead to a second version that integrated both 
contributions [38] in May 2012. 
The CTA Project Manager let UCM_ELEC know that the review and subsequent approval of this 
plan was postponed until the RAMS Plan were consolidated, in order to take benefit of the agreed 
dispositions for this last document. 
The Risks Management Plan has not yet been reviewed. 
3.2.2.1.4 RADS activities: RAMS Requirements 
As the design of the CTA progresses, three levels of requirements are being defined to be met by 
the final Observatory: 
— Level A requirements: Requirements applicable to the entire CTA. 
— Level B requirements: Requirements applicable to each Work Package of CTA. 
— Level C requirements: Lower level Technical Specifications. 
Figure 3–17 shows the three levels defined and the abstraction layer in the CTA blocks diagram 
to which they apply.  
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Figure 3–17: CTA Level A, B and C requirements and the elements to which they apply 
 
UCM_ELEC has prepared the document with the RAMS level A requirements, which latest 
version [19] has been released for review & approval. 
3.2.2.1.5 RADS activities: Support to technical groups 
In parallel to the preparation of the RAMS Plan and Risks Management Plan, UCM_ELEC 
group attended support requests from other technical groups in RADS topics, namely: 
— The preparation of the RAMS strategy for the Large Size Telescopes (LST) in the 
baseline design document for this work package of CTA at two different levels 
 [October 2011] In the first version of the LST baseline design document, [39], 
describing the overall RAMS organization and procedures in a very similar way as 
it was done for other technical groups in 3.2.2.1.1. 
 [March 2013] In the second version of the LST baseline design document, [40], 
detailing the RAMS life cycle and the applicable techniques to each phase once 
the RAMS 
— The preparation of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the cameras of 
the LST. 
— Support to the definition of the RAMS strategy for the ACTL work package for their 
contribution to the Preliminary Technical Design Report [18]. 
— Support to the Spanish site candidate group in the assessment of the seismological risks 
for the report on the CTA northern candidate proposal at Teide Observatory [22].  
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3.2.2.2 Second part of Preparatory Phase [2013-] 
The QMT structure disappeared with the new organization of the work packages of CTA (Figure 
3–10). The main changes introduced in the new organization are: 
— The transformation of the previous “Vertical” Work Packages of Figure 3–7 into real 
projects within CTA with their own managerial structure. 
— The centralization of all the managerial tasks, including Product Assurance, in the Project 
Office at Heidelberg and therefore the definition of new roles there: 
 CTA Quality Manager 
 CTA RAMS Manager 
 CTA Safety Officer 
As a result of this structure, UCM_ELEC group transferred the management tasks of the former 
RADS work package to the Project Office, but kept the responsibility of the RAMS Plan, Risks 
Management Plan and RAMS requirements documents. 
UCM_ELEC from that moment on has joined the former work package and now LST project as 
the responsible for RAMS assessment. 
3.3 Lessons learnt and ideas for the final solution 
proposed 
CTA is a Large Scientific Installation managed by an ad hoc Consortium. This fact considerably 
complicates the definition of common working practices, as compared to other LSIs managed by 
an existing Agency. The large amount of institutions, 172, and members, more than 1000, 
together with the scarce amount of financial resources under the control of the central project 
office severely complicates the decision making process, including the approval of high level 
documents.  
The lack of a procedure to review and approve the baseline documents for the development can 
make this task an endless loop with a continuous iteration of comments. As a result, key 
documents as the project plans may become too generic and subject to interpretations, whereas 
they should be concise, specific and unambiguous. Furthermore, the documents once approved 
may be already obsolete, as the context for which they were developed has evolved in the time 
elapsed between they were created and they were approved. This problem has been identified by 
the CTA management but a solution has not emerged yet.  
On the other hand, there is an unbalanced ratio between scientists and engineers at a critical 
phase of the development, with the associated unbalanced expertise in the related aspects of the 
development of CTA. This issue naturally emerges in any scientific installation and has also been 
recognised by the CTA project management, which has devoted a significant but not yet enough 
amount of time, efforts and resources to bring experts from industry, including the space sector, 
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and previous large scale installations, with the aim of exchanging know-how in training courses, 
workshops and meetings.  
The author of this thesis participated in the organisation of an international workshop on 
reliability engineering in scientific installations
7
 to mitigate this deficiency. This was the first 
initiative made in CTA to compare the methods carried out in the most relevant LSIs of the last 
years: ITER and CERN LHC with those of the Aerospace Industry (GMV, SENER).   
The RAMS in Science workshop served as a seed for the organisation of a second one
8
, held 
recently at CTA Project Office, with the participation of experts from CERN ATLAS, ICE Cube, 
MAGIC, VERITAS, HESS and Pierre Auger, as well as experts from the companies Thales 
Aerospace, which shared its knowledge in the Herschel-Planck missions, Fractal, which 
participated in GranTeCan observatory, and RAMS-CON, a pioneer company in the 
implementation of RAMS techniques in astronomical research infrastructures. 
The discussions in this workshop fully confirm the conclusions indicated in this section. 
Furthermore it became evident that the lack of availability of the information on product 
assurance techniques for Large Scientific Installations continually forces the need of starting from 
the scratch. This lack of availability has also been a major handicap for the development of this 
thesis. Despite these difficulties, CTA is considered a pioneer project concerning product 
assurance techniques: it has already developed a number of high level product assurance 
documents such as a quality plan, a RAMS plan, a risk management plan, a level A RAMS 
requirements document, a project management plan and a full product breakdown structure. The 
author of this thesis has actively participated in the first four.  
As a main conclusion, it must be pointed out that the international standards developed to define 
the Product Assurance processes for the Industry cannot be applied to CTA in a straightforward 
manner, it is necessary to develop something new. This has been one of the main motivations for 
the development of this thesis. An intermediate solution between the consolidated plans of 
Agencies-managed LSIs and the definition from scratch of the ad-hoc consortiums-managed LSIs 
is deemed necessary. 
  
                                                     
 
 
7
 RAMS in Science Workshop (http://www.ramsinscience.es/) 
8
 https://www.cta-observatory.org/indico/conferenceDisplay.py?confId=438 
 Product Assurance in the Cherenkov Telescope Array (CTA) 
 
 
Page 86 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Page 87 
4 Product Assurance management 
This chapter is the first one of the proposed solution for a generic set of procedures for Product 
Assurance in Large Scientific Installations. The structure of this chapter and the next ones has 
been set so that: 
— The first part describes the objectives of the discipline inside Product Assurance being 
analysed. 
— The second part describes the overall procedure to ensure its proper management and 
implementation in a given project/LSI. 
— Finally, the third part details the existing standards on which the procedure presented is 
based, along with the traceability matrices between the steps of the procedure and the 
requirements of the aforementioned standards.  
4.1 Objectives of Product Assurance 
Product Assurance is the discipline within a Project aimed at ensuring that the predefined 
requirements and expected quality level are met, so that the system produced is able to operate in 
a safe, available and reliable way. In order to cope with the goals behind this definition, Product 
Assurance is divided into different areas, the so-called Product Assurance Disciplines, each one 
focused on a specific aspect or the overall definition. 
These Product Assurance Disciplines, as defined in chapter 10, are shown in Figure 4–1: 
 
Figure 4–1: Product Assurance disciplines 
In a Large Scientific Installation, where the magnitude of the project is so huge, the disciplines 
above are self-contained tasks involving their own staff. This is the reason for dividing the contents 
of the procedures presented into dedicated chapters for each of the Product Assurance 
Disciplines. 
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This chapter, on the contrary, has been conceived to define the Product Assurance structure from 
a managerial point of view, omitting any technical detail. Therefore, the procedure explained in 
next sections hence includes: 
— The definition of the roles involved in Product Assurance Management and its 
organization. 
— The definition of the Product Assurance Management deliverables. 
— The definition of the monitoring and control entities within the project to check the 
correct implementation of the associated Product Assurance tasks (audits). 
 
4.2 Product Assurance Management procedure 
4.2.1 STEP 1: Define the Roles 
For the complete understanding of present procedure, it is very important to remark the different 
actors involved, as defined in chapter 10, namely: 
— The Project Manager, focal point of contact for all the managerial aspects of the project.  
— The Product Assurance Manager, focal point of contact for all aspects of Product 
Assurance. 
The first step of product assurance procedure is to properly assign the roles above with their 
responsibilities as defined in chapter 10. 
Apart from the Project Manager and the Product Assurance Manager, an internal Product 
Assurance Organization shall be defined in order to properly account for the product assurance 
tasks within the project. 
4.2.2 STEP 2: Define the Product Assurance organization 
The Project Manager and Product Assurance Manager shall define the Product Assurance 
Organization able to cope with the objectives of Product Assurance. From the point of view of 
Large Scientific Installations, on which the different aspects of the entire project are assumed by 
different institutions, such organization shall be done in a way that allows the exchange of 
information in an efficient way. It is very likely that these organizations assume entire parts of a 
design and their subsequent development, so the Product Assurance Organization shall be done 
so that there is a fluent exchange of information with the Product Assurance Manager and that the 
applicable overall Product Assurance procedure is properly implemented. 
The geographical distribution of the different institutions involved in the development of a Large 
Scientific Installation can be a significant drawback to this objective, or in other words, without a 
well consolidated product assurance procedure, the centralized product assurance vanishes. 
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The Product Assurance Organization shall be settled in a way that minimizes these boundary 
conditions. Therefore, here follows the proposed solution: 
— Divide the Product Assurance management so that there is a Product Assurance Delegate 
on each of the institutions involved. Such delegates will have the same responsibilities 
within their institutions that the Product Assurance Manager has for the entire project. 
— The Product Assurance Delegates report the activities carried out at their level in a 
regular basis through Product Assurance reports, delivered to the Product Assurance 
Manager. 
— The Product Assurance reports shall contain: 
 The status with respect to the life cycle (current phase) 
 A justification of the applicable procedures of the different Product Assurance 
disciplines for the current phase within the life cycle. 
 A summary of the results obtained after these procedures are applied (in case of 
deliverables, the appropriate reference suffices). 
The staff of the project dedicated to Product Assurance tasks is not limited to the Product 
Assurance Manager and the different Product Assurance Delegates. Based on the magnitude of 
the entire project (in the case of the Product Assurance Manager) or the part of the project 
assumed by a single institution (in the case of Product Assurance Delegates), there may be some 
additional people involved. It is responsibility of the Product Assurance Manager and Product 
Assurance Delegates to identify the needs of personnel to assist them in their tasks. The Project 
Manager –or the equivalent responsible in the institution involved in the case of Product 
Assurance Delegates– shall take the necessary means to attend these needs of personnel.  
4.2.3 STEP 3: Prepare the Product Assurance Plan 
The Product Assurance Manager shall prepare a Product Assurance Plan to contain all the 
Product Assurance activities foreseen. 
This Plan has to be approved by the Project Manager at the beginning of the project, or even be 
provided as input before for the Project Manager to properly delegate the Product Assurance 
tasks. 
The Product Assurance Plan shall contain: 
— The Product Assurance Organization. 
— The Product Assurance Procedures. 
— The specific procedures for Quality Assurance. 
— The specific procedures for Risks Management. 
— The specific procedures for Dependability. 
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— The specific procedures for Safety. 
Additionally, a chapter on specific procedures for Engineering rules and Quality Assurance in 
SW developments has also been added, although it formally it is not a discipline of Product 
Assurance, but a branch of Quality Assurance instead. 
For the preparation of this Product Assurance Plan, the corresponding parts of this document that 
cover each of the contents listed above are provided in Table 4–1: 
Product Assurance Plan contents Related section in this document 
Product Assurance Organization 4.2.2 
Product Assurance Procedure 4.2 and subsections 
Specific procedures for Quality Assurance 5.2 
Specific procedures for Risks Management 6.2 
Specific procedures for Dependability and Safety 7.2 
Specific procedure for SW developments 8.2 
Table 4–1: Product Assurance Plan contents and related sections in this document 
4.2.4 STEP 4: Define the Audits policy 
To verify the correct implementation of the Product Assurance procedure, the Product Assurance 
Manager shall conduct a series of audits to the project team on the different parts of the Product 
Assurance Plan. The audits shall be carried out on a regular basis and the results reported to the 
Project Manager.  
The objectives of the Product Assurance audits are: 
— To identify deviations to the procedures in the Product Assurance Plan and propose the 
appropriate corrective actions. 
— To gather feedback from the technical groups about the procedures in the Product 
Assurance Plan and to propose improvements. 
— To identify deficiencies in the project managerial structure and to propose the possible 
solutions. 
It is responsibility of the Product Assurance Manager to propose a calendar to carry out the 
audits, and to collect the information from the internal audits performed by the Product 
Assurance delegates when applicable. 
The results of the audits are the audit reports, containing the relevant information retrieved in a 
friendly format. The most efficient way to carry out the audits, should the Product Assurance Plan 
is prepared according to the guidelines provided in previous section 4.2.3, is to use a checklist 
template with the applicable procedures to be audited based on the steps of the different 
procedures involved. Such checklist is a table with a row for each step and four columns with 
different information: 
— Column 1: The reference to the step of the procedure in the Product Assurance Plan, 
— Column 2: The evidences presented to justify its proper implementation, and 
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— Column 3: The compliance status as a result of the evidences presented: 
 Compliant: If the step of the procedure is correctly applied. 
 Not Compliant: If the step of the procedure is not being applied. 
 Partially Compliant: If only a part of the step of the procedure is being applied 
 Not Applicable: If there is no need to apply this step of the procedure (on which 
case the appropriate justification shall be provided in Column 4) 
— Column 4: Comments by the auditing team to justify the compliance status chosen in 
Column 3; suggestions to improve the procedure being audited, etc. 
4.2.5 STEP 5: Procedure for the review & approval of relevant 
project documentation 
One key aspect in the project development is the provision of the relevant documentation in due 
date. Each document elaborated in the frame of the project shall be duly reviewed and approved 
in order to be incorporated to the baseline and become applicable from that moment onwards. 
This step of the Product Assurance procedure is aimed at defining an agile method for 
documentation review & acceptance processes that allows keeping track of all the comments 
discussed plus the dispositions agreed as a result of the discussions on these comments. Besides, 
the consolidated list of changes derived from the dispositions which are deemed necessary for the 
document to be approved is clearly defined and paves the way for its approval. 
Therefore, the procedure to be followed comprises the steps below: 
— The author submits the document for review to the Project Manager. 
— The Project Manager designates a review team, composed of these personnel of the 
project (or even external collaborators) with deep knowledge and background experience 
in the subjects covered by the document, and a schedule containing: 
 The deadline for the provision of comments by the review team. 
 The deadline for the provision of answers by the author(s) of the document. 
 The date for the meeting to discuss and dispose the comments, and agree the 
related actions to update the document. 
— A template of the so-called Document Review Sheet (DRS) is distributed to the review 
team.  
NOTE: A template of the DRS is provided in section 4.4 at the end of present chapter, 
which is used as the guideline for the fields referenced in the remaining steps. 
— Each reviewer reports his/her comments/discrepancies to the document using a copy of 
the DRS template, filling in the “Part I” of the table. 
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— The authors of the document, once the deadline for sending comments is over, collect all 
the DRS received and answer them in the “Part II” of the table.  
— The Project Manager, once the deadline for sending answers to the comments is over, 
collects all the answered DRS which are put together in a single document with a unique 
DRS code each. This document with all the DRS produced by the review team and 
answered by the authors (Part I and Part II completed) is distributed as input to the 
meeting to discuss all of them. 
— The Project Manager chairs the aforementioned meeting, on which every DRS in the 
joint document is discussed until an agreement is reached for all of them. As a result of 
the discussion, a final disposition is written in the “Part III” of the DRS table with the 
agreements reached. The final status of each DRS can be any of the following ones: 
 Closed by response (no action): The response by the authors is enough to clarify 
the comment/discrepancy => this implies that the response is accepted and no 
further action is required. 
 Closed by disposition (no action): The response did not completely answer the 
comment/discrepancy, but the subsequent discussion during the meeting was 
enough to clarify the open points => this implies that no further action is 
required. 
 Closed WITH ACTION according to response: The response contains not only 
an answer but a proposal to include in the document the needed clarifications to 
close the comment/discrepancy which is agreed by the reviewers => this implies 
that the response is accepted and the document has to be updated accordingly. 
 Closed WITH ACTION according to the disposition: The response provided, 
although it proposes to update the document, is not enough to close the 
comment as it is, and the subsequent discussion includes additional 
amendments/clarifications to be included in the document => this implies that the 
disposition includes all the changes to be done to the document and the 
document has to be updated accordingly. 
The final Minutes of Meeting includes all the DRS with their final dispositions, as well as 
the deadline to provide the updated document with the modifications agreed as a 
consequence of the DRS which final status is Closed WITH ACTION. 
— The Project Manager, upon reception of the updated document, checks the correct 
implementation of the dispositions and amends the Minutes of Meeting with the 
declaration of approval for the final document.  
Once these steps are completed, the document is approved and can be incorporated to the 
project applicable baseline. Additionally, the Minutes of Meeting contains all the relevant 
information to track the history of the document until it was approved. 
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4.2.6 STEP 6: Contribution to Project & Configuration 
Management 
Although neither Project Management nor Configuration Management is covered by this 
procedure, there are some contributions to these aspects of the general management of a project 
worth to be included as a part of the procedures for Product Assurance. 
4.2.6.1 Baseline settlement 
The Product Assurance Manager shall ensure that the applicable baseline documentation is 
properly identified. Besides, the Product Assurance Manager shall check that the documents in 
the baseline are available to the project’s staff. 
4.2.6.2 Availability of Product Assurance documentation 
Apart from the baseline documents, the Product Assurance Manager shall check that the specific 
Product Assurance documentation is available to the project’s staff: Product Assurance Plans, 
Product Assurance reports, Audit reports, Risk registers, etc. 
4.2.6.3 Non Conformances control system 
The Product Assurance Manager shall check that the non-conformances detected are properly 
stored for further monitoring and control. 
4.3 Traceability to standards 
The procedure presented is mainly based in ECSS-Q-ST-10C, [5]. Being ECSS the main 
reference, the tailoring process for ECSS standards in section 7 of [2] was followed. Thus, the 
correspondence is from the different sections of ECSS-Q-ST-10C, [5], to the corresponding 
sections of this procedure, and not the other way round. In the case of other procedures on which 
there are several baseline references not all of them being ECSS standards, like the Risks 
Management in chapter 6, the traceability matrix w.r.t. the standards is presented in the other way 
round, i.e., the traceability of each part of the procedure to the applicable standards is shown 
along with the appropriate justifications. 
ECSS-Q-ST-10C Section (s) Justification 
5.1.1.1 (a) to (d) 4.2.1, 10 (a), (b), (c): The definition of the main roles involved is done in chapter 2. 
(d): Additional details in 4.2.1 
5.1.1.2 (a) to (c) 4.2.2, 10 (a), (b), (c): 4.2.2 
(b): Part of Product Assurance Manager definition in chapter 2. 
5.1.1.3 (a) to (c) 4.2.2 (a), (b): 4.2.2 
(c): Discarded (N/A) 
5.1.2 (a) to (d) 4.2.2 (a), (b), (c), (d): 4.2.2 
5.1.3 (a) to (c) 4.2.3 (a), (b), (c): 4.2.3 
5.2.1 (a) to (l) 5, 10 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (k), (l): Included in the definition of Product 
Assurance Manager in chapter 2. 
(h), (i), (j): Qualification programme Covered by Quality Assurance 
procedure in chapter 5  
5.2.2 (a) to (c) 4.2.2 (a), (b): 4.2.2 
(c): Discarded (N/A) 
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ECSS-Q-ST-10C Section (s) Justification 
5.2.3 (a) to (d) 4.2.4 (a), (c), (d): 4.2.4 
(b): Discarded (N/A) 
5.2.4 (a) to (c) - Discarded (N/A). There is a dedicated procedure for Risks Management, 
but critical items control is not covered by present work 
5.2.5 (a) to (d) 4.2.6.1 (a): 4.2.6.1 
(b), (c), (d): Discarded (N/A) 
5.2.6 (a) 4.2.6.2 (a): 4.2.6.1 
5.2.7 (a), (b) - Discarded (N/A) 
5.2.8 (a) 4.2.6.3 (a): 4.2.6.3 
5.2.9 (a) to (d) - Management of Alerts is excluded from PA management, the appropriate 
treatment of failures, not acceptable risks and hazards are addressed in 
their respective sections. 
Table 4–2: Traceability of Risks management procedure to ISO and ECSS standards 
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4.4 Document Review Sheet template 
Document Review Sheet 
 
DRS code  
Date   
 
Document information 
Title Code Version Date 
    
 
PART-I: Comment / Discrepancy (to be filled in by the reviewer) 
Originator (Name / Institution) Version 
Chapter / Section / Paragraph  Page(s)  
Description of the comment / discrepancy to the document 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART-II: Response (to be filled in by the author) 
Responder (Name / Institution) Version 
Response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART-III: Disposition (summary of the agreed conclusions and derived actions, if any) 
Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
Final status 
 Closed by response (no action) 
 Closed by discussion (no action) 
 Closed WITH ACTION according to response 
 Closed WITH ACTION according to disposition 
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5 Quality Assurance 
5.1 Objectives of Quality Assurance 
Quality Assurance is, by far, the most extended discipline of Product Assurance. According to the 
definition provided in chapter 10, the main objective of Quality Assurance is to determine the 
level of fulfilment of the Quality requirements that a system has. 
Quality requirements are defined in the form of a series of procedures and methods to be 
followed during a project implementation. Present chapter is aimed at defining the Quality 
Assurance procedure relevant to the development of a Large Scientific Installation. 
5.2 Quality Assurance Procedure 
5.2.1 STEP 1: General Quality Assurance requirements 
5.2.1.1 Quality Assurance Plan 
The Quality Assurance Plan is the document with the overall procedures that are defined for the 
proper implementation of the Quality Assurance within a project. This document is prepared by 
the Product Assurance Manager and submitted for approval to the Project Manager, as per the 
procedure described in STEP 5 of Product Assurance Management procedure in section 4.2.5. 
The procedures presented in section 5.2 and related subsections covers all the elements for a 
Quality Assurance Plan. 
5.2.1.2 Critical Items management 
A Critical Item in a project, as defined in [7], is a potential threat to either the performance, 
quality, dependability or safety of the system under development which are controlled by a 
specific action plan aimed at mitigating the risks derived and the associated consequences. 
Although formally the process of managing Critical Items is very similar but not equal to the one 
for Risks management, for the sake of the easiness of the procedures involved, they are treated in 
the same way as Risks. 
Therefore, the procedure applicable for Critical Items management is the one described in steps 
2 to 4 of Risks management chapter (sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4). 
5.2.1.3 Non Conformances management 
A Non Conformance is a deviation of an applicable requirement of a project. The Non 
Conformances control system was already introduced in step 6 of Product Assurance 
Management chapter (section4.2.6). As it was pointed out there, these elements are covered by 
the Configuration Management system which procedures are out of the scope of present work. 
5.2.1.4 Stamp control 
All the items produced in the frame of the project shall be properly stamped for inventory 
purposes. The stamp control system shall: 
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— Indicate uniquely the status of the element:  
 Under development 
 Under testing 
 Approved 
— Define the roles within the project authorized to manage each item stamped, with the 
description of the operations allowed per each role, when necessary. 
— Use unambiguous labels to clearly identify each item stamped, with an appropriate 
material. 
5.2.1.5 Traceability 
All the items produced or procured in the frame of the project shall be properly traced in an 
inventory document which contains the following information: 
— A unique code to identify the item. 
— The location of the item. 
— In the case of items procured: 
 The vendor information. 
 The manufacturer information. 
 The manufacturer’s Serial and Part numbers (S/N) (P/N). 
 The status (in stock, in use, for disposal, destroyed) 
— In case of items produced: 
 The information contained in its associated stamp. 
5.2.1.6 Handling, Transportation, Storage and Preservation 
All the items procured in the frame of the project shall be handled and stored according to the 
manufacturer’s information. 
All the items produced in the frame of the project shall have documented the instructions for its 
secure handling, transportation, storage and preservation. 
5.2.2 STEP 2: Quality Assurance requirements for design 
phase 
5.2.2.1 Definition of a Design strategy 
All the elements produced in the frame of the project shall have a documented design strategy 
approved before proceeding to the manufacturing phase.  
Such design strategy shall ensure: 
 Quality Assurance 
 
 
Page 99 
— The simplification of the modules involved. 
— The standardization of the processes involved. 
— The clear definition of the requirements to be met. 
— The standardization of the interfaces. 
— The repeatability of the characteristics among the different items of the same type 
produced. 
— The inspectability and testability of the items produced with respect to the pre-defined 
requirements. 
5.2.2.2 Definition of a Verification strategy 
All the elements produced in the frame of the project shall have a documented verification 
strategy approved before proceeding to the manufacturing phase. 
Such verification strategy shall include: 
— The appropriate tests to cover all the requirements defined in the design strategy. 
— The appropriate procedures to conduct these tests. 
— The appropriate definition of the environment on which these tests shall be performed. 
— The appropriate definition of the external elements (inputs, measurement equipment) 
needed to perform these tests. 
— The conditions that shall be granted to declare the successful (PASSED) or not successful 
(FAILED) status of these tests once performed; the so called PASS/FAIL criteria. 
5.2.2.3 Design reviews 
Once the design and verification strategies are prepared, a Design Review milestone shall be 
organized to inspect their contents with respect to the expected elements defined in 5.2.2.1 and 
5.2.2.2. 
The design reviews are chaired by the Project Manager with the support of the Product Assurance 
Manager. The project’s top level management institution (Agencies or and ad-hoc consortium) 
representatives will ultimately pronounce the status (approved / rejected) of the design review. 
5.2.3 STEP 3: Quality Assurance requirements for 
implementation phase 
5.2.3.1 Implementation Plan 
Prior to the manufacturing phase, an implementation plan shall be defined for each item to be 
produced, containing all the elements needed for its proper construction, namely: 
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— Parts list, drawings, schematics. 
— Equipment used for the manufacturing, assembly and integration. 
— Environment constraints on the manufacturing laboratory (temperature, humidity, 
cleaningless levels, etc.) 
— Identification of critical characteristics and/or especially complex steps in the production 
deserving specific clarifications or instructions. 
— Provision of auditable breakpoints in the process that ensures its justification against and 
external witness (i.e., prepare the evidences for audits). 
— Tolerance margins in the intermediate checks (inspections) to ensure that the item grants 
the design requirements. 
5.2.3.2 Inspections 
The manufacturing process shall define inspection points on which different aspect of the design 
can be verified. 
The checks carried out at the inspection points shall constitute go / no-go decision points for the 
remaining manufacturing steps for the item being assessed on them. 
5.2.4 STEP 4: Quality Assurance requirements for verification 
& acceptance phases 
5.2.4.1 Test benches 
The manufacturing process shall set up the environment on which the tests shall be executed 
according to the verification strategy defined in 5.2.2.2. 
5.2.4.2 Test procedures 
During the verification phase, the tests shall be executed according to the predefined test 
procedures defined in the verification strategy of 5.2.2.2. 
5.2.4.3 Test reports 
The execution of each test carried out in the verification process shall be properly documented in 
the Test Report, which shall contain: 
— References to the applicable part of the verification strategy to the test performed: 
 Test case. 
 Test procedure. 
 Environment conditions. 
 External elements needed. 
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— Results of the evaluation of the PASS/FAIL criteria on the items tested. 
— Final result of the test (PASSED/FAILED) based on the results of all the PASS/FAIL 
criteria evaluated. 
— List of the foreseen corrective actions to be implemented in case of failures detected 
during the test execution. 
5.2.4.4 Test reviews 
The final approval of the items produced shall be pronounced on test reviews on which the 
evidences for the successful execution of all the tests are presented in the form of test reports. 
The test reviews are chaired by the Project Manager with the support of the Product Assurance 
Manager. The project’s top level management institution (Agencies or and ad-hoc consortium) 
representatives will ultimately pronounce the status (approved / rejected) of the test review. 
5.2.5 STEP 5: Quality Assurance requirements for 
procurement 
5.2.5.1 Procurement estimations 
During the design phase, all the external elements which need to be procured from third party 
sources shall be properly identified, detailing: 
— The description of the element to be procured (parts, equipment, fungible materials). 
— The expected amount of items to be procured, including a spare provision. 
— The list of sources from which the element can be procured (vendors, resellers). 
— The expected future availability (whenever possible) and potential alternatives in case of 
discontinuation in their provision. 
5.2.5.2 Selection of a provider 
Based on the information collected for each element to be procured as per 5.2.5.1, and in the 
case that there are several providers identified, it shall be justified the final source from which it 
will be procured in terms of: 
— Price. 
— Delivery time upon procurement. 
— Current and expected future stock available. 
5.3 Traceability to standards 
The standards on which the contents of this procedure are based are ECSS-Q-ST-20C [6] 
(mainly), and ECSS-Q-ST-10-04C [7] (for the identification of Critical Items Control and Risk 
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Assessment only). This section provides the traceability from the steps of the procedure proposed 
and the corresponding section of the main reference ECSS-Q-ST-20C [6], with the appropriate 
justifications to the adaptations made. 
 Section ECSS-Q-ST-
20C 
Justification 
5.2 5.1, 5.2 Refer to the justification for each requirement in the subsections 
5.2.1 5.1, 5.2 Refer to the justification for each requirement in the subsections 
5.2.1.1 5.1.1  
5.2.1.2 5.2.1  
5.2.1.3 5.2.2  
5.2.1.4 5.2.4  
5.2.1.5 5.2.1.5  
5.2.1.6 5.2.7.1, 
5.2.7.2, 
5.2.7.3 
All the requirements in 5.2.7 for handling, storage and 
preservation have been joined in a single requirement in the 
procedure proposed 
5.2.2 5.3 Refer to the justification for each requirement in the subsections 
5.2.2.1 5.3.1.1, 
5.3.1.2, 
5.3.1.3 
 
5.2.2.2 5.6.3.1 The verification strategy documentation (test procedures) part 
only 
5.2.2.3 5.3.2.2, 
5.3.2.3 
 
5.2.3 5.5 Refer to the justification for each requirement in the subsections 
5.2.3.1 5.5.1  
5.2.3.2 5.5.8  
5.2.4 5.6 Refer to the justification for each requirement in the subsections 
5.2.4.1 5.6.1  
5.2.4.2 5.6.3.1 The test execution according to the test procedure part only 
5.2.4.3 5.6.3.2  
5.2.4.4 5.6.5  
5.2.5, 
5.2.5.1, 
5.2.5.2 
5.4 The procurement requirements have been deeply revised, not 
adhering to ECSS related requirements but only extracting general 
ideas to the final proposal 
Table 5–1: Traceability of Quality Assurance procedure to ISO and ECSS standards  
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6 Risks Management 
6.1 Objectives of Risks Management 
Risks, as per the definition in chapter 10, are potential events that may happen during the 
development of a Project, which in case they finally occur can affect either: 
— The project’s cost, or 
— The project’s schedule, or 
— The expected technical performances. 
The objective of defining and implementing a so called Risks Management policy is, according to 
[8] and [9]:“to identify, assess, reduce, accept, and control project risks in a systematic, proactive, 
comprehensive and cost effective manner”. Basically, the idea behind Risks Management is 
twofold: Identify risky situations affecting the normal development of the project and advance 
solutions before they occur. 
An adequate Risks Management policy does not only avoid risky situations, it can also serve as a 
mean to improve some aspects of the project itself, on which case the risks become 
Opportunities. 
The goal of implementing a Risks Management policy, following the strategy above, is to include 
this task as a part of the normal work so that Risks are assessed on a regular and systematic basis. 
6.2 Risks Management procedure 
The Risks Management is a continuous process which shall be performed in all the phases of the 
project. There are not specific procedures applicable to each of the development phases, but a 
single overall procedure instead which is suitable for all of them.  
The Risks Management procedure is composed of four steps, three of which are repeated on a 
regular basis to account for the new risks that can arise and for the evolution of the existing ones 
previously identified; and they are listed below: 
— Define Risks Management implementation requirements 
— Identify and assess the Risks 
— Decide and act 
— Monitor, report and accept Risks 
A schematic view of these steps and their repeatability during project evolution is depicted in 
Figure 6–1: 
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Figure 6–1: Steps of the Risks Management procedure during project’s life cycle 
It is important to remark the “asynchrony” of risks management and project’s life cycle: The 
assessment of the risks is performed regularly regardless the phase of the development.  
The vertical groups STEP 2 → STEP 3 → STEP 4 which are repeated in Figure 6–1 are the so 
called Risks assessment cycles and should be performed on a regular basis to properly detect new 
Risks and monitor the evolution of the existing Risks previously identified in former cycles. 
6.2.1 STEP 1: Define Risks Management implementation 
requirements 
This first step in the Risks Management procedure is different from the remaining ones for 
several reasons: 
— It is not included in the Risks assessment cycles; this step is performed once at the 
beginning of the project. 
— The implementation requirements defined are applicable to the entire project, unlike the 
risks identified in the Risks assessment cycles, which can vary and evolve with the project 
itself, reason why such cycles are repeated on a regular basis. 
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The tasks to be performed in this step are: 
— Define the Risks Management policy. 
— Prepare the Risks Management Plan. 
6.2.1.1 Risks Management Policy 
The Risks Management policy consists in establishing the responsibilities on the different aspects 
of Risks Management and the associated requirements. According to the roles defined in the 
procedure for Product Assurance Management in chapter 4, the following actors are involved: 
— The responsibility for the Risks Management yields in the Project Manager. The related 
tasks which must encompass are: 
 Approve the Risks Management Plan prepared by the Product Assurance 
Manager. 
 Define the periodicity of the Risks assessment cycles. 
 Perform the tasks of the Risk assessment cycles (Identify and assess the Risks; 
Decide and act; Report, monitor and accept the Risks) or 
 Delegate the tasks of the Risks assessment cycles and collect the Risk reports to 
prepare the joint Risk report with the all the contributions. In this last case, the 
final magnitude of the Risks as well as their final acceptance shall be ultimately be 
decided by the Project Manager, based on the information in the reports 
provided by the Risks delegates (the persons which have been designated to carry 
out the Risks assessment cycles). 
— The Product Assurance Manager, or the Product Assurance Delegate as defined in 
section 4.2.2 in the case of a distributed working group, have the following responsibilities 
in the Risks Management policy: 
 Prepare the Risks Management Plan and submit it to the Project Manager for 
approval. 
 Support the Project Manager or the Risks delegates in Risk assessment cycles. 
 Update the Risks Management Plan to adapt it to the specificities of the project as 
it evolves. 
6.2.1.2 Risks Management Plan 
The Risks Management Plan is the document which contains all the elements needed for the 
proper implementation of Risks Management within a project, namely: 
— The Risks Management implementation requirements. 
— The Risks assessment procedure requirements. 
— The Risks reporting requirements. 
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The Risks Management Plan is prepared by the Product Assurance Manager and submitted for 
approval to the Project Manager, as per the procedure described in STEP 5 of Product Assurance 
Management procedure in section 4.2.5. 
The Risks Management procedure presented in section 6.2 and its subsections covers all the 
elements defined above, and could be used directly as the Risks Management Plan. 
6.2.2 STEP 2: Identify and assess the Risks 
6.2.2.1 Risks identification 
There is not a general recipe to identify Risks, provided the large amount of negative scenarios 
affecting a project and the different types of projects themselves. However, here follow some 
guidelines to proceed on a systematic approach intended to minimise the likelihood to miss-
detecting them: 
1. Review project funding status: Identify short and mid-term needs in terms of 
procurement and contracting, potential unexpected over costs that may occur due to new 
elements needed and not included in the project’s initial budget, evolution of the prices 
of the materials not yet procured and needed for subsequent phases. 
2. Review technical status with the project’s staff: List short and mid-term needs of training, 
evaluate the probability to miss qualified members of the staff, check periodically the 
feasibility of those aspects of the project which are new technological challenges. 
3. Review project schedule: Identify those elements in the project’s critical path and assess 
their status w.r.t. the expected one. 
4. Check the boundary conditions on which the project is being developed, i.e., those 
external elements which could ultimately affect the nominal development: legal issues, 
conflicts of interests with third parties, political constraints, etc. 
The Risks identified by each of the steps above shall be annotated and categorized as Cost Risks, 
Technical Risks, Schedule Risks and Other Risks, respectively. 
Many risks can be categorized on different ways, as they can impact, for instance, the project’s cost 
and schedule simultaneously. In that case it shall be evaluated the first aspect being impacted to 
properly categorize the risk. 
Example 
The lack of funding to purchase a new generation of devices needed in the project could be categorized as 
cost risk and technical risk, simultaneously. It can indeed be categorized as a schedule risk also provided 
that the time needed to obtain additional investments will surely cause a delay. However, the first element of 
this chain of consequences derived by the unaffordable price of the needed devices is that the project’s 
budget is not enough to purchase them, hence this risk should be categorized as a cost risk. 
 
6.2.2.2 Risks assessment 
This task consists of ranking each of the Risks identified attending two different conventions: 
— Risk severity 
— Probability of occurrence 
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The Risk severity defines five levels for Risks attending the impact that the potential events they 
represent could have in case they finally happened. The criterion to assign the severity of a Risk 
depends on its type (Cost, Technical, Schedule or Other Risks), and shall be reviewed and 
accepted by the Project Manager.  
Level Severity 
Convention to assign severity levels for: 
Cost Risks Technical Risks Schedule Risks Other Risks 
1 Catastrophic Project 
cannot be 
funded 
Project is not 
feasible 
Project 
termination 
Project 
termination 
2 Critical Project cost 
increase up 
to TBD% 
Complete re-
design of the 
project 
Project length 
enlarged up to 
TBD% 
Project could 
continue in 
TBD% of the 
cases 
3 Major Project cost 
increase up 
to TBD% 
Re-design of up 
to TBD% of the 
project 
Project length 
enlarged up to 
TBD% 
Project could 
continue in 
TBD% of the 
cases 
4 Significant Project cost 
increase up 
to TBD% 
Re-design of up 
to % of the 
project 
Project length 
enlarged up to 
TBD% 
Project could 
continue in 
TBD% of the 
cases 
5 Negligible Minimal or 
no impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Table 6–1: Definition of Risks severity levels for the different types of Risks 
It is remarkable that Table 6–1 is not self-contained, i.e. there are some entries which depend on 
the final settlement of the TBD value to properly define the severity of a type of Risks. Such 
assignment of the values which determine the severity of each type of Risks is a task that must be 
done at the beginning of the project as a part of the Risk management policy defined in STEP 1 
on section 6.2.1. 
The Probability of occurrence defines five levels for Risks attending the likelihood they have to 
occur. Unlike the previous case, the criterion to define the probability of occurrence of a Risk is 
independent of its type.  
Level Probability of occurrence Likelihood convention 
E Maximum Certain to occur, will occur one or more times per project 
D High Will occur frequently, likelihood up to 0.1 (TBD) 
C Medium Will occur sometimes, likelihood up to 10-2 (TBD) 
B Low Will seldom occur, likelihood up to 10-3 (TBD) 
A Minimum Will almost never occur, likelihood is 10-4 (TBD) or less  
Table 6–2: Definition of Risks Probability of occurrence levels 
As per the Risks severity levels, the Probability of occurrence levels shall be reviewed and 
accepted as a part of the Risks management policy defined in STEP 1 on section 6.2.1. 
6.2.3 STEP 3: Decide and Act 
Once assessed, each of the Risks identified would have been ranked with a letter (A to E) plus a 
number (1 to 5) defining both its severity and probability of occurrence, e.g. E2, B4, C3, A1, etc. 
That combined severity and probability of occurrence is the so-called Risk index. 
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This step, based on the Risk indices obtained, has to: 
— Determine the Risk magnitude, i.e. which Risks are Acceptable and which are Not 
Acceptable. 
— Define Mitigation Actions for Not Acceptable Risks 
The Risk magnitude defines two types of Risks: Acceptable and Not Acceptable. A Risk is 
Acceptable when it is considered that either the impact in the project in case it happened can be 
assumed or that the probability of occurrence is too small to be a real threat to the development. 
On the other hand a Risk is Not Acceptable when the project cannot assume the consequences in 
case it happened without altering significantly or even cancelling the development. 
The convention to define Risk magnitudes is based on the Risk index defined previously. The 
Risk index can be plotted in a double entry table with their rows indicating the Probabilities of 
occurrence and their columns the Risks severities. The main diagonal of this table defines the 
boundary between the Acceptable and Not acceptable Risks: 
    Risk Magnitude convention based on the Risk Index 
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
O
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 E TBD Not Acceptable Not Acceptable Not Acceptable Not Acceptable 
D Acceptable TBD Not Acceptable Not Acceptable Not Acceptable 
C Acceptable Acceptable TBD Not Acceptable Not Acceptable 
B Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable TBD Not Acceptable 
A Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable TBD 
    1 2 3 4 5 
   Risk Severity 
Table 6–3: Risk Magnitudes table: Definition of Acceptable and Not Acceptable Risks based on 
their Risk index 
The Risks which Risk magnitude is TBD –To Be Defined– (those which Risk index is E1, D2, 
C3, B4 or A5; i.e. the yellow cells in the main diagonal of Table 6–3) shall be analysed on a case 
by case basis to determine whether they are considered Acceptable or Not Acceptable. Regardless 
the final choice taken, the Project Manager shall provide the appropriate justification to the final 
Risk magnitude set in all of the TBC cases identified. 
Based on the Risk magnitude obtained for each of the Risks, the tasks to be done are: 
— For Acceptable Risks: No additional tasks to be done → proceed to STEP 4. 
— For Not Acceptable Risks: Reduce the Risk index or define a Mitigation action. 
A Mitigation action is a backup solution taken in advance to reduce the consequences of a Not 
Acceptable Risk before it occurs. For example: The provision of a contingency budget to face the 
unexpected additional costs of the project. 
Example 
The provision of a contingency budget to face the unexpected additional costs of the project. 
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The other possibility is to reduce the Risk index of those Not Acceptable Risks to turn them into 
Acceptable ones. This can be done by either reducing their severity or their probability of 
occurrence, when possible. 
Example 
A Not Acceptable Technical Risk in a project can be the risk of missing an expert in a specific technical field 
of the project, who is the only person who knows about it in the entire project. The risk index could be 
reduced by planning training sessions to other people of the staff to spread the knowledge or to reduce the 
probability to miss that person by offering him/her a better position. 
 
6.2.4 STEP 4: Monitor, report and accept Risks 
This final step of each Risk assessment cycle deals more with the appropriate reporting of the 
activities carried out in the previous steps than with new tasks linked to Risk treatment. 
The way to preserve and exchange information about the risks identified is to report all of them 
using a unified template that contains both the current information on each risk, and also their 
historic evolution. 
The unified template to report that information is the so-called Risk register. It contains the 
complete information to assess the Risks. The elements of the Risk register are listed below: 
— A Risk code to uniquely identify each of the risks, with a sequence number that allows 
identifying uniquely each Risk, on the form: 
RISK-<Risk_seq_num> 
— The complete Risk description, indicating the undesired event that this Risk represents, 
as detailed as possible. 
— The Risk assessment, as per the procedure described in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, which 
comprises the following information: 
 The Risk type (cost, technical, schedule or other, as per the definition of Risks in 
chapter 2). 
 The Risk severity (level 1 to 5, as per Table 6–1). 
 The Probability of Occurrence (level A to E, as per Table 6–2). 
With this information it will be automatically obtained: 
 The Risk index associated to the combined severity and probability of 
occurrence. 
 The Risk magnitude, to ultimately determine the subsequent actions to be taken. 
In case the risk magnitude is not properly defined (it is any of the TBC cases in 
Table 6–3), the register shall include the final magnitude selected, plus the 
appropriate justification to support that choice. 
— ONLY for those Risks which magnitude is Not Acceptable, the register shall include the 
appropriate Mitigation action defined to minimise the consequences of the risk in case it 
happened. 
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— The Risk trend which consists in plotting the historic risk magnitudes that a risk has had 
when identified in several risk assessment cycles, to keep track of its evolution. To do so, 
a table with four levels is used: 
  RISK-<XXX> trend  
R
is
k
 
M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e
 Not Acceptable  X     
TBD – Not Acceptable      X 
TBD – Acceptable X  X  X  
Acceptable    X   
  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
  Risk Assessment Cycles 
Table 6–4: Risk trend obtained by plotting the magnitude in the different Risk assessment cycles 
Actually, there are only two levels based on Risk magnitudes, Acceptable and Not 
Acceptable, but the “borderline cases” that lie on the main diagonal of Table 6–3 are 
actually the boundary between those categories. Explicitly distinguishing “TBD” cases that 
were finally assigned to each magnitude provides certain nuances to this binary division of 
Risks magnitudes. 
6.3 Traceability to standards 
The standards on which the contents of this procedure have been based are ISO-17666:2003, [8]; 
and ECSS-M-ST-80C, [9]. This section provides the traceability from the steps of the procedure 
proposed and the corresponding sections of these references, with the appropriate justifications to 
the adaptations made. 
 Section ISO-17666:2003 ECSS-M-ST-80C Justification 
6.2 4.1 4.1  
6.2.1 4.2.1 5.2.1.3, 6.3, 6.5 The overall management scheme has been 
simplified, taking into account that the roles in a 
scientific team are not as well defined as they 
are in the industry. 
6.2.2.1 4.2.1, 4.2.2.2 5.2.2.2  
6.2.2.2 4.2.1, 4.2.2.3 5.2.1.2, 5.2.2.3 The risk severities and probabilities of 
occurrence are defined in this section rather 
than in the risk requirements definition, to ease 
the references. In any case, the definition of the 
TBD values must be done as a part of STEP 1, in 
6.2.1. 
6.2.3 4.2.3 5.2.1.2,5.2.3 The risk magnitude table has been simplified 
with two categories, “Acceptable” and “Not 
Acceptable”. Besides, the boundary between 
them has been defined as TBD for a further 
analysis on a case by case basis. 
6.2.4 4.2.4.2 5.2.4 Risk trend has been simplified according to the 
simpler Risk magnitude definition. However, the 
borderline cases have been explicitly included to 
manage four different levels so that the risk 
evolution is more detailed. 
Table 6–5: Traceability of Risks management procedure to ISO and ECSS standards 
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6.4 Risk register template 
Risk register 
 
Risk ID  
Date   
 
Risk Type 
(select the appropriate checkbox) 
 Cost Risk  Schedule Risk  
 Technical Risk  Other Risk 
 
Description 
 
 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Severity Probability of Occurrence  
 5 - Catastrophic  E - Maximum 
 4 - Critical  D - High 
 3 - Major  C - Medium 
 2 - Significant  B - Low 
 1 - Negligible  A - Minimum 
 
Risk Magnitude  
  
 
Mitigation Action (only for Not Acceptable Risks) 
 
 
Risk Trend 
   
R
is
k
 
M
a
g
n
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u
d
e
 Not Acceptable      
TBD – Not Acceptable      
TBD – Acceptable      
Acceptable      
  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 
  Risk Assessment Cycles 
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7 Dependability and Safety 
Dependability and Safety, as defined in chapter 10, are two disciplines of Product Assurance that 
try to establish how robust a system is with respect to failures and accidents, respectively. Although 
they are different disciplines within a project, they are so interconnected one another that it is very 
often to explain their management jointly within a project. 
More precisely, Dependability and Safety covers aspects of a system which overlaps in a common 
region: If Dependability deals with failures and Safety with accidents within a system, there is a 
common area with potential failures leading to accidents or vice-versa which is common to both 
disciplines, as Figure 7–1 illustrates. 
 
Figure 7–1: Graphical representation of Dependability and Safety and the common region to both 
disciplines of Product Assurance 
This chapter is organized in a similar way as the previous procedures in chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
although the joint treatment of two disciplines (dependability and safety) deserves a general 
explanation of the structure followed. 
— In section 7.1 the overall objectives of Dependability and Safety are presented, along with 
the managerial aspects. 
— Section 7.2 explains the procedure for the proper implementation of Dependability and 
Safety analyses in a LSI. 
— Finally, section 7.3 and 7.4 details the Dependability and Safety analyses introduced 
previously and how to conduct them in a given project. 
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7.1 Objectives of Dependability and Safety 
Dependability involves three different elements to prevent the occurrence of failures in a system: 
Reliability 
Reliability is the capability of a system to operate with the expected performance margins under 
controlled conditions. Basically, a reliable system is that which is able to work without failures 
within a given time interval. 
Availability 
Availability is the capability of a system to be able to operate when requested to do so and 
maintain this operational state. 
Maintainability 
Maintainability is the capability of a system to return to the operational state from a previous non-
operational state (due to a failure, for instance) through the application of predefined procedures 
for its restoration. Basically, the idea behind maintainability is the capability of a system to be 
repaired in an efficient way when it fails. 
Dependability is often referred to as with an acronym that includes these three elements: RAM – 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability. 
Safety, on the other hand, is aimed at preventing the occurrence of accidents in a system. 
The joint term used to denote both Dependability and Safety is RAMS – Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety, and this will be the acronym used in this chapter from now on to refer 
to both disciplines jointly. 
7.2 Dependability and Safety (RAMS) procedure 
The procedure for RAMS implementation in a project is divided in several steps, each one 
covering a specific aspect from the organizational and managerial issues to the technical elements 
of RAMS. 
7.2.1 STEP 1: Define RAMS implementation requirements 
7.2.1.1 RAMS policy 
The proper assessment of RAMS within a system shall begin with the project itself. A system 
which is free of failures and completely secure does not exist. However, the success in properly 
identifying the potential failures and accidents in a system, and the actions to prevent it occurrence 
or mitigate their effects in case they finally happened is strongly linked to the design of the project 
itself. 
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The Project Manager shall initiate the RAMS assessment within a project at the very early stages, 
through the designation of a RAMS Manager in charge of implementing the RAMS assessment in 
the project. 
The responsibilities of the RAMS Manager are: 
— Define the RAMS organization, by allocating the needed resources in the technical 
groups in charge of carrying out the RAMS analyses. 
— Prepare and maintain the RAMS plan. 
— Organize the training in RAMS aspects for the technical groups. 
— Collect the information of the different RAMS analyses carried out from the different 
technical groups, and 
— Elaborate the RAMS reports periodically with the relevant information about the RAMS 
activities. 
The RAMS Manager shall have unimpeded access to the design documentation of the project, 
and iterate continuously with the technical groups in charge of designing and implementing the 
different elements of the system(s) developed in the project. 
7.2.1.2 RAMS Plan 
The RAMS Plan is the document which contains all the elements needed for the proper RAMS 
assessment within a project, namely: 
— The RAMS implementation requirements. 
— The RAMS assessment requirements. 
— The RAMS reporting requirements. 
— The description of the RAMS analyses involved and associated templates. 
The RAMS Plan is prepared by the RAMS Manager and submitted for approval to the Project 
Manager, as per the procedure described in STEP 5 of Product Assurance Management 
procedure in section 4.2.5. 
The RAMS procedure presented in section 7.2 and its subsections covers all the elements defined 
above, and could be used directly as the RAMS Plan. 
RAMS Plan evolution  
The RAMS Plan, unlike the other plans defined (Product Assurance Plan, Quality Assurance 
Plan and Risks Management Plan) which are expected to remain unchanged once approved, is 
expected to evolve with the project itself. The RAMS analyses proposed at the early stages of a 
project in the first version of the RAMS Plan, or even the RAMS policy itself, may be refined 
based on the conclusions of the RAMS reports. 
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It is responsibility of the RAMS Manager to propose and implement the changes in the RAMS 
Plan, and submit the updated document for approval as per the procedure described in STEP 5 
of Product Assurance Management procedure in section 4.2.5. 
7.2.2 STEP 2: Define the RAMS assessment requirements 
7.2.2.1 RAMS requirements 
The definition of the requirements of the system shall include the corresponding RAMS 
requirements to define: 
— The tolerance margins that define the operational state of the system, or a failure state 
otherwise. 
— The availability requirements (minimum % of time in operational state) 
— The maintainability requirements (maximum time to repair, provision of spares, etc.) 
— The classification with the different levels considered for the severity of the consequences 
of either failures or accidents inside the project. 
7.2.2.2 Definition of Severity of consequences 
Any potential failure or accident within a system shall be ranked according to a pre-defined scale 
of severities based on the consequences derived in case they occur. 
For the purpose of this procedure, the following generic table of severities is provided, adapted 
from [10], [11]: 
Severity Level Consequences from the point of view of 
Dependability Safety 
On individuals On the system On the 
environment 
Catastrophic 1 Failures 
propagation 
Loss of life, life-
threatening or 
permanently 
disabling injury or 
occupational 
illness 
Loss of system Severe 
detrimental 
effects 
Critical 2 Loss of system Temporarily 
disabling but not 
life-threatening 
injury, or 
temporary 
occupational 
illness   
Major damage to 
the system and 
public or private 
properties 
Major 
detrimental 
effects 
Major 3 Major system 
degradation 
Small injuries Moderate 
damage to the 
system 
 Moderate 
detrimental 
effects 
Minor or 
Negligible 
4 Minor system 
degradation 
Incident without 
damages 
Incident without 
damages 
Incident 
without 
damages 
Table 7–1: Classification of Severity of consequences for Failures (dependability) and Accidents 
(Safety) 
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7.2.3 STEP 3: Define the RAMS life cycle 
Once the RAMS policy and RAMS requirements have been established, the RAMS assessment 
can begin in the project. RAMS activities evolve with the project itself, so there is a strong link 
between the phases in the project life cycle and the associated RAMS activities to be carried out. 
7.2.3.1 Phases of the project life cycle 
For the definition of the RAMS analyses to be carried out at the different phases in the project, it 
is mandatory to establish a life cycle on which these phases are uniquely defined. For this 
purpose, an adaptation of the project phases defined in [12] is considered: 
Phase 0 – System analysis / needs identification 
This phase is aimed at assessing the main description of the system in terms of needs, expected 
performance, constraints, economic analysis, etc. 
Phase A – Feasibility 
This phase is intended to define the top level requirements of the system, analysis of the existing 
technologies to cope with the system objectives, preliminary project plans, managerial 
organization, identification of critical items, cost studies, etc. 
Phase B – Preliminary Definition 
This phase comprises the consolidation of the managerial structure of the project, project plans 
and project schedule. From a technical point of view, this phase encompasses the trade-off studies 
for the discrimination of the technologies to be used, define the operation concepts and the 
associated preliminary design, system requirements etc. 
This phase usually ends with the Preliminary Design Review milestone. 
Phase C – Detailed Design 
This phase’s objectives are the consolidation of the system design, including the lower level 
technical specifications, verification and validation strategies, HW manufacturing for assembly and 
testing, etc. 
This phase usually ends with the Detailed Design Review and/or the Critical Design Review 
milestones. 
Phase D – Qualification and Production 
This phase comprises the construction, verification and validation of the system against the 
requirements and specifications and handover to the operational environment. 
This phase often terminates with the Acceptance Review milestone. 
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Phase E – Operations 
This phase comprises the system lifetime, on which it is used in the operational environment. 
This phase includes the maintenance activities aimed at keeping the qualification status of the 
system, as well as to bring it back to the operational state after interruptions of the service (failure, 
controlled stops, etc.) 
Phase F – Disposal 
Once concluded the system lifetime, it shall be dismantled in a controlled manner with special 
care on the management of debris and minimizing the environmental impact. 
7.2.3.2 RAMS activities at each project phase 
Table 7–2 details the foreseen activities in RAMS for each project phase defined in 7.2.3.1. All of 
the analysis there will be detailed in sections 7.3 and 7.4, except the initial steps which deserve a 
special treatment in 7.2.3.3. 
Project 
phase as 
per [12] 
RAMS analyses applicable to each project phase 
Dependability Analyses Safety Analyses 
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A X     X    
B  X X    X X  
C  X X X   X X  
D   X X X  X X  
E     X    X 
Table 7–2: Applicable RAMS analysis on each project phase 
 
7.2.3.3 Identification of modules subject to RAMS analysis 
The first step for the RAMS assessment within a project starts with the identification of those 
potential events in the system on which either a failure or an accident occurs. In the first case 
(failures – dependability related) the annotated events comprise the so called List of undesired 
events, whereas for the second case (accidents – safety related) it becomes the List of hazardous 
events. 
Both lists are prepared at the early stages of the project (phase A) once the concept of the system 
is nearly consolidated. The remaining RAMS analyses, based on the information in these lists, 
provide different information on each event that allows to determine if it needs to be mitigated or 
suppressed by modifying the on-going design. 
Once the lists are collected, and based on the analysis of the potential failure / accident described, 
the associated event shall be ranked with a severity level as per the levels in Table 7–1. 
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A very important aspect of the lists of undesired and hazardous events is that they allow 
identifying the modules of the system which are RAMS-critical as those with the largest amount of 
events and / or the most severe ones, and focus the subsequent RAMS analysis on them. 
Example 
The need to identify the RAMS-critical parts of a system is sometimes so evident that there is no need to 
prepare the list of undesired and hazardous events. In a car, for instance, it is clear that the braking system is 
RAMS-critical whereas the radio-CD is not. This identification of RAMS-critical modules allows saving effort 
on the subsequent RAMS analyses of the system as they are done on an efficient basis focusing in them and 
discarding other non-RAMS-critical modules 
 
7.2.4 STEP 4: RAMS reporting 
Each technical group in charge of a RAMS-critical module shall carry out the RAMS analyses 
indicated for the phase of the project on which they are as per Table 7–2. 
On a periodic basis, which interval shall be agreed between the Project Manager and the RAMS 
Manager during the preparation of the RAMS Plan, they must report the RAMS activities carried 
out, including: 
— The project phase. 
— The RAMS-critical modules included. 
— The results of the application of the RAMS analyses applicable to that project phase for 
the identified modules, through the templates provided for each one. 
The RAMS manager, once collected the activities reported by all the technical groups, shall emit 
the project RAMS report with the all information gathered, plus: 
— A summary of the deficiencies identified (if any). 
— The main lessons learnt and conclusions extracted from the results of the RAMS analyses 
reported. 
— Suggestions to improve the RAMS assessment (if any) to be traced to the RAMS Plan. 
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7.3 Dependability analyses 
7.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis – FTA 
Description of the Fault Tree Analysis 
The FTA method for reliability analysis is a formal deductive procedure for determining the 
various combinations of component-level failures that could result in the occurrence of specified 
undesirable events at higher level. FTA is performed to ensure that the design conforms to the 
failure tolerance requirements for combinations of failures. 
The FTA provides valuable information such as: 
— Identification of undesirable events (top events). 
— Development of Fault Tree for each top event. 
— Identification of basic failure events 
— Evaluation of probabilities of basic failure events. 
— Evaluation of probability of intermediate events and top event. 
FTA template and guidelines 
The Fault Tree Analysis, as explained before, is a top-down method to identify the Basic Failure 
Events of a system from the known failures at system level (list of undesired events), carried out 
by: 
— Dividing the system into different abstraction levels, starting from the system as a whole 
downwards. 
— For each of the known failures at system level: 
 Identify in the lower abstraction level those events that can provoke the failure by 
their own, or those that must occur simultaneously to provoke it 
 Connect all of these events from the lower level to the system level using logical 
gates so that the events that can cause the failure individually are connected one 
another with OR gates, whereas those that must occur jointly are connected 
through  AND gates. 
— Repeat the process above for each of the events in the lower level as if they were the final 
failures and how they are caused by the events in the next abstraction level. 
Once this process reaches the lowest abstraction level, the different diagrams of each failure with 
the events and their connections though logical gates comprise the so-called Fault Tree Analysis 
for that failure. The events in the lowest abstraction level considered in the Fault Tree are the 
aforementioned Basic Failure Events. 
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The more amount of AND gates in a Fault Tree, the more reliable the system is, especially when 
they appear between the first level and the system as a whole, as it implies that the number of 
events which can cause a given failure by their own is small. 
 
 
 
Figure 7–2: Example of a Fault Tree Analysis with two abstraction levels 
 
The template for the FTA analysis along with the explanation of its different fields is provided 
below: 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Organisation: System: Subsystem: Equipment: 
    
Date and issue: Author: Approved by:  
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Header information 
The FTA worksheet contains the identity of the product (hardware or function) and the identity 
of corresponding equipment, subsystem, and system (as applicable). 
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1. Item number, Id 
The identification number assigned for traceability purposes. 
E.g. XXX-YYY-FT-nnn (TBC) where XXX is the system identification (TBD) and YYY the 
subsystem identification (TBD) and nnn a sequential number 
2. Top level event 
The identified top-level event to build each fault tree. 
Each top-level event should be uniquely identified. 
3. Hardware/Software fault(s) 
Each column represents descending levels of the tree branches being faults causing the one on 
top. Each fault should be uniquely identified. The last column of the worksheet is the basic level 
event. The table can have a variable number of columns depending on the in-depth of the fault 
tree. 
4. Recommendation 
Column to describe the recommendation to eliminate the basic software fault identified. 
E.g. S-XXX-YYY-FT-nnn (TBC) where XXX is the system identification, YYY the subsystem 
identification and nnn an identification number 
In addition, each fault tree analysis can be supported with tables and lists of single events. 
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7.3.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis / Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis – FMEA/FMECA 
Description of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis – FMEA 
The FMEA is a bottom-up reliability analysis which consists of studying how the failures of the 
most elementary blocks of a system are transmitted to the system as a whole. In a similar way as 
per the FTA, the system shall be divided into different levels of abstraction, but in this case the 
analysis starts at the lowest level, in this manner: 
— Determine the failures modes of each of the elements of this lowest abstraction level 
— For each of these failure modes identify the different events that each mode can provoke 
in the next abstraction level, and either the quantitative (when possible) of the qualitative 
estimated probability that it has to be transmitted in each of these ways. 
— Process the next abstraction level with the events identified as if they were failure modes 
again, until the upper abstraction level is reached (i.e., the system as a whole) 
The FMEA obtains the failures of a system from its basic failure events, whereas FTA determines 
the basic failure events from the system failures. Thus, it is possible to cross-check the results 
obtained by both analyses to determine if they are coherent one another. 
Description of the Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis – FMECA 
FMECA is an extension of FMEA that can be applied to the most critical subsystems. In the 
FMEA, the different events occurred by the transmission of the basic failure events to the higher 
abstraction levels can be assigned a pre-defined Severity Index, in which case the FMEA analysis 
turns into a FMECA – Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis. As the original FMEA 
already contained an estimated probability of occurrence, the combined probability and severity 
allows assessing the criticality of the failures. 
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FMEA template and guidelines 
The template for FMEA is extracted from [13] as follows: 
Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Organisation: System: Subsystem: Equipment: 
    
Date and issue: Author: Approved by:  
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Header information 
The FMEA worksheet contains the identity of the product (hardware or function) and the identity 
of corresponding equipment, subsystem, and system (as applicable). 
1. Identification number, Id. 
Unique FMEA reference number for traceability purposes.  
E.g. XXX-YYY-FM-nnn (TBC) where XXX is the system identification (TBD) and YYY the 
subsystem identification (TBD) and nnn a sequential number 
2. Item/block 
Name of the item or function being analysed, and the block of the reliability block diagram that is 
applicable to the analysis entry. 
3. Function 
A concise statement of the function performed by the item. 
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4. Failure mode 
Identification and description of all potential failure modes of the item or function under analysis.  
End effects of lower level FMEA are failure modes of the higher level FMEA. 
5. Failure cause 
When requested, identification and description of the most probable causes associated with the 
assumed failure mode. 
 Failure modes of lower level FMEA are failure causes of the higher level FMEA. 
 The failure causes are generally not identified when components are analysed 
(equipment level FMEA). 
6. Mission phase/Operational mode  
A concise statement of the mission phase and operational mode in which the failure is assumed to 
occur.  
These elements can be addressed in the header of the worksheet. Although all of the different 
mission phases or operational modes are taken into account, the record of results is limited to the 
phase or mode in which the worst failure effects occur. 
7. Failure effects 
The FMEA worksheet shall contain the identification of the consequences of each assumed 
failure mode at local effects and end effects levels. 
— Local effects: Local effects concentrate specifically on the impact of the failure mode on 
the operation, function, or status of the item identified in the second column of the 
worksheet. The local effects are recorded when different from the failure modes.  
The purpose of defining local effects is to provide a basis for evaluating compensating 
provisions and for recommending corrective actions. 
— End effects: End effects define the effect that the analysed failure mode has on the 
operation, function, or status of the product under investigation and its interfaces, such 
that it allows integration into the next higher level FMEA. 
8. Severity 
The severity classification category assigned to each failure mode according to the worst potential 
end effect of the failure  
9. Failure detection method  
Expected failure detection method and the observable symptoms. 
 Dependability and Safety 
 
 
Page 126 
The failure detection means include telemetry, visual or audible warning devices, sensing 
instrumentation, other unique indications (e.g. the failure effect itself), or none. 
10. Compensating provisions 
Existing compensating provisions, such as design provisions or operator actions, which circumvent 
or mitigate the effect of the failure. 
— Design provisions: Compensating provisions are considered design provisions when they 
feature a design that nullifies the effects of a malfunction or failure, control, or deactivate 
product items to halt generation or propagation of failure effects, or activate backup or 
standby items. Design compensating provisions include: 
 Redundant items or alternative modes of operation that allow continued and safe 
operation, and 
 Safety or relief devices which allow effective operation or limit the failure effects. 
— Operator actions: Compensating provisions are considered operator actions when the 
operator circumvents or mitigates the effect of the postulated failure mode. 
11. Recommendations  
Recommendations for corrective actions need to be noted. Each recommendation shall have a 
non-ambiguous identifier for tracking purpose. 
E.g. S-XXX-YYY-FM-nnn where XXX is the system identification, YYY the subsystem 
identification and nnn an identification number 
12. Remarks 
The FMEA worksheet also contains any pertinent remarks relevant to and clarifying any other 
column in the worksheet line. 
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7.3.3 Reliability Prediction Analysis 
The reliability prediction analysis consists in the estimation of the rate of failures of a system 
during its design & implementation with the information available from other dependability 
analyses. 
— At the very early stages of the development, (preliminary design), only coarse estimations 
based on the Dependability Risk Assessment can be done (from the pre-defined 
probability levels) 
— The FTA provides the first refinement, as the basic failure events found can be assigned 
an estimated probability of occurrence and the connection among them through logical 
gates allows predicting a combined probability of occurrence from the fault tree of each 
of the system failures considered. 
— Finally, as FMEA assigns estimated probabilities for the basic failure events and 
determines the connections with the next abstraction levels too, it is possible to obtain 
another estimation of the probability of occurrence of the failures at system level. In this 
case, being the basic failure events the inputs to the FMEA, it is very likely that their 
probabilities of occurrence are more accurate than those from FTA on which they are 
outputs. 
As a result of the estimated probabilities of occurrence of the failures at system level it is possible 
to obtain two metrics: 
— The Estimated Mean Time Between Failures (EMTBF) 
— The Estimated Mean Time To Repair (EMTTR) 
7.3.4 Maintainability Analysis 
Once the system is constructed and becomes operational, the maintainability activities to be 
performed are the following ones: 
— Maintainability prediction: Determination of maintainability parameters like MTBF 
(Mean Time Between Failures), MTTR (Mean Time To Restore) and MDT (Mean 
Down Time) for the components. MTTR includes failure detection and localisation 
times, removal and replacement or repair of default component, and preoperational 
testing time. MDT comprises the time between service interruption and service 
resumption.  
— Isolation of critical items (like for instance products that cannot be checked and tested 
after integration, limited-life products or products that do not meet or cannot be validated 
as compliant to the maintainability requirements) and issue of recommendations. 
— Support to design evaluation and trade-off studies. 
— Identification of spares and sparing recommendations. 
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— Determination of maintenance strategy, considering preventive and corrective actions. 
— Replacement strategy. 
Every technical group shall provide an updated maintenance plan with suggested maintenance 
schedules. This document shall specify service procedures, diagnostics and checklists to aid both 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.  
In order to define procedures for operations it is necessary to analyse, identify and assess the risks 
associated with operations, sequences and situations that can affect dependability performance. 
This analysis will take into account the technical and human environment. In addition, the 
operational procedures must: 
— Include dispositions to face abnormal situations and supply the necessary safeguard 
measures. 
— Not compromise equipment reliability. 
— Be in accordance with established maintenance dispositions. 
— Include dispositions to minimize failures due to human errors. 
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7.4 Safety analyses 
7.4.1 Hazard Analysis 
Description of the Hazard Analysis 
Hazard analysis is performed in a systematic manner and allows estimating the main hazard’ 
sources and their potential effects. More precisely, the target is: 
— Identify hazards, potential risks, their occurrence conditions and the gravity of the 
induced effects. 
— Plan and manage the way to search the safety elements in order to mitigate or eliminate 
the conditions which creates the risk (detection and recovery actions). 
— Track the identified hazards up until inherent risk is acceptable for the intended use of 
the product. 
This method is the most important one used for Safety analysis purposes and supports the hazard 
reduction process.  
Safety verification is ensured by the fact that any accepted safety recommendation will be injected 
in the life cycle as requirement. 
Hazard Analysis template and guidelines 
CTA Hazard Analysis (CTA-HA) 
Product: System: Subsystem: Equipment: 
    
Date and issue: Author: Approved by:  
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Header information 
The HA worksheet contains the identity of the product (hardware or function) and the identity of 
corresponding equipment, subsystem, and system (as applicable). 
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1. Hazard Id. 
Unique hazard reference number for traceability purposes.  
E.g. XXX-YYY-HA-nnn (TBC) where XXX is the system identification (TBD) and YYY the 
subsystem identification (TBD) and nnn a sequential number 
2. Hazards Description  
Comprises identification of the hazard and the associated hazardous event. 
E.g. Erroneous Input data in external interfaces. 
3. Cause 
Originating cause of the hazard.  Note, in some cases the cause can be undetected hardware 
failures and/or software errors. 
E.g. Input data is corrupted by the originator; communication problem. 
4. Consequence 
Output feared events that could result from the hazard. 
E.g. Loss of control of the CTA components 
5. Probability Number - PN 
The likelihood of occurrence of the hazard is allocated as a probability following expert judgment. 
The approach used for the assessment can be either qualitative or quantitative. The qualitative 
approach based on engineering judgment shall be used if specific data are not available. 
Probabilities of occurrence shall be grouped into defined levels which establish the qualitative 
probability level for entry into the worksheet column. The probability levels and limits shall be 
agreed between Project Manager and RAMS Manager and included in the RAMS Plan. 
Each level is identified by a probability number (PN), as defined in Table 7–3. 
PN Occurrence Level Description  Limits 
4 Probable It is likely to occur P > 10-2 
3 Occasional It is unlikely to occur but possible 10-4 <P < 10-2 
2 Remote It is very unlikely to occur 10-5 <P < 10-4 
1 Extremely remote It is assumed it will not occur P < 10-5 
Table 7–3: Probability Numbers (PN) assignment for Hazard Analysis 
Data sources, approved by the customer, will be listed and be the same as those used for the other 
dependability analyses performed for the programme. 
The hazard probabilities shall be ranked as per Table 7–3 and relevant entry (the PN) listed in the 
HA worksheet column. 
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6. Initial Severity Number - ISN 
Pre-mitigation severity of associated safety risk, as per the levels defined in Table 7–1. A severity 
number (SN) shall be given to each assumed Hazard, as per the values in Table 7–4. It is 
important to remark that severity numbers and severity levels are different. 
SN Severity 
4 Catastrophic 
3 Critical 
2 Major 
1 Minor or negligible 
Table 7–4: Severity Numbers (SN) assignment for Hazard Analysis 
 
7. Recommendation 
Recommendations will be detailed and controlled in the RAMS report document. This field 
provides the link to the Recommendation ID (as stated in the RAMS report) proposed for each 
hazard. 
E.g. S-XXX-YYY-HR-nnn (TBC) where XXX is the system identification, YYY the subsystem 
identification and nnn an identification number 
8. Final Severity Number - FSN 
Severity Number of the hazard once the Recommendation(s) is (are) implemented, as per the 
values in Table 7–4. 
9. HRI 
Hazard severity and hazard probability when integrated into a table format produces the Hazard 
Risk Index (HRI) matrix. The initial HRI is a risk categorization for hazards which is allocated 
prior to the establishment of control/mitigation requirements. 
HRI are estimated, considering the final severity, that is, after the application of the identified 
mitigations using the matrix depicted in Table 7–5. The Hazard Risk Index (HRI) for a specific 
hazard is then derived from the severity of the failure effects and the probability of occurrence. 
The HRI is calculated as the product of the ranking assigned to each factor: 
           [Eq.118] 
 
Hazards having a high HRI shall be given a higher priority in the implementation of the corrective 
actions than those having a lower HRI. An item shall be considered as critical (marked in red) 
item if: 
— a hazard has consequences classified as catastrophic, or 
— a hazard is classified as HRI greater than 6 in conformance with Table 7–5. 
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Yellow and green cell are non-critical with HRI equal or below 6. This difference is not essential 
Severity 
category 
SNs 
Probability level 
PNs 
1 2 3 4 
catastrophic 4 4 8 12 16 
critical 3 3 6 9 12 
major 2 2 4 6 8 
negligible 1 1 2 3 4 
Table 7–5: Hazard Risk Index – HRI matrix 
 
10. Trace to derived requirement 
When a recommendation is accepted, the trace to the derived requirement(s) is provided. 
7.4.2 Safety Risk Assessment 
Safety Risk Assessment is the portion of Hazard Analysis similar to Risk Assessment in section 
6.2.2.2, on which the severity and probability of occurrence are combined. However, the use of 4 
levels allows distinguishing these type of risks to the general risks treated there. In general, the 
Safety Risk Assessment:  
— comprises the identification, classification and ranking of safety risks and their 
contributors, 
— is based on deterministic hazard analysis by combining the consequence severity and the 
likelihood of occurrence of the consequence, 
— is used to facilitate effective and efficient safety risk reduction and control,  
— supports project risk management,  
— assesses compliance with probabilistic safety targets (if applicable). 
7.4.3 Human Dependability Analysis 
Given the human intervention in the system operation, the Human Dependability Analysis will 
support the safety analysis to take into consideration the human intervention during the operation 
and maintenance activities both preventive and corrective, as performed, in the operational phase. 
Whenever safety analyses identify operator errors as a cause of catastrophic or critical hazards, 
this dedicated analysis will be carried out. 
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The human error analysis will be used to support the safety analysis for the identification of 
human operator error modes and their effects and for the definition of adequate countermeasures 
to prevent or control human operator errors. 
7.5 Traceability to standards 
The ECSS standards on dependability [10], [13], and safety [11] were used as the main guidelines 
to elaborate this procedure However, this adaptation has been done on a case by case basis, 
hence not following the general structure of the aforementioned references unlike the previous 
ones on which there are clear references that were used and an explicit tailoring of existing 
standards. 
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8 Procedure for Software developments 
This last chapter includes a dedicated procedure for SW developments inside a Large Scientific 
Installation. Although it is not formally a Product Assurance discipline enumerated in 4.1 
8.1 Objectives of SW development procedure 
8.1.1 Context 
Software is present in every aspect of a Large Scientific Installation. Starting from the simulations 
carried out at the very early stages of its conception (the “proof of concept” or “feasibility 
studies”), up to the complex modules for HW control, data acquisition, data archiving, data 
analysis, Monte-Carlo simulations, etc. SW development is one of the most important elements to 
be considered on a LSI. 
Every scientist or engineer can be a SW developer at any time, but the way they encompass this 
task is crucial for the final product obtained. The effort needed to accomplish the development of 
SW products is very often under-estimated. The reason is straightforward: the SW programming 
allows designing and implementing complex systems rather more easily than any HW 
development. The outputs produced are so complex that the validation of all the potential states 
of the execution flow of the programs is basically impossible, reason why the proper adoption of 
a-priori design and validation strategies become key aspects for the successful accomplishment of 
the tasks assigned. 
The scenario sketched above –SW programs so complex that it is impossible to properly verify 
their correct performance plus the difficulty to adapt them to the changing requirements of the 
users– is what was assessed in the first NATO Software Engineering Conference in 1968 and gave 
birth to the term Software Crisis. This conference was the starting point for the SW engineering, 
which from then on involved specialists in the definition of procedures, norms and rules to 
success in the development of complex SW. 
At the time of writing this procedure, the work in SW engineering is basically done. It is clearly 
out of the scope of this chapter to address this problem from scratch. However, there are some 
typical scenarios in the SW developments for Large Scientific Installations worth to be analysed, 
and is for these specific contexts to which current procedure applies. 
8.1.2 The “three-P’s” problem of ad-hoc simulation SW 
There is no doubt that the final assessment on the capabilities of a design is often based on the 
results of the simulation of its components and the system as a whole. In many cases, simulation 
by means of dedicated SW provides the most reliable reproduction of an element without the 
need to implement complex HW replicas, when the commercial SW cannot commit with the 
requirements of the simulations. 
The SW elements in charge of simulating real systems are usually created as small packages with 
limited capabilities, which grow both in size and complexity as the requirements on more realistic 
performances become more and more demanding. 
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It is usual that the SW produced under these circumstances lay on a “metastable” existence 
during its lifetime, produced by the so-called three-P’s problem: 
—  Poor SW requirements definition 
—  Poor SW documentation 
—  Poor SW validation 
When this occurs the SW becomes not usable and “dies”, even though this SW had been 
carefully implemented by talented programmers. 
This scenario is very likely to occur at Universities and Research Institutions where the staff has 
very good knowledge on the target system under test and good skills in the programming language 
used for the simulation SW, but poor or inexistent experience on the production of qualified 
SW. 
The programs produced become self-contained, i.e. the comments inside the source code are 
used to specify the functionalities of its modules, interfaces, even the operational user manual, to 
mitigate the lack of documentation. This is the reason why the usage of the SW is almost limited 
to the developers, which become the only ones able to operate it. 
Although the scenario depicted in previous section seems a recipe for disaster, the continuous 
review of the SW by the programmers to implement/refine its capabilities leads to the 
aforementioned “metastable” phase which provides usability by the development team with good 
performances. 
On the other hand, the effort to endow a SW with appropriate design documentation / 
operational manuals and validation evidences (test procedures, cases and results) is so high that it 
is neither feasible nor appropriate for small projects. 
Needless to say that there is a wide greyscale in the ratio efficiency of the SW / applicable QA 
standards. Obviously the SW for the control system of an aircraft shall meet more demanding 
rules for its verification than that used to simulate a single diode in a laboratory. 
In a Large Scientific Installation, mainly on those managed by an ad-hoc consortium created for 
that purpose, the delay in the provision of appropriate project plans also affects the SW 
developments. The typical unbalanced ratio between scientific and engineering background 
experience at the early stages of these projects usually leads to the occurrence of the “three P’s 
problem” and is likely to be propagated to the development of real SW elements of the LSI as 
the project goes on. 
8.1.3 Final considerations on the SW procedure 
This procedure is aimed at providing a dedicated set of rules for SW developments in a Large 
Scientific Installation, without the need to adhere to any of the existing standards. Since the 
procedure proposed is a tailoring of ECSS rules [14], [15] (which was done respecting the ECSS 
tailoring requirements in [2]); and the peculiarities of a LSI has been the main driver for its 
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preparation, it could be directly applied and even serve as a dedicated SW Product Assurance 
Plan. 
8.2 Procedure for SW developments 
8.2.1 STEP 1: Rules for SW development 
8.2.1.1 Naming convention for SW development rules 
The rules have been assigned a code which allows to uniquely identifying one another. Therefore, 
each SW development rule has: 
— a SW Rule ID, the aforementioned code. 
— a SW Rule Title, which summarizes the contents of rule. 
— a SW Rule Description, with the contents of the rule itself. 
The naming convention for the SW Rule ID is defined hereafter: 
[SW-PA-<Type of Applicability> <Identifier>.<Version>] 
Where: 
— <Type of Applicability> stands for the criticality of the rule and the situations where it 
applies, with the different categories: 
 M – Mandatory rules which shall be applied in all cases. 
 R – Recommended rules. 
 O – Optional rules. 
— <Identifier> stands for a sequential number to be assigned to each rule which allows to 
uniquely identifying them. It is recommended to use multiples of 10 to allow the 
introduction of future rules between existing ones during reviews of the standards. 
— <Version> is a number indicating the number of revisions made to the contents of rule 
with respect to the first version labelled as “0”. 
Example 
The seventieth recommended SW rule defined, in a future revision 3 would be labelled as: [SW-PA-R 70.3] 
The first version of mandatory SW rule number 10 is labelled as: [SW-PA-M 10.0] 
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8.2.1.2 SW development rules  
[SW-PA-M 10.0] Team organization  
The Developer
9
 shall set up a structure for software development with the roles clearly defined 
with tasks and responsibilities. 
[SW-PA-M 20.0] SW PA designation 
The Developer shall designate the responsible for software product assurance for the project (SW 
PA manager/engineer). 
 [SW-PA-R 10.0] SW PA manager functions 
The software product assurance manager/engineer shall 
— report to the project manager (through the project product assurance manager, if any); 
— have organisational authority and independence to propose and maintain a software 
product assurance programme in accordance with the project software product assurance 
requirements; 
— have unimpeded access to higher management as necessary to fulfil his/her duties. 
[SW-PA-R 20.0] SW PA plan definition 
— The Developer shall prepare a software product assurance plan in response to the 
software product assurance requirements. 
— The software product assurance plan shall be either a standalone document or a section 
of the Developer overall product assurance plan. 
[SW-PA-R 30.0] SW Problems reporting 
The Developer shall set up a method for the logging, analysis and correction of all software 
problems encountered during software development. 
                                                     
 
 
9
 Refer to Developer definition in chapter 10 
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[SW-PA-R 40.0] SW Problems report contents 
The software problem report shall contain the following information: 
— identification of the software item; 
— description of the problem; 
— recommended solution; 
— final disposition; 
— modifications implemented (e.g. documents, code, and tools); 
— tests re‐executed. 
[SW-PA-R 50.0] SW life cycle definition 
— The software development life cycle shall be defined or referenced in the software 
product assurance plan. 
— The following characteristics of the software life cycle shall be defined: 
 phases; 
 input and output of each phase; 
 status of completion of phase output; 
 milestones. 
[SW-PA-R 60.0] Project plans documentation 
The following activities shall be covered either in software‐specific plans or in project general 
plans: 
— development; 
— specification and design documents to be produced; 
— configuration and documentation management; 
— verification, testing and validation activities; 
— maintenance. 
[SW-PA-M 30.0] Configuration Management 
For every SW development a configuration management system shall be set up allowing secure 
backup and versioning 
[SW-PA-M 40.0] Backup & Versioning 
The software configuration management system shall allow any reference version to be re‐
generated from backups. 
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[SW-PA-R 70.0] Criteria for SW verification 
— The outputs of each development activity shall be verified for conformance against pre‐
defined criteria. 
— Only outputs which have been subjected to planned verifications shall be used as inputs 
for subsequent activities. 
[SW-PA-R 80.0] SW metrics requirements 
Based on the criticality of the software, test coverage goals for each testing level shall be agreed 
between the LSI project management or an authorised delegate and the Developer and their 
achievement monitored by metrics: 
— for unit level testing; 
— for integration level testing; 
— for validation against the technical specification and validation against the requirements 
baseline. 
 [SW-PA-O 10.0] Tests coverage 
— Test coverage shall be checked with respect to the stated goals. 
— Feedback from the results of test coverage evaluation shall be continuously provided to 
the software developers 
[SW-PA-R 90.0] SW Problems reporting during validation 
The Developer shall ensure that non-conformances and software problem reports detected 
during testing are properly documented and reported to those concerned. 
[SW-PA-O 20.0] Documentation update on re-qualification 
In case of re‐testing, all test related documentation (test procedures, data and reports) shall be 
updated accordingly. 
NOTE: This activity should be carried out in case a major change in the SW is done thus 
implying  a partial or complete re-qualification 
[SW-PA-M 50.0] SW requirements definition 
The LSI project management or an authorised delegate shall derive system requirements 
allocated to software from an analysis of the specific intended use of the system, and from the 
results of the safety and dependability analysis. 
[SW-PA-M 60.0] Interfaces definition 
The LSI project management or an authorised delegate shall specify the external interfaces of the 
software, including the static and dynamic aspects, for nominal and degraded modes. 
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[SW-PA-R 100.0] SW life cycle requirements - I 
The software Developer shall define and follow a software life cycle including phases, their inputs 
and outputs, and joint reviews. 
[SW-PA-O 30.0] SW life cycle requirements - II 
— The life cycle shall be chosen, assessing the specifics of the project technical approaches 
and the relevant project risks. 
— The software Developer shall define the development strategy, the software engineering 
standards and techniques, the software development and the software testing 
environment. 
— The output of each phase and their status of completion, submitted as input to joint 
reviews, shall be specified in the software life cycle definition, including documents in 
complete or outline versions, and the results of verification of the outputs of the phase. 
[SW-PA-O 40.0] SRR definition 
After completion of the software requirements baseline specification, a system requirements 
review (SRR) shall take place. 
AIM: Reach the approval of the software requirements baseline by all stakeholders. 
[SW-PA-R 110.0] PDR definition - I 
After completion of the software requirement analysis and architectural design, and the 
verification and validation processes implementation, a preliminary design review (PDR) shall 
take place. 
AIM: To review compliance of the technical specification (TS) with the requirements baseline, to 
review the software architecture and interfaces, to review the development, verification and 
validation plans. 
[SW-PA-O 50.0] PDR definition - II 
In case the software requirements are baselined before the start of the architectural design, the 
part of the PDR addressing the software requirements specification and the interfaces 
specification shall be held in a separate joint review anticipating the PDR, in a software 
requirements review (SWRR). 
AIM: e.g. in case of software intensive system or when an early baseline of the requirements is 
required. 
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[SW-PA-R 120.0] CDR definition - I 
After completion of the design of software items, coding and testing, integration and validation 
with respect to the technical specification, a critical design review (CDR) shall take place. 
AIM:  
— To review the design definition file, including software architectural design, detailed 
design, code and user manual; 
— To review the design justification file, including the 
completeness of the software unit testing, integration and 
validation with respect to the technical specification. 
[SW-PA-O 60.0] CDR definition - II 
In case the software detailed design is baselined before the start of the coding, the part of the 
CDR addressing the software detailed design, the interfaces design and the software budget shall 
be held in a separate joint review anticipating the CDR, in a detailed design review (DDR). 
[SW-PA-O 70.0] QR definition 
After completion of the software validation against the requirements baseline, and the verification 
activities, a qualification review (QR) shall take place. 
[SW-PA-R 130.0] AR definition 
After completion of the software delivery and installation, and software acceptance, an acceptance 
review (AR) shall take place. 
AIM: To accept the software product in the intended operational environment. 
[SW-PA-M 70.0] SW requirements documentation 
The Developer shall establish and document software requirements, including the software quality 
requirements, as part of the technical specification. 
[SW-PA-M 80.0] SW architecture definition - I 
The Developer shall transform the requirements for the software item into an architecture that: 
— describes its top–level structure; 
— identifies the software components, ensuring that all the requirements for the software 
item are allocated to its software components and later refined to facilitate detailed 
design; 
— describes the software behaviour. 
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[SW-PA-R 140.0] SW architecture definition - II 
The Developer shall transform the requirements for the software item into an architecture that: 
— covers as a minimum hierarchy, dependency, interfaces and operational usage for the 
software components; 
— documents the process, data and control aspects of the product; 
[SW-PA-O 80.0] SW architecture definition - III 
The Developer shall transform the requirements for the software item into an architecture that: 
— describes the architecture static decomposition into software elements such as packages, 
classes or units; 
— describes the dynamic architecture, which involves the identification of active objects such 
as threads, tasks and processes; 
[SW-PA-R 150.0] Detailed Design documentation 
— The Developer shall develop a detailed design for each component of the software and 
document it. 
— Each software component shall be refined into lower levels containing software units that 
can be coded, compiled, and tested. 
— It shall be ensured that all the software requirements are allocated from the software 
components to software units. 
[SW-PA-M 90.0] User manual 
The Developer shall develop and document the software user manual. 
[SW-PA-R 160.0] Unitary Testing - I 
— The Developer shall develop and document the test procedures and data for testing each 
software unit. 
— The Developer shall test each software unit ensuring that it satisfies its requirements and 
document the test results. 
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[SW-PA-O 90.0] Unitary Testing - II 
The unit test shall exercise: 
— code using boundaries at n‐1, n, n+1 including looping instructions, while, for and tests 
that use comparisons; 
— all the messages and error cases defined in the design document; 
— the access of all global variables as specified in the design document; 
— out of range values for input data, including values that can cause erroneous results in 
mathematical functions; 
— the software at the limits of its requirements (stress testing). 
[SW-PA-R 170.0] Integration Testing 
The Developer shall integrate the software units and software components, and test them, as the 
aggregates are developed, in accordance with the integration plan, ensuring that each aggregate 
satisfies the requirements of the software item and that the software item is integrated at the 
conclusion of the integration activity. 
[SW-PA-M 100.0] SW design validation definition 
— The Developer shall develop and document, for each requirement of the software item in 
Technical Specifications, a set of tests, test cases (inputs, outputs, test criteria) and test 
procedures including: 
 testing with stress, boundary, and singular inputs; 
 testing the software product for its ability to isolate and reduce the effect of errors; 
NOTE For example: This reduction is done by graceful 
degradation upon failure, request for operator assistance upon stress, boundary 
and singular conditions. 
 testing that the software product can perform successfully in a representative 
operational environment; 
 external interface testing including boundaries, protocols and timing test; 
 testing Human-Machine Interface (HMI) applications. 
— Validation shall be performed by test. 
— If it can be justified that validation by test cannot be performed, validation shall be 
performed by either analysis, inspection or review of design. 
[SW-PA-M 110.0] Traceability of design in User manual 
— The Developer shall update the software user manual in accordance with the results of 
the validation activities with respect to the technical specification. 
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[SW-PA-M 120.0] SW requirements validation definition 
— The Developer shall develop and document, for each requirement of the software item in 
the Requirements Baseline, a set of tests, test cases (inputs, outputs, test criteria) and test 
procedures including: 
 testing against the pre-defined validation data. 
 testing with stress, boundary, and singular inputs; 
 testing the software product for its ability to isolate and reduce the effect of errors; 
NOTE For example: This reduction is done by graceful 
degradation upon failure, request for operator assistance upon stress, boundary 
and singular conditions. 
 testing that the software product can perform successfully in a representative 
operational and non‐intrusive environment. 
 external interface testing including boundaries, protocols and timing test; 
 testing Human-Machine Interface (HMI) applications. 
— Validation shall be performed by test. 
— If it can be justified that validation by test cannot be performed, validation shall be 
performed by either analysis, inspection or review of design. 
[SW-PA-M 130.0] Traceability of requirements in User manual 
The Developer shall update the software user manual in accordance with the results of the 
validation activities with respect to the requirements baseline. 
[SW-PA-R 180.0] Acceptance Testing 
The LSI project management or an authorised delegate shall perform the acceptance testing. 
[SW-PA-R 190.0] Acceptance Testing environment 
The acceptance shall include generation of the executable code from configuration managed 
source code components and its installation on the target environment. 
[SW-PA-R 200.0] Acceptance Testing traceability 
The acceptance tests shall be traced to the requirements baseline. 
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[SW-PA-R 210.0] Maintenance requirements 
— The maintainer shall develop, document, and execute plans and procedures for 
conducting the activities and tasks of the maintenance process. 
— Software maintenance shall be performed using the same procedures, methods, tools and 
standards as used for the development. 
— The maintainer shall implement (or establish the organizational interface with) the 
configuration management process for managing modifications. 
— The maintainer shall establish procedures for receiving, recording and tracking problem 
reports and modification requests, providing feedback to the requester. 
— Whenever problems are encountered, they shall be recorded and entered in accordance 
with the change control established and maintained. 
[SW-PA-R 220.0] Documentation update 
All changes to the software product shall be documented in accordance with the procedures for 
document control and configuration management. 
 
8.2.1.3 SW Rules classification 
The rules in previous section have been organized attending different criteria for a faster 
reference.  
The different criteria applied for SW rules classification are: 
—  Criticality: Whether they are  
 Mandatory 
 Recommended 
 Optional. 
—  Project Phase or Task to which they apply: Whether they apply to 
 Project Management 
 SW Design 
 SW Validation 
 SW Documentation 
 SW Maintenance 
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Classification by Criticality 
SW Rule ID Title 
Mandatory Rules 
[SW-PA-M 10.0] Team organization 
[SW-PA-M 20.0] PQC designation 
[SW-PA-M 30.0] Configuration Management 
[SW-PA-M 40.0] Backup & Versioning 
[SW-PA-M 50.0] SW requirements definition 
[SW-PA-M 60.0] Interfaces definition 
[SW-PA-M 70.0] SW requirements documentation 
[SW-PA-M 80.0] SW architecture definition - I 
[SW-PA-M 90.0] User manual 
[SW-PA-M 100.0] SW design validation definition 
[SW-PA-M 110.0] Traceability of design in User manual 
[SW-PA-M 120.0] SW requirements validation definition 
[SW-PA-M 130.0] Traceability of requirements in User manual 
Recommended Rules 
[SW-PA-R 10.0] SW PA manager functions 
[SW-PA-R 20.0]  SW PA plan definition 
[SW-PA-R 30.0] SW Problems reporting 
[SW-PA-R 40.0] SW Problems report contents 
[SW-PA-R 50.0] SW life cycle definition 
[SW-PA-R 60.0] Project plans documentation 
[SW-PA-R 70.0] Criteria for SW verification  
[SW-PA-R 80.0] SW metrics requirements 
[SW-PA-R 90.0] SW Problems reporting during validation 
[SW-PA-R 100.0] SW life cycle requirements - I 
[SW-PA-R 110.0] PDR definition - I 
[SW-PA-R 120.0] CDR definition - I 
[SW-PA-R 130.0] AR definition 
[SW-PA-R 140.0] SW architecture definition - II 
[SW-PA-R 150.0] Detailed Design documentation 
[SW-PA-R 160.0] Unitary Testing - I 
[SW-PA-R 170.0] Integration Testing 
[SW-PA-R 180.0] Acceptance Testing 
[SW-PA-R 190.0] Acceptance Testing environment 
[SW-PA-R 200.0] Acceptance Testing traceability 
[SW-PA-R 210.0] Maintenance requirements 
[SW-PA-R 220.0] Documentation update 
Optional Rules 
[SW-PA-O 10.0] Tests coverage 
[SW-PA-O 20.0] Documentation update on re-qualification 
[SW-PA-O 30.0] SW life cycle requirements - II 
[SW-PA-O 40.0] SRR definition 
[SW-PA-O 50.0] PDR definition - II 
[SW-PA-O 60.0] CDR definition - II 
[SW-PA-O 70.0] QR definition 
[SW-PA-O 80.0] SW architecture definition - III 
Table 8–1: SW Rules classification by criticality 
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Classification by Project Phase or Task 
SW Rule ID Title 
Rules for SW Project Management 
[SW-PA-M 10.0] Team organization 
[SW-PA-M 20.0] PQC designation 
[SW-PA-M 30.0] Configuration Management 
[SW-PA-M 40.0] Backup & Versioning 
[SW-PA-R 10.0] SW PA manager functions 
[SW-PA-R 50.0] SW life cycle definition 
[SW-PA-R 80.0] SW metrics requirements 
[SW-PA-R 100.0] SW life cycle requirements - I 
[SW-PA-O 30.0] SW life cycle requirements - II 
[SW-PA-O 40.0] SRR definition 
[SW-PA-R 110.0] PDR definition - I 
[SW-PA-O 50.0] PDR definition - II 
[SW-PA-R 120.0] CDR definition - I 
[SW-PA-O 60.0] CDR definition - II 
[SW-PA-O 70.0] QR definition 
[SW-PA-R 130.0] AR definition 
Rules for SW Design Phase 
[SW-PA-M 50.0] SW requirements definition 
[SW-PA-M 60.0] Interfaces definition 
[SW-PA-M 80.0] SW architecture definition – I 
[SW-PA-R 140.0] SW architecture definition - II 
[SW-PA-O 80.0] SW architecture definition - III 
Rules for SW Validation Phase 
[SW-PA-M 100.0] SW design validation definition 
[SW-PA-M 120.0] SW requirements validation definition 
[SW-PA-R 70.0] Criteria for SW verification  
[SW-PA-O 10.0] Tests coverage 
[SW-PA-R 160.0] Unitary Testing - I 
[SW-PA-O 90.0] Unitary Testing - II 
[SW-PA-R 170.0] Integration Testing 
[SW-PA-R 180.0] Acceptance Testing 
[SW-PA-R 190.0] Acceptance Testing environment 
[SW-PA-R 200.0] Acceptance Testing traceability 
Rules for SW Maintenance Phase 
[SW-PA-R 210.0] Maintenance requirements 
Rules for SW Documentation 
[SW-PA-M 70.0] SW requirements documentation 
[SW-PA-M 90.0] User manual 
[SW-PA-M 110.0] Traceability of design in User manual 
[SW-PA-M 130.0] Traceability of requirements in User manual 
[SW-PA-R 20.0]  SW PA plan definition 
[SW-PA-R 30.0] SW Problems reporting 
[SW-PA-R 40.0] SW Problems report contents 
[SW-PA-R 60.0] Project plans documentation 
[SW-PA-R 90.0] SW Problems reporting during validation 
[SW-PA-R 150.0] Detailed Design documentation 
[SW-PA-R 220.0] Documentation update 
[SW-PA-O 20.0] Documentation update on re-qualification 
Table 8–2: SW Rules classification by Project Phase or Task 
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8.2.2 STEP 2: Define the SW criticality levels 
The rules in 8.2.1 were defined with three criticality levels: 
— Mandatory 
— Recommended 
— Optional 
The applicability of each criticality level shall be decided as a whole for the entire group of rules 
concerned, i.e., if the Recommended rules are considered applicable for a given development, 
then ALL the Recommended rules apply, and not on a case by case basis for each rule of this 
group. Only for those criticality levels which are considered not applicable for a given SW module 
can include exceptions to this policy, and single rules of the N/A category could be considered 
applicable. 
Therefore, this implies that there will be three different types of SW in a LSI: 
— Critical SW: The SW elements inside this category shall met all the SW rules defined: 
 Mandatory rules 
 Recommended rules 
 Optional rules 
—  Relevant SW: The SW elements ranked with this category shall be compliant to: 
 Mandatory rules 
 Recommended rules 
NOTE: The applicability of the Optional rules can be decided on a case by case basis. 
— Routine SW: The SW elements ranked with this category shall only stick to: 
 Mandatory rules 
The applicability of Recommended and Optional rules as a whole or in a case by case 
basis is left at the Developer’s choice. 
Examples 
- Critical SW examples: Control SW for HW elements, Data acquisition SW,  Data archiving and 
restoration from archive SW, etc. 
- Relevant SW examples: Data analysis SW, Scheduling SW, Simulation SW of the main modules on 
which the LSI design relies, etc. 
- Simulation SW for secondary elements, Prototypes of algorithms, etc.  
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8.2.3 STEP 3: Define the SW life cycle 
The definition of a SW life cycle, covered by [SW-PA-R 50.0], [SW-PA-R 100.0] and [SW-PA-O 
30.0] is a mandatory task for Critical and Relevant SW, not so for Routine SW, although even for 
this last case is a highly recommended practise. 
The selection of the applicable life cycle is left at the Developer’s choice. However a typical V-
model is presented as a reference. 
8.2.3.1 V-model description 
The V-model is one of the most extended life cycles for SW development and can also be used 
for HW development. This model is an evolution of the waterfall model for SW development on 
which the design and verification phases are split into different levels of abstraction, which are 
connected one another.  
It is very suitable for a LSI as it covers many of the SW rules defined. The V-model consists in 
the definition of several phases during the development of the project attending the level of 
abstraction of the phase itself. In this model the development is continuous and does not allow 
overlapping of phases unlike other life cycles, i.e., a new phase does not start until the previous 
one is finished. Figure 8–1 presents a schematic description of the model: 
 
Figure 8–1: V-model life cycle schematic description 
  
The different phases in the V-model can be grouped into three categories: 
— Project Definition, which contains the following phases: 
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 Concept of operations 
 Requirements Definition & Architecture Design 
 Detailed Design 
— Implementation, which comprises the activities: 
 Codification 
 Unitary Testing 
— Project Test & Integration, which includes: 
 Integration Testing 
 System Testing 
 Maintenance 
8.2.3.1.1 Project Definition 
 
Concept of Operations 
This initial phase consists in the collection of the high level requirements of the system based on 
the needs expressed by the final user. The external interfaces which will be used as inputs or 
outputs of the system shall also be defined at this level. 
Those high level requirements or User Requirements and interfaces identified in this phase shall 
be derived to the User Requirements Document and Interfaces Control Document, respectively. 
Requirements Definition & Architecture Design 
Once the high level requirements of the system are well known, this phase is in charge of defining 
a set of SW Requirements and a modular description of the system which shall meet them. This 
description shall contain the functional blocks or logical units, each of which implements some of 
the functionalities identified in the previous phase, whereas the SW requirements are the detailed 
set of fulfilments derived from the higher level User requirements.  
The expected outputs of this phase are the Architecture Design and SW Requirements 
Documents. 
Detailed Design 
This phase is aimed at establishing the complete description of the modules which comprise each 
functional block in the architecture design. All SW requirements defined previously shall be 
traced to any of these modules to ensure that all the functionalities requested are correctly 
managed by our system. 
As an output to this phase, the Detailed Design document shall be produced. Moreover, this 
phase completes the Project Definition branch of the V-model. So, the Verification Cases and 
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Procedures Document shall also be generated to ensure that the design proposed once 
implemented includes all the functionalities stated in the SW Requirements Document. 
8.2.3.1.2 Implementation 
 
Codification 
This phase consist in the elaboration of the compilation units which implements the modules 
defined in the Detailed Design. 
The expected output once this phase is completed is the preliminary source code ready to be 
tested. 
Unitary Testing 
Each compilation unit created shall be tested to ensure its correct performance within the system. 
To achieve this goal, a dedicated testing shall be done and each of the tests defined are named 
“Unitary Tests”. This is the lower level of the verification and validation process. 
The source code tested at unitary level shall be ready once this phase ends. 
8.2.3.1.3 Project Test & Integration  
The “ascending branch” of the V-model goes, level by level, checking that the outputs of the 
equivalent phase of the “descending branch” (Project Definition) is correctly implemented. 
Integration Testing 
This phase correspond to the same level of abstraction as the Detailed Design during the Project 
Definition. During this phase, the interconnection among the different modules comprising the 
functional blocks to ensure a proper operation is verified. 
System Testing 
The last step in the V-model corresponds to the validation of the system as a whole. All the 
requirements defined are checked to be correctly implemented. 
The integration and/or the system tests are defined in the Validation Cases and Procedures, which 
establishes the different pass/fail criteria which shall be granted to considered a test passed, the 
environment description under which each test shall be run, etc. 
The results of the Integration & System Testing campaigns shall be logged in the Verification and 
Validation Results Document once both phases are completed. 
Maintenance 
To ensure a proper operation of the system once validated after the system testing campaign, an 
active maintenance phase shall follow. This may allow the identification of these anomalies not 
covered by the system tests, as well as ensure its correction. 
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This phase can be extended during the operational lifetime of the SW produced. The 
management of the Non-Conformities and the re-qualification of the SW when needed shall be 
managed during this period. 
8.2.3.1.4 Documentation Deliverables 
Figure 8–2 presents a detailed overview of the V-model, as well as the expected documents to be 
produced as outputs once each phase is completed as per the SW rules defined. 
 
 
 
Figure 8–2: V-model life cycle including the expected documentation deliverables 
A description of the documents referred above as outputs to each phase is provided below: 
— URD - User Requirements Document: Summarizes the fulfilments of the system without 
regard to the technical details needed to implement them.  
— ICD – Interfaces Control Document: Details the format of the inputs to & outputs from 
the system. 
— SRD – SW Requirements Document: Traced to the user requirements, contains the 
specifications of the system taking into account the technical details needed to implement 
it. 
— ADD – Architecture Design Document: It is a high level description of the system 
composed by functional blocks interconnected, so that each one is in charge of covering a 
part of the SW requirements. 
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— DDD – Detailed Design Document: Contains a complete description of each functional 
block defined in ADD, detailing their inputs/outputs, and the way to implement them. 
— VCP – Verification Cases and Procedures: It is a collection of test cases to check the 
correct implementation of all the SW requirements of the system. Each test must have an 
overall description, a set of PASS/FAIL criteria, a procedure to be followed to execute it 
and the needed inputs and expected outputs. 
— SVR – SW Verification Results: This document comprises the information about the 
testing campaigns to qualify the SW at three different levels: Unitary Testing (UT’s), 
Integration Testing (IT’s) and System Testing (ST’s). 
— SOUM – SW Operations and User Manual: This document contains a description of the 
system, version history, its functionalities and use cases for the most common operations. 
— Maintenance reports: These documents shall be produced periodically highlighting the 
activities carried out in the period covered: Non Conformances detected, status of the 
known problems, version history and proposed schedule for the production of new 
releases. 
8.3 Traceability to standards 
The procedure presented is the result of a tailoring of the two main ECSS standards for SW, 
ECSS-E-ST-40C [14] and ECSS-Q-ST-80C [15]. The following table provides the traceability 
between the SW rules defined and its equivalent in the aforementioned standards. 
SW Rule ECSS standard ECSS 
section 
Amendment 
[SW-PA-M 10.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.1.1 [general comment] Supplier is replaced by developer  
[general comment] Customer is replaced by LSI project 
management or an authorised delegate 
[SW-PA-M 20.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.1.4.1 The role in the general Product Assurance Management 
procedure is the Product Assurance Delegate (see 4.2.2) 
[SW-PA-R 10.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.1.4.2   
[SW-PA-R 20.0]  ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.2.1.1 The SW Product Assurance Plan expected as output to this 
rule can be either the overall Product Assurance Plan or a 
dedicated one. 
[SW-PA-R 30.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.2.5.1   
[SW-PA-R 40.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 5.2.5.2 A template of the document for SW problem 
reporting/logging shall be defined. 
[SW-PA-R 50.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.1.1 The definition of a SW life cycle is mandatory, however, the 
characteristics of this cycle as specified in second bullet is 
optional and can be agreed between the development team 
and the PA Delegate. 
[SW-PA-R 60.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.2.1.1   
[SW-PA-M 30.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.2.4.1 This rule shall be understood as follows: For every SW 
development a configuration management system shall be 
set up allowing secure backup and versioning 
[SW-PA-M 40.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.2.4.2   
[SW-PA-R 70.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.2.6.2   
[SW-PA-R 80.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.3.5.2 It shall be understood that the roles of supplier & customer 
refers to development team & PQC manager respectively. 
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SW Rule ECSS standard ECSS 
section 
Amendment 
[SW-PA-O 10.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.3.5.5   
[SW-PA-R 90.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.3.5.6   
[SW-PA-O 20.0] ECSS-Q-ST-80C 6.3.5.16 Added note to refine the scope of the applicability 
[SW-PA-M 50.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.2.2.1   
[SW-PA-M 60.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.2.4.3   
[SW-PA-R 100.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.2.1 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraphs b, c and 
d are optional 
[SW-PA-O 30.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.2.1 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraphs b, c and 
d are optional 
[SW-PA-O 40.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.1   
[SW-PA-R 110.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.2 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraph b is 
optional 
[SW-PA-O 50.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.2 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraph b is 
optional 
[SW-PA-R 120.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.3 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraph b is 
optional 
[SW-PA-O 60.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.3 Paragraph a is recommended, whereas paragraph b is 
optional 
[SW-PA-O 70.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.4   
[SW-PA-R 130.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.3.4.5   
[SW-PA-M 70.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.4.2.1 The quality requirements can be references to the Product 
Assurance plan or this traceability matrix 
[SW-PA-M 80.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.4.3.1 Bullets 1, 2 and 7 are mandatory, whereas bullets 3 and 4 are 
recommended. Finally, bullets 5 and 6 are optional 
[SW-PA-R 140.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.4.3.1 Bullets 1, 2 and 7 are mandatory, whereas bullets 3 and 4 are 
recommended. Finally, bullets 5 and 6 are optional 
[SW-PA-O 80.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.4.3.1 Bullets 1, 2 and 7 are mandatory, whereas bullets 3 and 4 are 
recommended. Finally, bullets 5 and 6 are optional 
[SW-PA-R 150.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.5.2.1   
[SW-PA-M 90.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.5.2.8   
[SW-PA-R 160.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.5.3.2 Paragraphs a and b are recommended, whereas paragraph 
c is optional 
[SW-PA-O 90.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.5.3.2 Paragraphs a and b are recommended, whereas paragraph 
c is optional 
[SW-PA-R 170.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.5.4.2   
[SW-PA-M 100.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.6.3.1   
[SW-PA-M 110.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.6.3.3   
[SW-PA-M 120.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.6.4.1   
[SW-PA-M 130.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.6.4.3   
[SW-PA-R 180.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.7.3.2   
[SW-PA-R 190.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.7.3.3   
[SW-PA-R 200.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.7.3.5   
[SW-PA-R 210.0] ECSS-E-ST-40C 5.10.2.1   
Table 8–3: Traceability between SW Rules and ECSS standards 
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9 Conclusions 
Review of the objectives of this work 
The analysis of the different Large Scientific Installations presented in this work has shown how 
the industrial production and the scientific objectives are obliged to take along well in their joint 
effort to provide the new generation of instruments for the scientific research of XXI century. 
This process is more or less consolidated in those LSI’s managed by Agencies, whereas in those 
managed by ad hoc Consortiums there is an increasing awareness of the need to harmonize the 
procedures with the industrial production. However, the definition of procedures and plans from 
scratch is a huge task that demands a significant effort, which in this latter case turns into a 
handicap compared to agencies-managed LSI’s. 
The definition of intermediate procedures and plans –not so demanding as the existing 
standards– and focused in the idiosyncrasy of the LSI’s can help mitigating this handicap. 
The work devoted by UCM_ELEC in the CTA project has been an exceptional laboratory for the 
refinement of the procedures presented. The CTA project management has supported 
UCM_ELEC group and the best token is the provision of an Industrial Research & 
Development – IRD10 project for the development of training material, templates and plans for 
Product Assurance within CTA, in 2012. 
Besides, the co-authorship in the approved versions of the CTA Quality Plan and RAMS Plan, as 
well as the authorship of the Risks Management Plan under revision made UCM_ELEC become 
the reference in Product Assurance issues within CTA. This experience has served as the basis for 
the preparation of present thesis. 
It is worth remarking that the different support actions taken as a result of the requests by CTA 
technical groups, as well as the comments and suggestions by UCM_ELEC to the managerial 
structures has improved the overall awareness on Product Assurance topics within the project, and 
ultimately driven the last corrective actions in the deficiencies identified. 
The procedures proposed have been partially tested in the CTA environment, and the results 
become evident: The initial deficiencies identified are been addressed whereas the organization of 
two workshops in product assurance topics (Reliability Engineering Madrid 2012 and Risk 
Management Heidelberg 2013) has broadened the awareness on this issue by gathering the 
experience from other LSI’s, both from the scientific aspects, as well as from the point of view of 
the industries involved. 
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Future work 
The procedures presented are the starting point for the definition of global Product Assurance 
Standards for scientific research. Should the work presented is applied to new installations apart 
from CTA, new feedback could then improve them and spread their scope.  
For the time being they have been conceived for a LSI with high demanding performance and 
availability requirements as well as technological challenges from the point of view of electronic 
devices, mainly. This is the typical scenario for a LSI devoted to physics. However, no procedures 
have been included yet for the management of chemical and biological installations, on which 
there are aspects not covered by present work. 
There are currently two clear branches for the near future concerning the topics of present thesis: 
— The next challenges in CTA project: Consolidation of a procedure for documentation 
approval, review and acceptance of Risks Management Plan, application of the more 
technical aspects of the procedures (RAMS techniques), and improvement of the 
templates proposed based on the experience from CTA reports on Product Assurance 
topics. 
— The application to other LSIs (hopefully) on other topics different from physics 
(chemists, biology, medicine, etc.) to broaden its scope.  
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10 Definitions 
Accident 
Undesired event occurred during the operation of a system that may lead to: 
— Human death of injury. 
— Loss or damage to the system elements (HW, SW, auxiliary materials, etc.). 
— Loss or damage to public or private property. 
— Detrimental effects on the environment. 
Reference: [1]. 
Dependability 
Dependability is the discipline within Product Assurance that is aimed at ensuring that a system is: 
— Reliable: Reliability is the capability of a system to operate with the expected performance 
margins under controlled conditions. Basically, a reliable system is that which is able to 
work without failures within a given time interval. 
— Available: Availability is the capability of a system to be able to operate when requested to 
do so and maintain this operational state. 
— Maintainable: Maintainability is the capability of a system to return to the operational 
state from a previous non-operational state (due to a failure, for instance) through the 
application of predefined procedures for its restoration. Basically, the idea behind 
maintainability is the capability of a system to be repaired in an efficient way when it fails. 
Developer 
Developer is the organization / institution / team in charge of the development of a SW element. 
Failure 
The interruption of the capability of an element / system to perform a required function form 
which it was designed. 
Reference: [1]. 
Hazard 
Existing or potential condition of an element/system that may result in an accident. 
Product Assurance 
Product Assurance is the discipline within a Project which is intended to define the procedures, 
norms and controls to ensure that the development and the final product / system obtained: 
— grants the predefined objectives,  
— has appropriate the level of quality, and 
— operates in a safe, available and reliable way. 
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References: [1], [5]. 
Product Assurance Disciplines 
The different disciplines covered by Product Assurance are: 
— Quality Assurance 
— Risks Management 
— Dependability 
— Safety 
For a complete description of the elements listed above, please refer to their corresponding 
definitions. 
Product Assurance Manager 
The Product Assurance Manager is the responsible for Product Assurance within a project and 
reports directly to the project manager, having unimpeded access to higher management. 
The tasks which shall be assumed by the Product Assurance Manager are listed below: 
— Ensure that the Product Assurance disciplines are well organized at the beginning of the 
project according to the project’s requirements. 
— Ensure that the inputs used to the Product Assurance disciplines are consistent and 
complete, and available in line with the project schedule. 
— Ensure that the tasks described in the Product Assurance Management procedure for the 
different disciplines are performed in line with the project schedule. 
— Ensure that the outputs produced as a result of the aforementioned tasks are consistent 
and complete, and in line with the project schedule. 
— Ensure the application of the processes defined in the applicable project plans and 
documents. 
— Control the quality of the elements provided by other project teams and/or external 
entities by: 
 Defining the product assurance requirements to be met, and 
 ensuring the implementation of these requirements by such project 
teams / external entities. 
— Ensure that the Product Assurance contributions to verification are defined and provided. 
— Ensure that a qualification programme is defined and maintained, and that the 
qualification results are recorded, evaluated and documented. 
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— Ensure that the results of the implementation of the qualification programme are kept in 
the form of a Qualification Status List for all the relevant components / subsystems. 
— Review and approve the qualification status achieved as a result of the implementation of 
the qualification programme. 
— Approve the final product / system during acceptance / delivery review. 
References: [5]. 
Project 
A Project is a standalone process encompassing several activities aimed at achieving a predefined 
objective, defined by a set of requirements. A project definition includes time, cost and resources 
constraints.  
The term project is used in this document to identify: 
— The process to design and implement a Scientific Installation. 
— A sub-process inside a bigger project with enough entity to be considered as a project 
itself. 
— The routine work of a scientific group which tries to align its internal procedures with the 
ones proposed here.  
References: [1], [3], [4]. 
Project Manager 
The Project Manager is the responsible for the fulfilment of the objectives of a project, namely: 
the planning, execution and closure tasks.  
Quality 
Quality is a concept used to denote the level of confidence of the inherent characteristics of a 
system with respect to a set of predefined requirements.  
It is important to remark that Quality is a relative concept. It is not possible to determine the 
absolute quality of something, as it has to be compared against a set of requirements, often 
denoted as quality requirements. 
References: [1], [3]. 
Quality Assurance 
Quality Assurance is the discipline within Product Assurance that is aimed at checking that quality 
requirements are met.  
References: [1], [3]. 
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Risks 
A Risk is a potential event which can jeopardize the nominal development of a project in case it 
finally occurred. Risks can be categorized by the type of impact they may cause to a project, as: 
— Cost Risks: Events impacting project’s cost: Situations that can either increase the 
estimated cost, or jeopardize the funding needed to cover the remaining activities.  
— Technical Risks: Events impacting the expected project’s performances, such as the 
availability of technology when necessary. The lack of expertise on a given technical 
aspect of the project by the project’s staff is also covered by this type of risks. 
— Schedule Risks: Events impacting the foreseen project’s planning: Delays caused 
internally by, for instance, lack of available personnel when necessary (this type of 
schedule risk deals with the lack of personnel itself not with its expertise on a given 
technical subject as the previous case did); or externally by third parties (resellers not 
providing materials in time, etc.). 
— Other Risks: Events which cannot be associated to any of the three previous categories 
but may have an impact in the project’s development: Political or territorial constraints, 
managerial issues, etc. 
It is very important to clarify the scope of the previous definition, i.e., what is a risk and what is 
not. There are many potential events that may affect a system itself rather than its development, 
which can be wrongly identified as Risks. The Risks definition above only deals with negative 
scenarios affecting project’s development, not the final product/system. Whilst Risks are covered 
by Risks management, the negative events that may happen to / be caused by that final 
product / system are treated by the Dependability and Safety management, respectively. 
Finally, there is a type of Risk which does not affect negatively the development of a project, but 
has benefits instead. Such potential events are called Opportunities and it is a must to exploit 
them once identified for the sake of the efficiency of the project. 
Risks Management 
Risks Management is the discipline within Product Assurance that is aimed at identifying Risks 
within a project and to rank them according to two criteria: 
— The severity of their consequences in case they occur. 
— Their probability of occurrence. 
Aimed at the systematic and iterative optimization of the project resources and performed 
according to the established project risk management policy. 
References: [1], [8]. 
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Safety 
Safety is the discipline within Product Assurance that tries to ensure that a system can operate with 
an acceptable level of risk with respect to the occurrence of accidents. 
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